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ABSTRACT 
 
 In the years following WWII, the West German peace movement emerged from 
its dormancy, developed into a popular movement, rose to challenge the policy of the 
government, and changed the character of West German society. The development of 
peace activism in postwar West Germany was a process that required the efforts of 
people willing to push the boundaries of the normal spheres of political life. The training 
ground for many of these peace activists was the West German conscientious objection 
(CO) movement. By studying their learning process as they rediscovered pacifist 
traditions as well as the organizations and the transnational networks they cultivated, we 
can learn a great deal about the foundations of the protest movements of the late 1960s. 
 This dissertation examines the origins and activities of the early West German 
CO protest groups and problematizes the role of these groups in the early West German 
peace movement. The groups were an integral part of the broader German peace 
movement and frequently participated in peace demonstrations both nationally and 
internationally. The organizational development of the CO groups in the 1950s and early 
1960s laid the groundwork for the emergence of larger and more popular protest 
movements that played major roles in the turbulent late 1960s. 
 The individual actors who were the catalysts of change and growth for the 
conscientious objection movement and the peace movement as a whole are an essential 
element of my dissertation. The contacts they made, the relationships they developed, 
the philosophical teachings they (re-)discovered, and the protest culture they cultivated 
 iii 
 
 
are fundamental to understanding how the peace movement left its mark on West 
German society. Often dismissed as a ‘single issue’ campaign, I argue that although CO 
groups primarily focused on conscientious objection, they also promoted a complex set 
of issues regarding political legitimacy, the role of the postwar state, and challenged the 
right of an older generation over the use of their bodies. My work challenges the 
traditional understanding of the conscientious objection movement in West Germany 
and elucidates the early development of extra-parliamentary opposition. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
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CDU Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich 
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Bayern) 
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DP German Party (Deutsche Partei) 
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EKD West Germany’s Protestant Church (Evangelische Kirche in 
Deutschland) 
FDP Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) 
FRG Federal Republic of Germany 
GdW Group of Military Service Objectors (Gruppe der 
Wehrdienstverweigerer) 
HIS Hamburg Institute for Social Research (Hamburger Institut für 
Sozialforschung) 
IdK German Branch of the War Resisters’ International 
(Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner) 
IfZM Institute for Contemporary History in Munich (Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte München) 
IISG International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam 
(Internationaal Instituut voor sociale Geschiedenis) 
KdA Fight Atomic Death (Kampf dem Atomtod) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
ND Nuclear Disarmament 
SCPC Swarthmore College Peace Collection 
SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands) 
SJD Socialist Youth of Germany (Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands) 
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SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands) 
UN United Nations 
VK Association of Military Service Objectors (Verband der 
Kriegsdienstverweigerer) 
WRI War Resisters’ International 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
From the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23, 1949, the 
West Germans were faced with the difficult task of building a new democratic society; 
one that ensured the basic rights of its people and promoted participation in the new 
parliamentary system. Burdened by the legacy and remnants of National Socialism, 
Germans had to find within themselves the building blocks for a civil society to 
transform into a “civilized” nation. This multilevel process required political, economic, 
and social reform to reverse the barbarization of society that occurred during the Third 
Reich. This dissertation, ultimately, studies this recivilizing process in West Germany by 
examining the early protest movements and positioning them in history of how Germany 
became a “civilized” society after the Second World War. 
Konrad Jarausch in his 2006 book After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 
wrote, “The idea of a sphere of societas civilis outside of one’s own house but still below 
the purview of the state was understood…above all as a demarcation from nature and 
barbarism.”1 An important feature of civil society, as described by Jürgen Kocka, is 
social self-organization of free citizens for the pursuit of collective interests in the public 
sphere.2 Jarausch provided a useful definition of the concept of civil society that includes 
1 Konrad Hugo Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 12. 
2 Jürgen Kocka, Civil Society and Dictatorship in Modern German History (Hanover, NH: 
University Press of New England, 2010). 
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nonviolent sociability, a relationship between states that is not marked by militarism, 
religious tolerance, civic courage, a sense of responsibility for the community, and 
perhaps most importantly, “…civil society entails civic involvement in both local 
self-government and national rights of democratic participation.”3 Jarausch presents the 
concept of civilized society as an alternative to the Sonderweg thesis and the idea of 
westernization in measuring the development of states.4 
The civil society concept allows for a more cultural approach to the development 
of German society after the Second World War. Jarausch contends that such an approach 
can bring together high politics and the grassroots experience. This dissertation focuses 
on the point where the spheres of politics and society intersect. By studying the 
conscientious objection movement and a number of key activists during the latter half of 
the 1950s and early 1960s this dissertation illustrates how West Germans navigated the 
undefined extra-parliamentary space and learned to participate in the new democracy. 
Through their actions, which were driven by strongly held convictions and sense of 
morality, these individuals helped create a place in their society that allowed for the 
peaceful but resolute expression of political opinion.  
The earliest mass protest movements in the Federal Republic of Germany were 
those against West German rearmament and military conscription in the 1950s. Fifteen 
                                                 
3 Jarausch, After Hitler, 12. 
4 However, the importance of the decidedly westward development of postwar Germany should not be 
dismissed as Heinrich August Winkler argued in his work on the history of modern Germany. Heinrich 
August Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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years later the next generation erupted in protest over a wide range of issues as part of 
the larger 1968 protests. These two separate periods of protest, characterized by the 
belief that citizens are obligated to speak out against the policies of their government, 
shared the common themes of being anti-military and anti-conscription. By 1968 
opposition to the military and compulsory military service were common elements in 
any protest movement and more immediate concerns such as nuclear weapons, 
American involvement in Vietnam, and the reform of the universities and society as a 
whole became the primary focus. The protest movements of the late 1960s are not often 
associated with the rearmament and conscription protests of the 1950s and historians 
have approached them as completely separate events. However, there was a clear 
connection between the two forged by the resistance to military conscription that began 
in the mid-1950s and continued through the 1960s. My dissertation investigates the 
conscientious objection movement as a bridge between the people who protested in the 
1950s, the activist cohort that emerged in the early 1960s, and the student movements of 
the late 1960s. Furthermore, it will challenge the traditional understanding of the 
conscientious objection movement in West Germany. This dissertation will be a starting 
point for future study on the issue of conscription and society in the Federal Republic. It 
will also help to uncover the beginnings of extra-parliamentary protest in West Germany 
by exploring the continuities between the postwar generation of protesters and the 
1968-generation and investigating the organizational legacy of some of the first protest 
groups in the Federal Republic. 
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This study focuses on a ten-year period from 1956 to 1966, which corresponds 
with the establishment of conscription in 1956 and the forming of the grand coalition 
between the Social Democrats and the CDU in 1966. This period of German history is 
marked with many significant events that influenced West German society and the 
development of democratic protest. The creation of the Bundeswehr in 1955 and the 
concurrent acceptance of the Federal Republic into NATO cemented the bond between 
West Germany and the Western powers that had been forming for the past decade.5 Up 
to this point, the peace movement in Germany was just beginning to rebuild and many 
Germans were still focused on rebuilding their lives after the destruction of the Second 
World War. The return of the last German prisoners of war from the Soviet Union in 
1955 and 1956 brought a measure of closure while simultaneously further entrenching 
West Germany into the Western alliance.6  
The two major movements at the center of this dissertation are the conscientious 
objection movement and the antinuclear movement. I describe both as peace movements 
and part of the larger West German and European peace movement that emerged after 
the Second World War. A useful definition of peace movements is that they are 
“…social movements that aim to protest against the perceived dangers of political 
                                                 
5 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 233. 
6 Frank Beiss, “Survivors of Totalitarianism: Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of Masculine 
Citizenship in West Germany, 1945-1955,” in Hannah Schissler (ed.) The Miracle Years: A Cultural 
History of West Germany, 1949-1968 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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decision-making about armaments.”7 Sociologist Charles Tilly defines a social 
movement as a series of continuous performances, displays, and campaigns by which 
ordinary people make collective claims on others. Social movements, according to Tilly, 
are a major vehicle for ordinary people’s participation in public politics.8 Similarly, 
sociologist Sidney Tarrow describes social movements as “collective challenges [to 
elites, authorities, other groups or cultural codes] by people with common purposes and 
solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities.”9 I argue that 
the conscientious objection organizations in West Germany, the German Branch of the 
War Resisters’ International (Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner, IdK) and the 
Association of Military Service Objectors (Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer, VK) 
along with the individual activists involved in the organizations, represented a collective 
challenge to authorities by people with common purpose, namely disarmament, in 
sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities, specifically the West 
German government and the political elite. Through their involvement in the 
conscientious objection movement, West Germans participated in the recivilizing of 
their society. Holger Nehring noted, “[J]oining the campaign was very often also an 
                                                 
7 Benjamin Ziemann, “A Quantum of Solace? European Peace Movements during the Cold War and their 
Elective Affinities,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 49 (2009): 351-389, 388. 
8 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004). 
9 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge 
[England]: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4-5. 
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exercise in actively expressing their democratic credentials and civility by actively 
producing structures of a self-consciously civilian society.”10 
A key component to my study is the connection between the “’45ers” and the 
“’68ers.” The 45ers were the generation that had lived through the War and had 
experienced National Socialism first hand. They participated in the creation of the 
Federal Republic and the emergence of democracy in West Germany.11 The 68ers were 
the generation that grew up in a period of economic boom and political stability. As in 
other countries, they criticized the government and rebelled against society that they 
believed was too strict, too old fashioned, and most importantly, in the case of West 
Germany, too close to its Nazi past. The conflict between the generations is a defining 
aspect of the protest movements of the 1960s, however little is made of the connections 
between them. I propose that the anti-conscription and conscientious objection 
organizations that began in the 1950s and continued through the 1960s are some of the 
connections. Many of the people involved in the founding of the IdK and VK 
participated in the rearmament protests in the mid- to late-1950s when the Adenauer 
government created the Bundeswehr and subsequently instituted conscription.  
                                                 
10 Holger Nehring, Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold 
War, 1945-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 73. 
11 A. D. Moses, “The Forty-Fivers: A Generation Between Fascism and Democracy,” German 
Politics and Society, no. 50 (1999): 94-126; Konrad Jarausch, “1945 and the Continuities of 
German History: Reflections on Memory, Historiography, and Politics,” in Geoffrey J. Giles, ed., 
Stunde Null: The End and the Beginning Fifty Years Ago (Washington, D.C., 1997), 9-24. 
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 German historiography has tended to see the conscientious objection (CO) 
movement as one that focused solely on conscientious objection. In categorizing the CO 
movement as a single-issue campaign, historians miss the real character of the 
organizations. I argue that although these groups primarily focused on conscientious 
objection, they also promoted a complex set of issues regarding political legitimacy, the 
role of the postwar state, and challenged the right of an older generation over the use of 
their bodies. The CO movement helped establish the postwar German peace movement 
and propelled it into the 1960s. A major contribution that the CO movement made to the 
development of the peace movement in West Germany was the initiation of the 
antinuclear movement in the l950s. 
My work supports the argument that the antinuclear campaign known as the 
Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner (Easter March of Atomic Weapons Opponents) was 
the first sustained campaign of protest and thus the first extra-parliamentary opposition 
movement.12 This is a widely accepted view as the Easter March was one of the largest 
and most active protest movements of the early 1960s and played a very important role 
in the development of the extra-parliamentary opposition (außerparlamentarische 
opposition, APO). However, most historians neglect the fact that the West German 
conscientious objection movement was instrumental in the forming of the Easter 
Marches as it served as a training ground for the key individuals who initiated the 
antinuclear campaign. In fact, I argue that it was through the international connections 
                                                 
12 Nick Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy 
(Oxford: Berg, 2003), 40. 
8 
 
and organizational development of the IdK and VK, along with the knowledge gained 
from several years of active protest, that the Easter Marches were able to emerge and 
grow into one of the most powerful protest movements in Germany. By focusing on the 
IdK and VK in the late 1950s and early 1960s my dissertation will provide an essential 
component to the pre-history of 1968 that will help explain how a powerful protest 
movement like the Easter Marches came into existence.  
 Research for this dissertation included material from archives in Germany and 
the United States as well as interviews with key members of the West German peace 
movement, published primary sources, and news media. The archives at the Hamburg 
Institute for Social Research (Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, HIS) provided a 
great deal of information on the West German conscientious objection movement and 
antinuclear movement. The HIS hold the collections of important conscientious 
objection activists such as Theodor Michaltschef, founder of the post war IdK, and 
Konrad Tempel, founding member of the VK, founding member of the Action Group for 
Nonviolence (Aktionskreis für Gewaltlosigkeit, AG), and the initiator of the West 
German antinuclear movement the Easter March of Atomic Weapons Opponents. These 
collections extend beyond the personal papers of Michaltschef and Tempel to include 
much of the literature, internal communications, external publications, and news 
clippings relating to the IdK, VK, AG, and Easter Marches. The Active Archive (Archiv 
Aktiv) in Hamburg is a small private archive that maintains a large collection of material 
donated by peace activists from throughout Germany. The holdings include a great deal 
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of published material such as protest event flyers, monthly newsletters, and 
informational pamphlets.  
 The Institute for Contemporary History in Munich (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 
München, IfZM) has an extensive collection of material relating to the VK as well as the 
papers of Horst Maurer who was the International Secretary for the organization. Maurer 
was also the editor of several of the group’s periodical publications including the 
monthly newsletters “Zivil” and “Kontakte für Kriegsdienstverweigerer”. The State 
Archive of Hamburg (Staatsarchiv Hamburg) is the repository for the papers of 
Karl-Heinz Stahnke, who was the head of the VK’s documentation office. The office 
collected a variety of printed material about conscientious objection and peace protest 
from around the world and these documents are part of the collection at the State 
Archive of Hamburg. The Swarthmore College Peace Collection (SCPC) in Swarthmore, 
PA holds the papers of the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA) as well as a 
number of collections concerning conscientious objection in the United States and 
Europe. The CNVA organized an international peace walk that crossed the United States 
and Europe on its way to Moscow in 1961. The CNVA worked closely with West 
German peace activists and this interaction was a very fruitful experience for all 
involved. 
 The War Resisters’ International (WRI), an international conscientious objection 
organization based in Britain, played an important role in the development of the West 
German conscientious objection movement and the organization’s papers are held at the 
10 
 
International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam (Internationaal Instituut voor 
sociale Geschiedenis, IISG). The WRI collection at the IISG contains the papers for 
every aspect of the organization including meeting minutes, secretary’s reports, 
conference reports, publications, as well as correspondence between the WRI and its 
affiliated groups. An especially significant aspect of the collection is the correspondence 
between the WRI leadership and individual members from around the world. 
 An important and original source are the oral history interviews I conducted with 
a number of key activists in Germany. The interviews with Helga Tempel (née Stolle) 
and Konrad Tempel, as well as Dr. Andreas Buro and Werner Böwing, allow the voices 
of these actors to be part of this incredible story.13 Helga Tempel and Konrad Tempel 
were peace activists from Hamburg who were the initiators of one of the biggest 
anti-nuclear protest movements of the 1960s, the Easter March. They both survived the 
war as children and it was this experience that drove them to peace activism. Their first 
involvement in peace work was in the IdK and as they developed as peace activists, they 
founded the Action Group for Nonviolence, which provided the platform for the 
initiation of the Easter Marches. Dr. Andreas Buro joined the IdK in the late 1950s and 
took part in organizing the Easter Marches and the CNVA peace walk to Moscow. Buro 
was an influential figure in the intellectual development of the Easter Marches and 
stayed involved with the movement into the later 1960s. Werner Böwing was a founding 
member of the VK and participated in the organization of the early Easter Marches. He 
                                                 
13 Helga Stolle married Konrad Tempel in 1962. 
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became the Chairman of the VK in the mid-1960s and eventually left the organization at 
the end of the 1960s when the student movements took over the movement. These 
interviews provide a wealth of first hand information about the development of the 
conscientious objection movement and the interpersonal relationships that influenced the 
trajectory of the organizations. The interviews offer unique perspectives that cannot be 
found in written sources and allow me to provide the personal experiences of several key 
individuals. 
The scholarship on the late 1960s protest movements in Germany is vast. 
Historians have given a great amount of attention to the events, people involved, and the 
significance of this period in German history. In German, the research is extensive with 
much of the new scholarship focusing on the international aspects of 1968 as well as the 
social impact of the movement in Germany.14 Until recently, however, far less attention 
has been paid to the forerunners of the late 1960s protest movements; the peace 
movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s. There has also not yet been a thorough 
study of conscription and conscientious objection in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In most cases, the topic only receives a cursory overview with little to no analysis of its 
complexities and significance. Furthermore, it is common to have contemporaries of the 
protest movements participate in academic debates in peace historiography. While their 
                                                 
14Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, 1968: vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998); Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried, and Karl Christian Lammers, 
Dynamische Zeiten: die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften (Hamburger Beiträge zur 
Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 37. Hamburg: Christians, 2000); Christina von Hodenberg and Detlef 
Siegfried, Wo "1968" liegt: Reform und Revolte in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Norbert Frei, 1968: Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest (München: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008). 
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first hand experiences can be very useful, historians much approach them with the 
caution required of any historical source. 
 Perhaps the most complete study of conscientious objection in West Germany is 
Guido Grünewald’s Die Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner (IdK): ihre Geschichte 
1945 bis 1968.15 While a useful history of the IdK, its utility is limited because it is more 
a narrative written by a current member of the IdK than an objective analysis of a 
German protest movement. It does not explore the connections the group had with other 
protest movements or analyze its role in the emergence of the APO. Furthermore, the 
work does not really engage larger historiographical issues such as the legacy of the 
protest movements in Germany or the deep generational divides that are so central to 
understanding them. 
German historian Hans Karl Rupp did a very thorough examination of the 1950s 
protests in his 1970 work Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer.16 
Rupp’s work is foundational to any study of the anti-military and antinuclear protests of 
the 1950s. He retroactively applies the term extra-parliamentary opposition to the SPD 
antinuclear campaign Fight Atomic Death (Kampf dem Atomtod, KdA) that peaked in 
                                                 
15Guido Grünewald, Die Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner (IdK): ihre Geschichte 1945 bis 1968 
(Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1982). 
16 Hans Karl Rupp, Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampfe gegen die 
Atombewaffnung in den fünfziger Jahren; eine Studie zur innenpolitischen Entwicklung der BRD (Köln: 
Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1970). 
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1958. Rupp uses the term extra-parliamentary opposition to mean any organized 
opposition to an established parliamentary position.17 
German activist and sociologist Karl A. Otto saw the rise of extra-parliamentary 
opposition first hand and wrote about it in his foundational 1977 work Vom Ostermarsch 
zur APO: Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 
1960-1970.18 Otto uses the term APO to describe a more restricted collection of groups 
that opposed established party politics in the late 1960s. His book Vom Ostermarsch zur 
APO details the creation of the Easter Marches and the transition from protest to 
extra-parliamentary opposition. I use APO to describe protest groups or individuals who 
opposed established parliamentary positions after the SPD shifted to a more mainstream 
position on defense and nuclear policy. At that point, many protest organizations were 
left without representation in the Bundestag and were compelled to voice their 
opposition outside of the political sphere in a new space where society and politics 
intersected in an effort to influence government policy. Both Rupp and Otto discuss the 
conscientious objection movement but neither really draws the connections with the 
development of APO or the creation of transnational protest networks. 
In English most of the research focuses on the transatlantic and transnational 
aspects of 1968 and conscientious objection is hardly mentioned.19 In fact, there are only 
                                                 
17 Rupp, Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer, 21. 
18 Karl A. Otto, Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der 
Bundesrepublik 1960-1970 (Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verlag, 1977). 
19 Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in 
the Global Sixties (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010); Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, 
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a few histories of the West German protest movements in English and these works 
typically marginalize groups like the IdK and VK. One is Nick Thomas’ Protest 
Movements in 1960s West Germany and his work, while quite informative, completely 
ignores conscientious objection.20 Thomas does engage, to some extent, the previously 
mentioned historiographical issues about the legacy of the protest movements, 
particularly the political legacy, and sees the generational and international aspects as 
essential to understanding the protests and their historical legacy. Thomas does not 
investigate the character and influence of the conscientious objection movement and 
consequently his narrative of the origins of the APO (the pre-history of 1968) is 
incomplete.  
Holger Nehring’s recent work, Politics of Security: British and West German 
Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970, is an exception to this trend as 
he draws the links between the British and West German peace movements and clearly 
establishes the connection between the Easter Marches and the West German 
conscientious objection movement.21 I draw on Nehring’s understanding of the 
development of protests movements, especially his explanation of transnational 
networks and their use in creating a transnational community of activists that aid the 
                                                 
and Detlef Junker, 1968, the World Transformed (Publications of the German Historical Institute. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Belinda J. Davis, Changing the World, 
Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 
1960s and 1970s (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global 
Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
20 Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany. 
21 Nehring, Politics of Security. 
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transfer of protest methods and philosophies. The concept of transnational social space is 
a useful way to study the international cooperation, exchange of ideas, formulation of 
protest strategies, and spirit of united purpose of the various “national” activists.22 Many 
West German peace activists developed and maintained a network of likeminded 
activists from around the world. These networks are better understood as transnational 
social spaces. I use the term transnational because they transcend national borders and 
sovereign states themselves are not part of the network. The social spaces are the links 
between activists who are in different places geographically, yet share common interests, 
beliefs, moral values, and expectations and ascribe to commonly held codes of conduct. 
At the same time, these transnational social spaces are uniquely influenced by the 
cultures of the people who create them.23 
Historians have done a good deal of work on the rearmament protests as part of 
the larger rearmament debates during the Adenauer era.24 Most historians recognize that 
                                                 
22Thomas Faist, and Eyüp Özveren, Transnational Social Spaces: Agents, Networks, and Institutions 
(Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2004). 
23 Holger Nehring, “Americanized Protests? The British and West German Protests against Nuclear 
Weapons and the Pacifist Roots of the West German New Left, 1957-1964,” in Jessica Gienow-Hecht 
(ed.), Decentering America (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007, 210-251) 226. 
24 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era 
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the rearmament protests played an important role in the development of democracy in 
West Germany; it was the first time since the rise of National Socialism that the people 
had exercised their right to voice their political opinion in a public setting without fear of 
repression. However, the continuities between the two periods of protest (and resulting 
democratic development) are not as well established. There is little published on this 
topic in German or in English and my dissertation will build on the work of other 
historians and take another direction in the study of continuities in German history by 
examining the emergence of the APO through the lens of two protest organizations that 
spanned the gap between the 45er and 68er generations.  
The secondary material on the rearmament process in West Germany is 
substantial. While the interest shown in the Bundeswehr and its creation has increased 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union and German reunification, it is still thoroughly 
overshadowed by the continuing attention enjoyed by its predecessor, the Wehrmacht. 
This, however, is a trend that will likely continue for the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, works on the Bundeswehr continue to be published and contribute to a 
growing scholarship that remains influential. There are a number of significant books, in 
both English and German, that have influenced the field. Most notable among these is 
the multi-volume set produced by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (the 
Historical Research Office of the German Ministry of Defense) titled Anfänge 
westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956. This collection, authored by a group of 
accomplished German historians, provides an all-encompassing look at West German 
rearmament that is a standard in the field. For a more manageable work, David Clay 
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Large’s Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era is 
excellent. Large attempts to bring together the key issues of German rearmament in an 
easily accessible work that is both broad and complete. However, Large misses the 
cultural and social effects of rearmament as he focuses primarily on the high politics and 
parliamentary process.25 
To assess the extent that protest movements influenced the politicians in Bonn it 
is essential to know what was discussed on the floor of the German parliament, the 
Bundestag. This is made possible by reading the Bundestag minutes in the 
Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (Minutes of the German Parliament). Some 
useful resources for a study like this are the public opinion polls that were conducted at 
the time. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann founded the Institut für 
Demoskopie Allensbach in 1947 and it is regarded as one of the best polling 
organizations in Germany.26 Allensbach has been under contract by the government of 
the Federal Republic since 1950 to carry out monthly public opinion polls and was the 
first to measure the former level of public support for the Nazi regime after the war. As 
well as providing the government with detailed public opinion data, Allensbach 
published their findings in a number of venues including news articles, pamphlets, and 
                                                 
25Federal Republic of Germany, Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956 vol, 1-4, (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1982-1993); Large, Germans to the Front Front. 
26 Allensbach is the name of the town where the Institute is based in southwestern Germany. 
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books. This study utilized the data collected by Allensbach to help determine the West 
German public opinion of military policies and nuclear weapons policies.  
Chapter II details the beginnings of protest in the Federal Republic. The first 
major protests were against rearmament in the early 1950s. The rearmament debate, 
according to Large, “did much to define the political culture of the Federal Republic in 
the crucial formative years of its history.”27 As the Federal Republic moved toward full 
sovereignty and participation in NATO it became increasingly clear that not only would 
a significant West German force need to be assembled, the Federal Republic would have 
to turn to conscription to fill the ranks of the new military. The rearmament and 
conscription debates went beyond the halls of the Bundestag and many West Germans 
took to the streets in protest. This chapter will discuss the politics of rearmament in the 
Federal Republic, the reaction of West German society, and the response of 
conscientious objection groups and the West German peace movement as a whole. 
 The protests against rearmament were unorganized and sporadic. Some simply 
stated they would not involve themselves in whatever the government decided. The 
Ohne Mich! movement, if it can be called such, characterized this sentiment and was 
primarily made up of young men who claimed the government could rearm Germany but 
it would have to do so without them. They wore buttons with the slogan Ohne Mich! 
(Without me!) and went about their daily lives in an expression of their lack of interest 
in political action. Unsurprisingly their opinions went largely unnoticed. Perhaps the 
                                                 
27 Large, Germans to the Front, 6. 
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most organized and best-known protest occurred in Frankfurt at the famous Paulskirche 
where thousands of people, supported by the Social Democratic Party, demonstrated 
against the signing of the Paris Accords in 1955. The Adenauer government, in a move 
that the government would later use repeatedly against extra-parliamentary opposition 
movements, insinuated that the protests were communist influenced intending to destroy 
the credibility of the protesters in the public consciousness.28  
The West German conscientious objection organizations rallied in opposition to 
the government’s military policies but were not successful in building a significant 
resistance effort. After the Federal Republic established compulsory military service in 
1956, the conscientious objection organizations focused on providing support for 
conscientious objectors. The debates over rearmament and conscription forced the peace 
movement out of its latency and into action. Crippled by the loss of German pacifists 
during the Nazi regime, the conscientious objection groups worked to raise support from 
other parts of society, particularly from the West German youth. 
After rearmament and the establishment of conscription, the conscientious 
objection movement struggled to find its identity. Chapter III explores this period of 
reorganization and reform within the movement. Many of the issues facing the 
conscientious objection groups such as communism, growing generational divides, 
                                                 
28 Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary 
Opposition and the Democratic Agenda (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 9. 
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understanding the democratic process, and Cold War angst, were some of the same 
issues that faced West German Society as a whole.  
The IdK, as the German branch of the War Resisters’ International, was the 
organization most traditional pacifists belonged to, many of whom were older and had 
been involved in peace work since before the Second World War, and it reflected their 
generational values, particularly in how the IdK approached protest. The IdK often took 
an analytical approach to issues and wanted to connect with people intellectually. The 
Gruppe der Wehrdienstverweigerer (Group of Military Service Objectors, GdW), the 
forerunner of the VK, was formed in the mid-1950s by Wehrmacht veterans and young 
men who opposed military service because they were anti-military rather than strictly 
pacifists. As a younger group overall, the GdW was much more confrontational in their 
approach to issues and was interested in engaging people emotionally. The two 
organizations also dealt with the communism issue very differently. The IdK was 
generally unconcerned about a person’s political ideology, as long as they supported the 
WRI’s anti-war message the IdK was comfortable with members who had communist 
sympathies. The GdW was much more concerned with communists and were outspoken 
in their distrust of people with communist sympathies. These issues, along with several 
others, created such a divide between the IdK and GdW that despite their common 
mission they were unable to fuse the two organizations in an effort to be more effective.  
 Chapter IV examines the period from 1958 to 1960 when the conscientious 
objection movement broadened its scope of protest and became involved in nuclear 
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weapons opposition. These years represented a transitional step in which former 
anti-conscription activists learned to both broaden the scope of their activism and to 
develop, in a transnational context, tools that would be important in their future 
direction. Specifically, this period featured the development and implementation of new 
protest tactics such as nonviolent direct action and civil disobedience. Another major 
element that this chapter engages is the creation of a transnational social space that was 
essential to the development of West German and international protest movements. It 
also furthers the argument that the movement helped establish the organizational and 
operational framework for the emergence of extra-parliamentary opposition in West 
Germany.  
The two major events discussed in this chapter are the shift towards antinuclear 
activism and the impact of the SPD’s Godesberg Program. During the late 1950s, 
nuclear weapons and their potential danger became increasingly central to the protest 
efforts of peace activists. The Social Democrats opposed arming the Bundeswehr with 
nuclear weapons or allowing NATO to station nuclear weapons on West German soil. 
Adenauer’s government warned that the Soviet threat necessitated nuclear capabilities 
for defense and the ensuing debate spilled out of the parliament into the public sphere. 
The SPD mobilized the popular campaign Fight Atomic Death in 1958 to pressure the 
government to reconsider its position on nuclear weapons. The SPD sponsored 
movement was very active and popular for several months before fizzling out by the end 
of the year. In 1959, the Social Democrats adopted the Godesberg Program which 
indicated a significant shift in the political course of the Party towards a more 
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mainstream platform in order to challenge the CDU for control of the government.29 
These were wrenching decisions that badly divided the party and led many activists to 
abandon the SPD and seek another kind of leftist political space. Many conscientious 
objection activists participated in the KdA rallies and some even organized their own 
antinuclear protest events as they expanded their protest repertoire. When the KdA failed 
and the SPD adopted the Godesberg Program, a number of activists began to create their 
own antinuclear movement to fill the void. This is the point, I argue, where 
extra-parliamentary opposition began to emerge in West Germany and people who were 
previously affiliated with the SPD found themselves truly in opposition to established 
parliamentary positions. 
Chapter V studies the creation of the Easter Marches Against Atomic Weapons 
and the formulation of extra-parliamentary opposition. This chapter shows how key 
peace activists from the conscientious objection movement initiated the Easter Marches 
and turned them into the first sustained, popular protest movement. As the Easter 
Marches grew and increasingly took the place of the Fight Atomic Death campaign as 
the primary organization for antinuclear action in West Germany it carved out space 
between the spheres of traditional party politics and public life. The SPD’s resistance 
and opposition to the movement served to illustrate the fact that the party no longer 
represented many on the left and extra-parliamentary opposition, in the form of the 
Easter Marches, was the only alternative. The Cold War seemed to be drawing closer to 
                                                 
29 Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960, 260-263. 
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an armed conflict and the absence of political representation in the Bundestag forced 
peace activists to take matters into their own hands.  
Historians often describe the Easter March founders as “a small group of 
religious pacifists,” and describe the Easter March as a continuation of the 1950s’ 
protests against nuclear weapons.30 However, the initiators of the Easter March were 
much more than just religious pacifists, and the Easter March was a product of a much 
broader network of activists and organizations, which dated back to the debates over 
rearmament and conscription in the 1950s. I argue that key activists built the Easter 
Marches on the foundations laid by the conscientious objection movement and mark the 
beginning of extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany. Furthermore, this chapter 
examines how the West German public received the Easter March movement and how 
its leadership navigated the complex and often contradictory Cold War East West 
rhetoric. This chapter will also look at how the Easter Marches developed as a distinctly 
West German protest movement as a result of the experiences of the activists and the 
unique geopolitical position of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
Chapter VI looks at how the conscientious objection activists built and relied on 
a transnational social space that connected them with likeminded activists from around 
the world. The event at the center of this chapter, 1960-1961 San Francisco to Moscow 
                                                 
30Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 
1954-1970 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997), 220; Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of 
Peace: German Peace Movements Since 1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 98.; Otto, 
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Walk for Peace, is the perfect illustration of the implementation of the transnational 
social space. Formed by the American Committee for Nonviolent Action, the peace walk 
was a truly transnational protest that involved peace activists from the U.S. and Europe. 
The West German activists provided essential support to the march and shared their 
accumulated protest knowledge with the American activists. The Germans also had the 
opportunity to see nonviolent direct action tactics such as civil disobedience first hand. 
By examining the cooperation between the organizers of the Committee for Nonviolent 
Action’s 1960-1961 American-European March for Peace, I demonstrate how the West 
German, British, and American activists coordinated and developed non-violent protest 
strategies. While the West German activists learned from and adopted some of the 
protest methods of peace organizations in Great Britain and the United States, they 
created their own culture of protest and with it developed a distinct set of tactics and 
“rules of engagement” for their organizations.31  
The multinational character of the march led to communication problems that 
highlighted the difficulty of navigating the rhetoric of the Cold War. One of the primary 
issues was the lack of a common discourse about nuclear disarmament and peace. The 
communication issues that arose during the development and implementation of the 
                                                 
31 The influence of American forms of protest on the protest movements in the Federal Republic of 
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peace walk were a common feature of international protest actions. Because of the 
multitude of national activists involved and the states being crossed during the peace 
walk it was difficult, if not impossible, to develop a common discourse. Every activist 
brought with them the specific domestic and national concerns that made up their protest 
agenda and political discourse.32 Activists can never really escape the political realities 
of their respective countries. However, these struggles illustrate the protest culture of the 
West German peace movement and offer a window into the unique character and 
immediate concerns of the movement. Ultimately, the march highlights the development 
of the peace movement in West Germany, from the early opposition to rearmament and 
conscription in the mid-1950s to the major national and transnational protests against 
nuclear weapons and war in the 1960s, and illustrates how the movement became a force 
in West German society.  
                                                 
32 Nehring, “National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the 
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CHAPTER II 
REARMAMENT AND CONSCRIPTION DEBATE 
On the evening of January 29, 1955 nearly 1,000 West Germans gathered in the 
famous Paulskirche in Frankfurt to protest West Germany’s decision to rearm for the 
first time since the end of the war. The Paulskirche was the site of many democratic 
protests in German history and the protesters were very aware of the church’s symbolic 
nature.1 They signed a manifesto that stated: “Out of grave concern for the reunification 
of Germany, we are convinced that the hour has come to solemnly call upon the people 
and the government to resolutely oppose the ever stronger tendency toward the 
permanent division of our nation.”2 The reason for their “grave concern” was not only 
the imminent rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, but those present 
believed that without drastic and immediate intervention by the West German people, 
Germany would be permanently divided. The Paulskirche movement is significant 
because it blurred the lines between official party politics and political activism outside 
of the core.  
The peace movement in West Germany, nearly nonexistent in the first few years 
after the Second World War, was resurrected in the 1950s by several salient issues: 
1 The Paulskirche in Frankfurt was where the Frankfurt Assembly met to write the Frankfurt Constitution 
during the failed 1848 revolution. The aim of the Frankfurt Assembly and their constitution was a unified 
Germany based on a parliamentary democracy. It was therefore fitting that the Paulskirche movement, 
which was concerned about the prospects of German reunification, called for opposition to rearmament. 
For more on the Frankfurt Parliament see Brian E. Vick, Defining Germany: The 1848 Frankfurt 
Parliamentarians and National Identity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002).  
2 Manifest der Paulskirchenkundgebung January 29, 1955, reprinted in Christoph Kleßmann, Die doppelte 
Staatsgründung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 484-485. 
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rearmament and conscription, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and nuclear weapons.3 The experience of war was enough to keep the West 
Germans away from militarism for the immediate postwar years although this aversion 
to militarism was not linked to a newfound sense of pacifism; the German people were 
simply exhausted by war. When the Federal Republic rearmed in 1955 and established 
conscription in 1956, the members of the quiescent West German peace movement, 
particularly those in conscientious objection organizations, felt they had no choice but to 
take action.4 The corresponding debates over nuclear weapons on West German soil 
further incited the peace movement and West German activists began to fight to 
influence government policy from the public sphere.  
This chapter will discuss the politics of rearmament in the Federal Republic, the 
reaction of West German society, and the response of conscientious objection groups 
and the West German peace movement as a whole. A major hurdle for the early protests 
was the accusation of communist influence and the complicated rhetoric of peace during 
the early stages of the Cold War. The conservative government easily brought serious 
challenges to the movement’s credibility by suggesting it was connected to communism. 
These challenges handicapped conscientious objection groups and the peace movement 
for some time but became the catalyst for internal change. The failure of the West 
                                                 
3 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 31-33. 
4 H.G. Friedrich, “The Peace Movement in West Germany,” Background Paper, WRI Study Conference 
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German peace movement to have a significant influence on the civil-military policies of 
the Federal Republic during rearmament initiated a period of reform and introspection 
within the peace movement that led to the development of more effective protest 
organizations that created and sustained long-term protest movements.  
Soon after the end of the war the Allied Powers, the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and the Soviet Union, began demilitarizing the country to thoroughly cleanse the 
German people of the “Prussian militarism” that some believed had plagued them for 
centuries. They attempted to demilitarize Germany in such a way that it would “never 
again be able to disturb the peace of the world.”5 The demilitarization process required, 
to some degree, the participation of the German people and many were willing pupils 
eager to distance themselves from war. The horrific personal experiences and collective 
trauma the war inflicted on German society effectively broke the allure of military glory. 
Jarausch considers this rejection of militarism in the immediate postwar period as, 
“[T]he first important result of the collective learning process that transformed Germany 
after 1945.”6  
Along with demilitarization, the Allied Powers began a process known as 
denazification, which was designed to reeducate the German population and remove any 
evidence of the Nazi regime in Germany.7 Denazification initially consisted of 
                                                 
5 Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960, 34. 
6 Jarausch, After Hitler, 45. 
7 For more discussion of denazification see Alexander Perry Biddiscombe, The Denazification of 
Germany: A History 1945-1950 (Stroud: Tempus, 2007) and Constantine FitzGibbon, Denazification 
(London: Joseph, 1969). 
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dissolving Nazi organizations, the dismissal of Nazi from administrative positions, and 
the roundup and internment of the Nazi elite. The Allies then turned to the German 
population, which carried the collective guilt of the Nazi regime, and attempted to 
classify Germans in a five-category system from chief Nazi to exonerated. After filling 
out a lengthy questionnaire, every German age 18 and older went before a review board 
and was subject to judicial proceedings. While many high-level Nazi functionaries were 
tried as war criminals, some committed suicide or went into hiding. The vast majority of 
mid- and low-level Nazis were whitewashed or given amnesty by the Allies in order to 
streamline the denazification process. The process was incomplete, somewhat erratic, 
and at times illogical, a view held by many Germans at the time, but it was successful in 
eliminating high-level Nazis from public life and erasing Nazism as a political force. 
Jaruasch argues that even with all the shortcomings, through denazification, [T]he 
foundation for fundamental change in the political culture was laid.”8  
The occupation of Germany by the four Allied victors quickly turned into the 
frontlines of the Cold War as East and West Germany became the armed camps of the 
two superpowers. In June 1948, the Soviet Union blocked all access to the western 
sectors of Berlin in an attempt to gain complete control of the city.9 The eleven-month 
Soviet blockade of Berlin failed in the end because of the success of a massive campaign 
by the Western powers to airlift supplies into the western zones of the city. While this 
                                                 
8 Jarausch, After Hitler, 54. 
9 This was also retaliation on the part of the Soviets for the West German Currency Reform in June of 
1948, Dennis Bark and David Gress, From Shadow to Substance 1945-1963 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell 
Inc, 1989), 210. 
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was a victory for the Western powers, it also made clear the vulnerability of Central 
Europe to Soviet pressure. It became clear to some that West German soldiers would be 
required to help secure Western Europe from the threat of Soviet aggression.10 As the 
Western Allies were drawing down their militaries the newly formed NATO indicated 
that West Germany would soon need to provide troops for its own protection.11  
 The situation continued to deteriorate when war broke out in Korea in the spring 
of 1950. Soldiers of communist North Korea drove across the 38th parallel into South 
Korea in an invasion that took the American-led United Nations (UN) troops by surprise. 
The UN forces were quickly overwhelmed and pushed south, down the Korean 
peninsula, in a matter of weeks. Many in the West saw this as a thinly veiled attempt by 
the Soviets to expand their sphere of influence into the other parts of the free world and 
some believed that Western Europe would be next. As the United States deployed more 
and more troops to Korea, American military leaders soon realized that without help 
from the Federal Republic the United States would not be able to maintain sufficient 
troop levels in Western Europe. The Allied powers quickly recognized that a West 
German contribution to the defense of Western Europe was essential to counter-balance 
the perceived Soviet threat.12 The Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer 
                                                 
10 Large, Germans to the Front, 36; Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 35; for 
more discussion of the Berlin Airlift see Gerhard Keiderling, "Rosinenbomber" über Berlin: 
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11 Konrad Hugo Jarausch, After Hitler: recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 37-38. 
12 For a discussion about the effect of the Korean War on the West German rearmament debate see 
Christian Griener, “Die alliierten militärstrategischen Planungen zur Verteidigung Westeuropas, 1947-
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(Christian Democratic Union or CDU), realized in this situation a unique opportunity for 
the Federal Republic. Adenauer hoped that in return for a West German contribution to 
the defense of Western Europe he would be able to secure full sovereignty for the 
Federal Republic. With this in mind, Adenauer became a strong proponent of West 
German rearmament.13 However, the West German people were by no means united in 
support for rearmament.  
 In fact, most West Germans bitterly opposed rearmament in any form. The Social 
Democrat (SPD) Carlo Schmidt told a party rally in 1946 that, while other nations “may 
continue to rearm, never again do we want to send our sons into the barracks. If the 
madness of war should break out again somewhere, …then we would rather perish, 
knowing that it was not we who committed the crime.”14 Writing under the pseudonym 
Jens Daniel, Der Spiegel publisher Rudolf Augstein argued that the German people were 
not ready, neither psychologically nor physically, to rearm. He wrote that even if 
Germany were to rearm it would be too little too late to make a real difference if war 
broke out in Central Europe between the Allies and the Soviet Union. Augstein 
concluded, “Hang yourself or not - you’ll regret either.”15 Paul Sethe, another prominent 
                                                                                                                                                
1950,” in Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, vol. I: Von der Kapitulation bis zum Pelven Plan 
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1982). 
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14 Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 35. 
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Sicherheit Westdeutschlands,” in Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 431. 
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journalist in the Federal Republic who was an editor for the FAZ, wrote an article for the 
Frankfurter Hefte titled “The Decision on Life and Death” (Die Entscheidung auf Leben 
und Tod) where he described the paradoxes of West German rearmament. In order to 
rearm, Sethe wrote, the West German population would have to forget the previous five 
years of Allied denazification and demilitarization programs. They would also have to 
reverse the dismantling of the German war industry and soldiers would have to forget 
the implications of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial. Not only would the Federal 
Republic have to forget the recent past, but so would the rest of the world. Sethe wrote, 
“One arms the Germans, although they are still regarded as untrustworthy, in the hope 
that they already fight on the right side and will remain in the fight.”16 
 In the early 1950s a common sentiment among West German youth in response 
to Adenauer’s rearmament agenda was the phrase “Ohne mich!” (Without me!). Their 
opinion was that if the West German government wanted to rearm they would have to 
find someone else to fill the ranks.17 These young men had grown up during the National 
Socialist regime and many had been indoctrinated in the military of the Third Reich; 
they were not interested in participating in a new German military. The Ohne mich! 
movement was characterized by a lack of interest in political participation. The 
supporters wore buttons and occasionally painted signs, often an army boot with the 
                                                 
16The Franfurter Hefte was an important and widely read periodical that focused on cultural and political 
issues in the Federal Republic. “Man bewaffnet die Deutschen, obgleich sie weiterhin als unzuverlässig 
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slogan “Ohne mich!” written on it, but they really only practiced passive resistance. 
They preferred to simply abstain from any involvement in rearmament rather than 
actively work to change policy.18 
 Not long after the First World War in 1921, a group of European pacifists, many 
of who had been involved in war resistance during the Great War, founded an 
international pacifist organization called the War Resisters’ International. The founders 
adopted the following declaration that has remained unchanged: “War is a crime against 
humanity. I am therefore determined not to support any kind of war and to strive for the 
removal of all causes of war.” National branches formed across Western Europe and in 
many other places such as India and South Africa. Based in England the WRI 
coordinated with the various branches and kept them in touch with one another through 
regular newsletters and reports.19 German pacifists formed the Internationale der 
Kriegsdienstgegner (IdK), the German branch of the WRI, when the WRI was founded 
in 1921. During the interwar period, the IdK membership resisted the rise of nationalist 
political organizations but were forced to flee or go underground when the Nazis rose to 
power in 1933.20 
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 The German pacifists who survived the war reformed the IdK in 1947. Letters 
between the German pacifists and the WRI offices in England illustrate the uncertainty 
and turmoil of the immediate postwar period as WRI members struggled to make contact 
with friends in Germany.21 The German pacifists were battered and traumatized by their 
war experiences but their resolve to prevent war and remove all causes of war was 
strengthened. The IdK believed the German people were pacified by the horrors of the 
war and were fairly confident they did not have to worry about German militarism 
resurfacing for a long time. By 1949 as tensions rose between the East and the West the 
IdK realized, much to their shock, that Germans could once again be headed to war. The 
WRI also recognized the rising threat of a global, nuclear war and worked to rally 
national branches around the world in resistance to militarism.22 
During this period, the IdK focused on mobilizing the West German youth 
against rearmament. It was the West German youth, after all, who had the most to lose if 
the country rearmed. In their leaflets and banners the IdK equated rearmament with war 
and emphasized the call for peace. In one demonstration in Nuremburg young people 
affiliated with the IdK marched with signs that declared “Youth Demand Peace!”23 They 
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would not support West German rearmament and they most certainly would not allow 
the government to conscript them to fight. 
 While the West Germans were not ready to talk about the possibility of a new 
German military, the United States had already begun considering West German 
rearmament in 1949, and the discussion heightened among the Allied Powers with the 
establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23, 1949.24 American 
congressmen believed that West Germany should make a contribution to its own 
defense, not just because of military necessity but also to lighten the load on the Western 
Powers.25 The discussion soon reached the West German public where it became 
apparent that many West Germans did not approve. 
 A 1950 poll by the West German opinion polling organization Allensbach asked 
about 2,000 participants, “Would you be in favor of Germany being invited, in 
connexion with the Atlantic Treaty and within the framework of a European Army, to 
build up her armed forces again?” Of the participants fifty-eight percent responded 
against rearmament, thirty-three percent were in favor, and fifteen percent were 
undecided.26 Nevertheless, despite of the sentiments of the population it soon became 
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clear that international pressures would press the Federal Republic to rearm. The real 
question became how and when. 
As West German rearmament became an increasingly real possibility, the 
question was how the Federal Republic would fill the ranks of the new military. The 
Federal Republic decided to create a military comprised of volunteers and draftees, but 
the path that led to that decision was beset with difficulties that came from the full 
spectrum of West German society. The West German public had mixed feelings about 
the draft throughout the course of the debate. Awakened by the specter of rearmament 
and military conscription, West German pacifists became vocal in opposition.27 The 
major political parties also had a voice in the debate, as did trade unions and the clergy. 
This level of involvement was to be expected as the question of conscription was 
inextricably tied to a number of issues that were just as contentious as conscription itself.  
For example, the West German business community and agricultural interests 
were very worried about the economic implications of a 500,000 man army that would 
be made up of young volunteers and conscripts. These concerns were well founded as 
the unemployment numbers indicated that a draft would further tax the already tight 
labor supply. Because of the Wirtschaftswunder or economic miracle experienced by 
West Germany in the early 1950s the number of unemployed in the Federal Republic 
had been steadily declining since 1950 and by September 1955 only 2.7 percent of the 
work pool was unemployed. Of the male work pool only 225,100, or 1.8 percent, were 
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unemployed. Therefore, the proposed number of 500,000 soldiers, of which a large 
majority would be conscripts, caused great alarm among the businesses and industries in 
the Federal Republic.28  
From the outset of the conscription debate the topic of conscientious objection 
was at the forefront. The right of an individual to refuse military service based on 
principle was enshrined in the Grundgesetz, the Basic Law, when West Germany was 
founded in 1949. The fact that the right of conscientious objection was written into the 
constitution caused many proponents of conscription to believe that the men who drafted 
it foresaw the need to institute compulsory military service.29 Conscientious objection 
further complicated an already divisive issue as the rearmament debate began to 
dominate the public and political spheres of West German society. 
Even though many believed that the Federal Republic would have to rearm itself 
in the near future, the idea was not universally accepted. With wounds still fresh from 
the most devastating war in modern history and caught between two superpowers who 
faced each other with nuclear weapons, many thought that West German rearmament 
was nothing short of madness.  
Championing this cause, the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) was the most adamant voice of 
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opposition to the government.30 The Social Democratic Party in Germany is the oldest 
political party in Germany with roots as far back as the 1850s. Traditionally made up of 
the working class as an Arbeiterpartei (workers party), the SPD has sought to speak for 
workers and trade unions from the left of the political spectrum.31 Decidedly anti-war 
after 1945, the Social Democrats went as far as to pass an anti-war resolution in 1947 
stating that war should be banished “from the minds and hearts of men.”32 Central to the 
Social Democrats’ argument against rearmament, and later conscription, was the fear 
that a remilitarized Federal Republic would further divide West Germany from its 
Eastern counterpart, the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik, DDR). The reunification of East and West Germany was at this point still seen 
as a possibility and many saw reunification as the primary issue facing the Federal 
Republic.  
 Those supporting rearmament included a number of center-right political parties 
such as the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands, CDU), the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union in 
Bayern, CSU), the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), and the 
German Party (Deutsche Partei, DP). Early on the CDU and CSU had become sister 
parties and formed a common faction where they have often been referred to as the 
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CDU/CSU faction. The CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP created a coalition government after 
the 1949 and 1953 Federal elections with Konrad Adenauer as Federal Chancellor.  
 Founded in 1945, the CDU brought Catholics and Protestants together in a 
common conservative party. Made up of former Deutsche Zentrumspartei (German 
Center Party, the Catholic political party) members as well as other conservatives, the 
CDU bridged the gap between the two main Christian faiths—Catholic and Lutheran—
to make one of the most powerful political parties in post-war Germany.33 From the 
beginning, Konrad Adenauer was key to the organization of the CDU. Born in the 
Rhineland city of Cologne on January 5, 1876, Adenauer entered politics in the early 
1900s. A devout Roman Catholic, Adenauer had been a member of the Center party and 
was elected mayor of his home city of Cologne in 1917. Adenauer’s time as mayor was 
cut short in 1933 when the Nazis came to power and because he refused to work with the 
party, he spent most of the Nazi regime in hiding.  
 After the war, the Allies noticed Adenauer as one of the few remaining German 
politicians who had not cooperated with the Nazis and tabbed him to serve again as 
mayor of Cologne for a short time. He emerged as a dominant political figure in the 
British Occupation Zone and worked hard to create a space for conservative German 
politics in the wake of National Socialism.34 Adenauer played a central role in the 
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founding of the CDU and led the young party into the first democratic elections in 1949. 
As the leader of the CDU Adenauer was elected the first Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic in the 1949 Federal election, a position he would hold until 1963. As Federal 
Chancellor, Adenauer fought to strengthen West German ties with the western powers 
since he was convinced that the Federal Republic had to turn to the west and become 
more democratic and socially responsible. For a significant portion of his time as Federal 
Chancellor, Adenauer worked to secure full sovereignty for the Federal Republic.35  
 Initially focused on simply building the new republic, the CDU/CSU soon 
strongly favored rearmament based on the belief that the Federal Republic could not gain 
full sovereignty without a military to defend it. There was also a real concern with the 
Soviet threat. The CDU/CSU was alarmed by the seemingly aggressive moves being 
taken by the Soviet Union, most notably the Berlin Blockade, the violent suppression of 
the East German Uprising June 17, 1953, and overall increased Soviet troop levels in 
East Germany. The party wanted to be sure that the Federal Republic would be able to 
defend itself. Concerned that the Allied governments would abandon West Germany if 
the Soviets attacked, the party believed the Federal Republic would be better served with 
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a military of its own.36 West German pacifists saw the government’s stance as 
alarmingly militaristic and a serious threat to any chance of German reconciliation.37  
The IdK, very concerned by the events of the late 1940s and early 1950s and the 
direction the West German government was taking, worked to rally the West German 
population against rearmament politics. The IdK focused on highlighting the threat of 
war if West Germany rearmed. The IdK distributed leaflets claiming that rearmament 
would not help secure the West German state, but bring the Federal Republic closer to 
war. The IdK leaflets called for “Resistance of the whole Nation!” against rearmament 
and warned the government that the German people would not be pushed into a 
Bruderkrieg (literally fratricidal war) with East Germany.38 By bringing up the specter of 
a war with East Germany the IdK underscored a major concern many West Germans had 
about rearmament: if West Germany established an army the division between east and 
west would become more permanent and, even more frightening, when the new West 
German army went to war it would fight East Germans. This was a very real fear in the 
Federal Republic during the 1950s because there were many West Germans who had 
recently fled East Germany or had family in East Germany.  
 One of the first steps towards West German rearmament were taken in October 
of 1950 when Theodor Blank, a loyal Adenauer supporter, was appointed as the first 
                                                 
36 Large, Germans to the Front. 
37 Theodor Michaltscheff, “The Struggle for Peace in the German Federal Republic,” WRI Study 
Conference Offenbach/Main, Germany August, 1964, Horst Maurer Collection, ED 718/17, IfZM. 
38“Widerstand des ganzen Volkes!” Kraushaar, Die Protest-Chronik 1949-1959, 1:743. 
 42 
 
Defense Minister. The Chancellor charged Blank with quietly preparing the way for 
rearmament. His office, known as the Amt Blank (Blank Office), was officially 
responsible for affairs relating to Allied occupation troops. However, as time progressed 
the primary focus became the re-establishment of the military. The Blank Office was 
responsible for many rearmament issues, including the thorny problem of conscription 
(Wehrpflicht).39  
 In 1950, the French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed a plan to create a 
pan-European defense community (EDC) that would include military contributions from 
a number of Western European nations, including West Germany. This proposal, the 
Pleven Plan, was meant to prevent the Federal Republic from joining NATO and, 
consequently, would have allowed the Western Powers to control any West German 
military force. Pleven’s own government in 1952 eventually torpedoed the plan as some 
in the French parliament believed that such an arrangement would threaten France’s 
national sovereignty. Despite its failure, the plan helped pave the way for discussion, 
both internationally and domestically, about West German rearmament.40 
 The Allensbach Institute polled the West German population in March 1950 
about their opinion of conscription. The results indicated that most Germans, just five 
years since the end of World War II, were against the draft. The question posed by 
                                                 
39 “Der härteste Schädel in Bonn,” Der Spiegel, 10 December 1952, 6-13; Christian Greiner, “Die 
Dienstelle Blank,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 17 (1975): 99-124; For an excellent study of the 
Amt Blank see Dieter Krüger, Das Amt Blank: die schwierige Gründung des Bundesministeriums für 
Verteidigung, Einzelschriften zur Militärgeschichte, 38. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1993). 
40 Large, Germans to the Front, 130. 
 43 
 
Allensbach was “Are you, in principle, for or against compulsory military service?” Of 
the participants, fifty-five percent said that they were against conscription and thirty 
percent said that they were for it. The remaining fifteen percent were undecided about 
the matter.41 Nevertheless, the Adenauer government continued to move towards 
rearmament and conscription.  
The first time conscription was publicly discussed was in October 1950 when 
Blank’s predecessor, Count Gerhard Schwerin who was in charge of the unofficial 
Ministry of Defense, told reporters in Bonn that he believed the Federal Republic would 
have to introduce conscription to staff the military adequately. This statement, while 
accurate, was a clear breach of policy and was not well received within the government 
or in the public sphere. This blatant political misstep was one of the reasons for Count 
Schwerin’s quick dismissal and Blank’s appointment.42 Blank made the first official 
statement about conscription in January 1952 when Bonn felt that the time had come to 
introduce the draft. In a discussion with Allied officials, Blank estimated that the 
German contribution to a European army might consist of more than a million drafted 
soldiers. The West German press received this information with some skepticism as 
some were unsure of how the government would be able to call up so many men for 
service. The Social Democrats were quite vocal in their opposition to this proposal as 
they believed that any discussion about rearmament and conscription at that point was 
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premature and out of line. There first had to be laws regarding the rights of soldiers and, 
most importantly, the right to establish a military, before any discussion of conscription 
could occur.43 
To the IdK and likeminded individuals, the right to object to military service for 
reasons of conscience was a central democratic principle, particularly in Germany where 
the legacy of the Nazi regime was so immediate. All the major political parties in the 
Federal Republic supported the draftees’ right to refuse military service to varying 
degrees. The Social Democrats fought hard for a very broad interpretation of the law 
while the CDU/CSU were very specific about exactly who should be able to object and 
for what reasons. Adenauer’s government believed that the law should only apply to 
conscientious objectors who refused to perform military service because they were either 
fundamentally opposed to war in any situation or objected for religious reasons.44 The 
more liberal SPD thought that every individual had the right to refuse based on his 
conscience for a greater number of reasons. For example, some Germans, the SPD 
maintained, might object to military service because of life circumstances: a person in a 
divided Germany might refuse to perform military service when they would be required 
to fight against other Germans, or they might object if they had family still living in the 
Soviet zone. Others might resent the military if they lost family because of the war or 
because of Nazi persecution. Some Germans might object to military service because of 
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the use of nuclear weapons. The Social Democrats felt that the right of conscientious 
objection was applicable to anyone who refused to perform military service for reasons 
of conscience.45  
 The West German population was also in disagreement about the right of 
conscientious objection. When polled by Allensbach in December 1953 West Germans 
were asked, “It will also have to be decided whether it should be permissible to object to 
military service. Do you think those called up should, or should not, be allowed to object 
to military service?” Of the participants, fifty-one percent thought that a person should 
be allowed to object to military service and thirty-one percent thought that a person 
should not be allowed to object. The remaining eighteen percent responded saying that 
they did not know.46 
 Some West Germans became more involved in resisting rearmament and 
conscription through joining a conscientious objection organization. In addition to the 
IdK several anti-military and anti-conscription groups formed in the early 1950s. 
Founded in 1953, the Group of Military Service Objectors (GdW) was originally an 
anti-military and anti-conscription organization that protested against rearmament and 
military conscription in West Germany during the rearmament debates in the early 
1950s. Unlike the IdK, the GdW originally existed solely to resist rearmament and 
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compulsory military service in the Federal Republic of Germany.47 Co-founder Werner 
Böwing explained that they created GdW because of their experiences in World War II, 
“We didn’t want a new German army because we were afraid that the horrors of the war 
would return (if West Germany rearmed).” For that reason, the GdW was absolutely 
against rearmament in East and West Germany from its founding.48 However, they were 
not fundamentally pacifist or Christian as an organization.49 The leadership of the GdW 
stated succinctly, “We are nothing more than an association of people who have made 
their decision… and no longer want to shoot other people.”50 The GdW was a very 
pragmatic organization that focused on helping COs, no matter the reason they had for 
objecting. 
The conscientious objection organizations continued to weigh in on the public 
debate. Along with the standard leaflets and posters protesting rearmament, the GdW 
sponsored a number of informational talks and gatherings. In Chancellor Adenauer’s 
hometown of Cologne the GdW held an anti-military motorcade. The cars in the 
motorcade carried signs with anti-rearmament slogans such as “The joke of the day: 
Peace through Cannons!” and “Barracks drill is no education!” and drove around the city 
for hours.51 The leader of the GdW, Hans Herman Köper, explained why the group 
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chose to use a motorcade to spread their message, “Cars are more impressive than a 
small group of a hundred protesters. The impression is reinforced by the police 
vehicles.”52 The goal was to point out to the West German public, particularly to the 
young men, the contradictions the GdW saw in West German rearmament. The GdW 
activists believed the idea that peace could be ensured in Central Europe by the creation 
of a West German military was preposterous. Furthermore, the GdW disagreed with the 
government in Bonn when Adenauer suggested that military service was a “school of the 
nation.”53  
 Members of the GdW also wrote to their local newspapers against rearmament.54 
One 20 year old young man wrote to a Frankfurt paper about why he was against 
rearmament, 
I will tell you why I do not want to be a soldier. My whole family was at the 
front in the last war, a brother, a brother-in-law, a cousin. What is left? My 
brother-in-law comes home with one arm, my brother with malaria, my 
cousin does not come back. Our family is totally bombed out. Now I ask: 
Why should I go to the front? I cannot defend my family at all. My parents 
are dead, my family is dead. I have no power as a soldier to fight against 
atomic bombs.55  
This 20 year old pointed out a number of the issues young men his age faced in West 
Germany. They remembered the war and still lived with the effect it had on their 
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families. If West Germany rearmed and went to war they could face a nuclear armed 
Soviet Union and many potential conscripts in West Germany wanted no part of it. 
 A decision on the rearmament issue was ultimately in the hands of the West 
German legislature. The 1954 Paris Accords that formally ended the Allied occupation 
of West Germany and conferred sovereignty on the Federal Republic were debated in the 
Bundestag in early 1955. The treaties also meant the acceptance of German membership 
in NATO (along with a military force of 500,000) and the possibility of nuclear 
weapons. To many Germans the ratification of the Paris Accords by the West German 
Bundestag would threaten German reunification. In fact, many believed that the 
confirmation of West German sovereignty and the establishment of a West German 
military would make reunification impossible and doom Europe and the two German 
states to perpetual tension and conflict. 
 The Social Democrats bitterly opposed the Paris Accords and initiated a public 
campaign to protest their ratification in the Bundestag. The SPD leadership, working 
with local party leaders, peace activists, trade unions, and antinuclear supporters, 
organized a large anti-rearmament campaign to raise public opposition to the treaties 
with the intent to demonstrate to the Adenauer government that the West German people 
opposed the direction Bonn was taking the country.56 In their first foray into grassroots 
political action the campaign organizers gave speeches, held rallies, handed out 
pamphlets, and set up information booths to inform the people about the treaties. One 
                                                 
56 Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960, 135. 
 49 
 
SPD leader told West Germans at a rally in Hesse that the fate of Germany depended on 
the ratification or rejection of the Paris Accords.57 
 The highpoint of the campaign was a rally at the Frankfurt Paulskirche on 
January 29, 1955 organized by the SPD, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German 
Trade Union Federation, DGB), and peace activists. Under the banner “Save Unity, 
Peace and Freedom! Against Communism and Nationalism!” the SPD chairman Erich 
Ollenhauer, distinguished academics and church leaders, and trade union leaders gave 
speeches to a crowd of nearly 1,000 that included members of the West German press.58 
At the rally the German Manifesto was drawn up to state the demands of the movement. 
The manifesto highlighted that the policies of the CDU government in Bonn would 
threaten the possibility of German reunification; “Out of grave concern for the 
reunification of Germany, we are convinced that the hour has come to solemnly call 
upon the people and the government to resolutely oppose the ever stronger tendency 
toward the permanent division of our nation.”59  
 The speakers at the Paulskirche rally stressed the ugly prospect of a politically 
divided Germany if the Paris Accords were ratified. The manifesto stated “The answer to 
the fateful German question of the present day—whether our nation can be reunited in 
peace and freedom or whether it must live in the unnatural condition of political division 
and progressive human alienation—depends today primarily on the decision about the 
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Paris Treaties.”60 Furthermore, the manifesto called attention to an even greater, more 
disturbing consequence if the Paris Accords were ratified, German armies facing each 
other across the border between East and West Germany.  
The stationing of German military forces in the Federal Republic and the 
Soviet zone will invariably eradicate the chances for reunification in the 
foreseeable future and reinforce the tension between East and West. Such a 
measure would increase the moral distress of large segments of our people to 
an unbearable degree. A terrible fate would become reality: with weapons in 
hand, siblings from one family would face off against each other in opposing 
armies.61 
 
Since the Social Democrats could not stop the ratification in the Bundestag they 
recognized the need for popular sentiment against the Paris Accords. The SPD leaders 
and Paulskirche organizers implored the German people to speak out against the policy 
of the Adenauer government, hoping that a ground swell of public opposition would 
cause the CDU to reconsider ratifying the Paris Accords. The manifesto pleaded, “At 
this hour, every voice that is capable of speaking out freely must issue an unmistakable 
warning against this development. Immeasurable will be the responsibility of those who 
failed to see the danger of ratifying the Paris Treaties, which will slam the door on 
Four-Power negotiations on the restoration of German unity in freedom.”62  
 After the rally at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, the campaign became known as 
the Paulskirche movement. The Paulskirche movement was one of the largest organized 
protests against West German rearmament and its popular appeal was due in part to the 
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support of the Social Democrats and the cooperation of groups outside of mainstream 
politics. The strength and organizational capabilities of the party allowed the movement 
to spread its message across West Germany. Coupled with the cooperation of the trade 
unions, churches, members of the intelligentsia, and peace activists, the movement 
gained significant popular support. In fact, after many more rallies and speeches the 
Paulskirche movement acquired hundreds of thousands of signatures from all over West 
Germany.63 The protest rallies, demonstrations, and profuse leafleting successfully 
raised awareness to the issue and built strong public opposition against the ratification of 
the Paris Accords.64 Furthermore, the movement prepared the ground for future 
extra-parliamentary protest. For the first time a major political party joined with 
organizations and activists on the periphery of the political sphere in pursuit of a 
common goal. This experience would prove invaluable as the SPD collaborated with the 
same groups and organizations once again in a united effort to take on the Adenauer 
government over the issue of nuclear weapons.65 
 Despite the efforts of the Paulskirche movement, the Bundestag ratified the Paris 
Accords February 27, 1955.66 Adenauer criticized the movement, claiming that it was an 
attempt to transfer the decision-making powers from the Bundestag to the voice of 
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streets and going as far as to suggest that the SPD tactics were similar to those of the 
Communists.67 The SPD angrily responded to the accusations saying that the SPD and 
the Paulskirche movement had nothing to do with the Communists.68 Furthermore, the 
campaign was not a threat to the Parliament’s authority but an expression of each 
citizen’s right to state their opinion on a critical national issue.69 The damage was done, 
however, and even though the Paulskirche movement built a significant amount of 
public opposition it was not enough to influence Adenauer’s policy or the majority of the 
West German population. The response of the Adenauer government would become 
Bonn’s standard answer to extra-parliamentary movements in the 1950s. All the 
government had to do was claim the extra-parliamentary movements were connected to 
the Communists and they would lose any chance of seriously influencing the West 
German public. Historians Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will summed up the 
situation succinctly writing, “Thus, all the various extra-parliamentary campaigns of the 
1950s…were seriously handicapped by the relative ease with which Adenauer was able 
to tar them with the brush of communism.”70 
 On May 5, 1955 the Allied High Commission formally dissolved the Occupation 
Statute and the Federal Republic became a sovereign nation and was admitted to NATO 
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as a full member.71 After a heated debate in the Bundestag, the Bundeswehr was 
established and Federal Defense Minister Blank commissioned its first soldiers on 
November 12, 1955.72 The date coincided with the 200th birthday of the great Prussian 
military reformer of the early nineteenth-century, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, whose ideals 
and traditions the Bundeswehr had chosen to embrace as its own.73 With the 
Bundeswehr established, the debate over conscription became increasingly contentious 
as West Germans realized that sufficient troop levels could not be reached with 
volunteers alone.  
 Elements of West Germany’s Protestant Church, the Evangelische Kirche in 
Deutschland (EKD), strongly opposed rearmament and felt that conscientious objection 
was a moral Christian duty.74 The EKD leadership declared “The world needs love, not 
violence; it needs peace, not war.”75 The EKD Council called war a sin against God’s 
will and therefore conscientious objection was a legitimate Christian position that the 
state must respect and protect.76 However the EKD was deeply divided about the issue 
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and many saw rearmament and participation in NATO as the only way to protect West 
Germany from the Soviet threat and ensure that the Federal Republic stayed free. In the 
end, because of this internal division, the EKD chose not to make any official statements 
on political issues.77 
 Following the establishment of the Bundeswehr in November 1955 the 
conscription debate became one of the primary political issues in West Germany. Now 
part of NATO the Federal Republic, as feared by many West Germans, was obligated to 
make a military contribution to the defense of Western Europe. Their portion consisted 
of twelve divisions totaling around 500,000 men. Having had little success in recruiting 
a sufficient number of volunteers, Federal Defense Minister Blank soon realized that 
conscription would be necessary if the Federal Republic were to meet its obligation to 
NATO. This knowledge only heightened the controversy about conscription as people 
from all aspects of West German society voiced their opinions about the draft in the 
hopes that they would be able to influence the outcome of the debate in parliament. 
Rudolf Augstein in Der Spiegel later criticized the rearmament plan for being 
incompatible with the political atmosphere. Augstein wrote “In such a situation, to insist 
on the 500,000 men, too little to protect us, sufficient to obstruct all political 
possibilities, is Quixotic.”78 While many of the arguments for and against conscription 
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had already been voiced, several new ones were articulated in the months leading to the 
Bundestag debate.79 
Similar concerns over conscientious objection were raised in the Bundestag and 
the general public. The Adenauer government was willing to honor the right of 
conscientious objection to military service but only with strictly defined conditions. 
While the Social Democrats agreed that the right of conscientious objection should be 
upheld, they vehemently disagreed with the conditions put forth by the government. The 
Social Democrats maintained that anyone should have the right to object based on their 
conscience, whatever that may be. They believed that the state had no right to determine 
the validity of anyone’s conscience, once an individual stated his conscience he should 
not have to prove that “he was not a Schweinehund.”80 
The CDU/CSU faction responded that while Parliament should acknowledge the 
rights of the conscientious objectors, it also had to be concerned about national security 
and therefore could not allow conscientious objection for any number of reasons. Each 
citizen also had duties as well as rights and these duties included defending the nation. 
Any state that would allow any of its citizens the right to refuse military service would 
effectively be committing suicide. 81 The CDU coalition did, however, change the 
conditions for conscientious objection to exempt men who had close relatives in the East 
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or who had lost immediate family (parents or siblings) in World War II. This change was 
aligned with public opinion on the issue. When polled by Allensbach a few months 
earlier, participants were asked if young men with family in the Soviet zone should have 
the right to refuse to do military service. Of the participants, fifty-four percent said that 
the young men should have the right to refuse, twenty-two percent said that no 
allowances should be made, and twenty-four percent were undecided.82 
With leaflets and local meetings the West German conscientious objection 
organizations worked to influence potential draftees. The Bund der 
Kriegsdienstverweigerer (BKV) called on young men to object to military service to 
preserve peace. They reminded the potential draftees that only peace ensured success 
and happiness in life; military service was slavery. Furthermore, the BKV called 
attention to the fact that conscientious objection was the right of every West German 
citizen and it was a right that young men should exercise.83 
Once the conscription law was passed portions of the West German population 
reacted predictably. Some young West Germans refused to register for the draft and the 
local draft boards were unsure of what to do. In an article printed in The Nation, 
correspondent John Dornberg described the situation in Germany. Titled “Defying the 
Draft: German Youth Rebels” Dornberg wrote that many draft boards throughout West 
Germany reported that the nineteen year olds who were required to register for the draft 
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were not reporting. In fact, in a number of large cities only a small portion of eligible 
young men reported. For example in Nuremberg less than twenty-five percent registered 
by the deadline, in Munich less than ten percent reported, and in Cologne barely half of 
those eligible showed up to their draft board. Dornberg also reported that a number of 
city officials also refused to participate in draft registration. In the city of Dortmund, 
fifteen city officials who had been assigned to the draft board refused to go to work. 
Dornberg quotes the representative of the group saying, “We’re not going to send our 
own kids to the army. Our conscience would bother us if we had to register those 
boys.”84  
Resistance to the draft among the West German population was illustrated when 
a number of local grassroots conscientious objection organizations sprang up in the 
Federal Republic in the fall of 1956. In addition to the older conscientious objection 
organizations such as the IdK and GdW, these groups often provided information about 
the right to conscientious objection for young men who wished to object to military 
service as well as free legal counsel. Many West Germans who conscientiously objected 
to military service but who were not eligible for the draft joined conscientious objection 
groups. These people would never be called to serve in the Bundeswehr yet they 
organized to protest conscription because they saw it as their responsibility as members 
of a civil society.  
Many conscientious objection activists were war veterans who, because of their 
own experiences, wanted to make sure that the young men of the Federal Republic 
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would never have to experience the horrors of war. Along with war veterans these 
groups counted among their members people from other parts of West German society 
such as university professors, clergy, trade unionists, pacifists, and housewives. Voicing 
the opinion of many, a leader of the GdW Hans Nikel stated,  
I’m a product of your American reeducation program. I was drafted into the 
German Army as a teenager and served until the Hitler regime collapsed. In 
1945 you Americans told us that we should never again have an army. In 
1950 your reeducation officers all packed their bags and went home. Coming 
in behind them were your generals and politicians who told us to get busy on 
rearmament. I’m sticking to the original lesson. It appeals to me, and besides 
I’m getting tired of being reeducated.85 
 
Many West Germans could relate to Hans Nikel’s experiences, they had lived through 
the devastation of World War II and the occupation that followed. They were devoid of 
any militaristic feelings and were unwilling to see German youth forced to serve in a 
new German army. In addition to providing legal counsel, these groups actively lobbied 
for the rights of conscientious objectors in the courts.86 
The law guaranteeing conscientious objection states, “No one may be compelled 
against his conscience to perform military service under arms.”87 Conscientious 
objection was included in the Basic Law primarily to prevent the reemergence of a 
military that conscripted young men who were morally opposed to military service. The 
West German government determined that a young man could object to military service 
for a few specific reasons. Those who were opposed to military service for religious 
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reasons, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses or Quakers, were allowed to do so. The young men 
who objected to military service on personal moral grounds—a pacifist—could also 
make a case for conscientious objection. However, one had to be against all military 
service in principle, not just on a conditional basis. This was because of the 
government’s concern that those who objected to a war with nuclear weapons or a 
fratricidal war with East Germany would make up a large portion of the population and 
therefore significantly reduce the capabilities of the Bundeswehr.88  
Interestingly, with all the activity and publicity concerning the right of 
conscientious objection, a very small percentage of the men called up actually claimed 
the right. In fact, of the 100,000 men mustered for the first draft in April 1957 (those 
inspected by the draft boards but not actually drafted), only 328 (0.3 percent) exercised 
the right of conscientious objection.89 Of those mustered only 10,000 were actually 
called up for service in the first draft. This indicates that while many of the West 
German population were aware of the right to conscientious objection only a small 
portion of young men actually exercised this right. This may have been because the 
government had been able to convince many of the young men that the Bundeswehr was 
actually a very different military from the Wehrmacht of Nazi Germany. One could also 
make the argument that the young men eligible for the draft believed that the rights 
granted to them as soldiers were indeed as progressive and democratic as the 
government had said they were and therefore military service would not be as oppressive 
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as they had once believed. Or perhaps the number of conscientious objectors was small 
because a social stigma existed, possibly involving questions of patriotism or manhood, 
that prevented young men from objecting to military service.90 It is most probable that 
choosing to conscientiously object to military service was not acceptable in the 
conservative society of 1950s West Germany. To most West Germans conscientious 
objection was “abnormal and a bad exception to a good rule.”91 
 This conclusion points to one of the major failures of the West German 
conscientious objection organizations and the peace movement as a whole during this 
period, they were not able to make a major impact on the public conscience during the 
rearmament debate. The young men called up were not convinced that objection was the 
only right choice if they wanted peace. Furthermore, even though the West German 
peace movement worked with the clergy, trade unions, intelligentsia, youth, and even the 
Social Democrats, they had little to no influence on government policy. While the SPD 
put up a stiff fight in the Bundestag against the ratification of the Paris Accords, 
rearmament, and the establishment of conscription, the CDU-led majority easily passed 
each measure. In fact, as a testament of how ineffectual the peace movement was during 
the rearmament and conscription debates, Adenauer and the CDU/CSU won an outright 
majority in the 1957 Federal Elections for the first and only time in the history of the 
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Federal Republic.92 Even though there was significant participation in the various protest 
events and the polling data show a fairly divided public opinion over the issues of 
rearmament and military conscription, when it came time to vote the West German 
people voted overwhelmingly in favor of the CDU/CSU and Adenauer’s Westward 
leaning, pro-military policies.  
 Nevertheless, the West German peace movement did see growth during this 
period. The debates over rearmament and conscription forced the peace movement out of 
its latency and into action. Crippled by the loss of German pacifists during the Nazi 
regime, the conscientious objection groups tried to raise support from other parts of 
society, particularly from the West German youth. The cooperation with the Social 
Democrats, trade unions, churches, and other prominent members of West German 
society during the Paulskirche action gave the movement some momentum and hope. 
Much of this progress was lost when the CDU easily pushed the ratification of the Paris 
Accords through the Bundestag. The next year military conscription was established 
despite the efforts of the various conscientious objection organizations and other 
elements of the peace movement. For the peace movement in West Germany, the 
experience of extra-parliamentary protest during the rearmament and conscription 
debates of the mid-1950s emphasized the need for substantial, coordinated public 
support. Furthermore, the conscientious objection groups, and the West German peace 
movement as a whole, had to find a way to operate outside of the political sphere 
without being so easily painted with the brush of communism by the government. 
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CHAPTER III 
REFORM 
After failing to make a significant impact on the course of the rearmament and 
conscription debates, the IdK and GdW were forced to reassess their position in West 
German society. The period was one of intense growth and organizational change for 
both groups. Through this process, we can see the various generational and ideological 
elements that these groups were comprised of and uncover the issues that divided, and 
united, these early West German activists. The issues facing the IdK and GdW, 
communism, growing generational divides, understanding the democratic process, and 
Cold War angst, were some of the same issues that faced West German society as a 
whole. 
Recognizing that they could not reverse rearmament or conscription, the CO 
groups focused on educating potential conscripts about their legal right to conscientious 
objection and supporting COs during the rigorous review process. They also worked to 
reform their organizations to better represent their goals and the political environment of 
the late 1950s. This chapter focuses on several key events for the West German 
conscientious objection movement such as the Göttingen Declaration, the rise and fall of 
Kampf dem Atomtod, and the attempted merger of the two German conscientious 
objection organizations. It examines how the conscientious objection organizations 
transformed themselves after their failure to block rearmament and conscription with 
particular interest in the growing generational divide that began to define these groups 
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during this period and their struggle with communism. At this time, the conscientious 
objection organizations and the activists in leadership positions reorganized to develop a 
dynamic and multifaceted protest movement that centered on conscientious objection. 
The work of West German peace activists during this period helped create the 
organizational and intellectual space that allowed for the emergence of an 
extra-parliamentary opposition movement in the Federal Republic. 
Many key activists got their start in peace activism during this period. Two 
people in particular were central to the development of the movements; Konrad and 
Helga Tempel. Konrad Tempel, born 1932 in Hamburg experienced the National 
Socialist regime and the war as a child. His biological father was absent for much of his 
childhood and he was quite close to his mother. As a young child in the late 1930s, 
Tempel was deeply affected by the ideology of National Socialism. He distinctly 
remembers standing at attention and giving the Hitler salute while in his home whenever 
the Horst Wessel song came on the radio. He had absorbed so much Nazi ideology that 
as a young child he adopted the violent anti-Semitism that characterized Nazism. Tempel 
recalls encountering an old Jewish woman on the street while walking with his mother in 
Hamburg. As a child under the age of 10, Tempel crossed the street and physically 
attacked the woman. He was not a particularly aggressive or violent boy but he 
committed violence for a system of belief he did not fully understand. After the war, he 
reflected on the power of the fascist ideology; how could a society reach the point where 
children saw violence as a socially acceptable action? Tempel resolved to eschew 
violence and find a way to change his society. These memories stayed with him and, 
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along with his wartime experiences, were part of what prompted him to become 
involved in peace work.1 
After the war, Tempel studied education and became a schoolteacher in the early 
1950s. Drawn to pacifism, he joined the IdK in 1952 and quickly became a very active 
member. Tempel’s staunch pacifism was grounded in his Quaker faith, which he was 
introduced to through international contacts made in the IdK.2 Tempel studied the theory 
and practice of nonviolence and read everything he could get his hands on, including 
books and papers about the life and philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and Henry David 
Thoreau. He worked to make many of these writings accessible in German.3 Tempel’s 
dedication to pacifism and relationships with peace activists in Britain put him in 
position to assume leadership roles in the IdK and later the VK.4 
 Helga Tempel, born 1932 in Hamburg, spent the war years away from Hamburg, 
along with Konrad, as part of the Kinderlandverschickung, which was a relocation 
program for children to protect them from the bombings. Helga was also a schoolteacher 
and had become a Quaker after being introduced to the faith by international IdK 
members.5 Helga joined the IdK in 1954, where she met Konrad, and counseled 
conscientious objectors as they went through the review process. Helga was also very 
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interested in nonviolence, particularly the practice of nonviolent direct action. Along 
with Konrad, Helga built relationships with peace activists in Britain and emerged as a 
leader on the national level for the IdK and later the VK.6  
 When Konrad and Helga joined the IdK in the early 1950s, they joined an 
organization that was led by older pacifists who had been involved in peace work in 
Germany for decades. These older pacifists provided them a great deal of instruction and 
guidance as Konrad and Helga learned about pacifism and peace work. However, the life 
experience and philosophical approach to activism that characterized their generations 
became a point of contention as the younger members matured as peace activists. 
 The Chairman of the IdK, Dr. Theodor Michaltscheff, was born in Bulgaria in 
1899 and had been involved in peace work in Europe since he refused to perform 
military service in 1920. He was imprisoned in Bulgaria for refusing to perform military 
service and in 1924 he immigrated to England where he became involved with the newly 
formed War Resisters’ International. Michaltscheff then moved to Hamburg, Germany 
where he studied philosophy and earned his doctorate in 1937.7 After World War II, he 
reestablished contact with the WRI and took up a leadership role in the German branch 
of the WRI, the IdK.8 Theodor Michaltscheff was dedicated to pacifism and wrote a 
great deal about pacifism and the peace movement in Germany. Konrad Tempel 
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remembered Michaltscheff as a person who was, “Very warm hearted but also narrow 
minded in some respects. He didn’t like discussions. He had his own opinions and they 
were always right.”9 Tempel recalled that Michaltscheff was not very flexible when it 
came to the direction of the IdK or how protest actions should be undertaken. 
Michaltscheff was the only paid person in the IdK leadership in the mid-1950s and ran 
the organization from his home in Hamburg. It was his leadership and personality that 
the IdK developed around during this period.10 Michaltscheff wielded a substantial 
amount of control over the IdK and this influenced the character of the IdK a great deal.  
 Many of the other elder statesmen of the IdK had similar life stories. Dr. Fritz 
Wenzel, past President and Chairman of the IdK, was born in Prussian Breslau in 1910 
and was a doctor of theology and philosophy.11 He was a prominent evangelical pastor 
and after the war was one of the many expellees from the German territories in the East. 
Dr. Wenzel was also an SPD politican in the early 1950s and president of the German 
Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, DFG) for much of the 1950s.12 Dr. 
Wenzel as a very inspiring speaker and IdK members were proud to have a pacifist, one 
of their own, in the Bundestag.13 Rosel Lohse-Link, born 1905 in Baden-Württemberg, 
was a Quaker and the daughter of one of the founders of the IdK. She was a dedicated 
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pacifist and had served in many leadership roles, including as Vice-Chairman of the 
national council, in both the local IdK chapter and the national leadership council.14 
 Heinz Kraschutzki, born 1891 in Prussian Danzig, served in the Imperial Navy 
during World War I with Martin Niemöller and had participated in the November 
Revolution in 1918.15 During the 1920s and early 1930s, Kraschutzki was very active in 
the German peace movement and actively worked against the NSDAP and other 
nationalist political organizations.16 When the Nazis came to power, Kraschutzki 
immigrated to Majorca but was arrested and thrown in prison by Franco’s government 
after the Spanish Civil War. Because of his international pacifist connections, the WRI 
was able to secure his release from prison in 1943 and he spent the rest of the war in 
Gibraltar.17 After World War II Kraschutzki returned to Germany and worked as a social 
worker in the West Berlin prison system. He served in a number of roles in the national 
leadership of the IdK—he also served on the International Committee of the WRI—and 
from his home in West Berlin, he actively worked for an East-West détente.18  
 Heinz Kraschutzki was a very able person who inspired a number of IdK 
members with his passion and commitment to pacifism. At the same time, many did not 
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understand his open mindedness about communism.19 While not a communist himself, 
he believed that a person’s pacifism transcended their political affiliation and was not 
very concerned about IdK members with communist sympathies. Because of his 
experiences during the interwar period, Kraschutzki was not threatened by communism; 
he knew many pacifists in the DDR and believed they held just as strongly to their 
pacifist ideals as he did. Kraschutzki was concerned, however, about the specter of 
communism furthering the divide between East and West Germany and therefore refused 
to allow the IdK to make an issue of it.20 
 Nearly all of the IdK’s senior leadership had founded the postwar IdK in 1947.21 
They were all dedicated pacifists who had extensive experience in peace work in 
Germany and had been involved in other peace organizations as well. When they faced 
the challenge of the IdK-GdW fusion, they were unwilling to allow the IdK to change to 
incorporate the relatively new and somewhat radical GdW. They believed the GdW’s 
strong anti-communist position was not compatible with the spirit of the IdK and would 
damage the character of the organization.22 
 The GdW leadership was primarily made up of younger activists, some had 
served in the Wehrmacht during WWII but most had experienced the war as children 
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and had little memory of the Weimar Republic. For the original GdW leadership the war 
played a defining role when they were in their teens. Hans Nikel, born 1930 in Bielsko 
Poland, was assigned to the signal corps of the Wehrmacht in the last phase of the war at 
the age of 15. He experienced the bombing of Dresden and lost his two brothers in the 
war. After the war, he dedicated himself to pacifism. Nikel became a journalist and 
worked for the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Frankfurter Rundschau. He applied his 
experience in publishing and journalism to his work in the GdW, of which he was a 
co-founder, when he started publishing the organization’s monthly magazine ZIVIL. 
Nikel had a penchant for mockery and in the mid-1950s he also founded the satirical 
magazine PARDON.23 
 Werner Böwing, born 1928 near Leipzig, served in the Wehrmacht during the 
last months of the war until he was captured by the British Army in April 1945. He then 
spent three years in prisoner of war camps, first in Belgium then in Scotland and 
England. Böwing’s time in the UK was instrumental in his political development as he 
learned some English and was introduced to democracy.24 In 1948, the British 
Government sent him back to East Germany and soon after he encountered trouble with 
the East German authorities. Böwing lived and worked in the town of Lychen, north of 
Berlin, and while there, he and some friends formed a little group that spoke out against 
the government. On some nights, they would paint a white F for Freiheit (freedom) on 
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municipal buildings to protest the communist regime. The authorities soon identified 
Böwing as a ringleader of the group responsible for the seditious graffiti and he was 
forced to flee to West Berlin to escape the police.25 After the Federal Republic gave him 
political asylum, Böwing immigrated to West Germany in 1949 as a political refugee.26 
Werner Böwing relocated to the West German capital of Bonn and found work as a 
carpenter. While in Bonn he joined Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands (Socialist Youth 
of Germany, SJD), also known as Die Falken, and met other conscientious objection 
activists at an anti-rearmament protest in Cologne.27 
 The leader and cofounder of the GdW, Hans Hermann Köper, born 1925, was a 
Wehrmacht veteran as well. He served in as a paratrooper in a battalion that held the 
bridgehead at Stettin during the final months of the war. During this engagement, he was 
wounded by shrapnel and captured by the Red Army. After a brief time in Soviet 
captivity, he returned to Cologne in 1946 where he studied music and lived on a medical 
pension.28 His contemporaries described Köper as a left-wing social democrat who was 
an anti-militarist rather than a pacifist.29 Because of his pension, Köper had both the time 
and resources to dedicate a great deal of his efforts to protest activism.30 Köper, like 
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most in the GdW had strong feelings about communism and did not allow communists 
in their organization. The IdK, on the other hand, accepted communists as long as their 
politics did not interfere with their pacifism. 
 The difference in how the two groups approached communism is in part a 
product of the differences in the ideology of the leadership and membership of the two 
groups. Within the conscientious objection movement, there were two kinds of activists: 
pacifists and anti-militarists.31 These two positions were not mutually exclusive but they 
often dictated how a person conceptualized their activism and how they approached 
various issues, such as communism. The pacifists often came to conscientious objection 
from a position that was characterized by a strongly held moral opposition to violence. 
The anti-militarists often came to conscientious objection because they were against the 
idea of a remilitarized Germany and were motivated by current events, such as the 
establishment of conscription, as opposed to believing in nonviolence and pacifism. The 
GdW leadership and most of its membership were anti-militarists and the IdK leadership 
and many of its members were generally pacifists, with some exceptions.32  
 One of the major reasons for the failure of the conscientious objection 
organizations and the West German peace movement as a whole during the rearmament 
and conscription debates was their inability to decisively separate themselves from the 
perception of communist influence. Even at the pinnacle of the peace movement during 
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the Paulskirche action Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer easily dismissed the 
campaign by claiming their message was similar to communist propaganda. No matter 
how frequently and vehemently organizations within the peace movement denied any 
communist influence or involvement, once painted with the brush of communism, their 
legitimacy was continually challenged in the public sphere.33 Much like McCarthyism in 
the United States in the early to mid-1950s once an organization or person was labeled a 
communist, regardless of the truth of the matter, they were suspect and politically 
doomed.  
 The conscientious objection organizations found it difficult to distance 
themselves from communism for a number of reasons. The fact that their primary reason 
for existing was to promote conscientious objection and to support young men who 
refused to participate in the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany was often 
problematic for them. Since the Soviet Union constituted the main threat to West 
Germany it was easy for some West Germans to assume that if a young man was not 
willing to fight to defend their country against a Soviet invasion then he must be a 
communist or at least sympathize with communism. In fact many West Germans 
believed that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands, SED), the governing party of Communist East Germany, had infiltrated 
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many West German peace organizations to influence them to promote a pro-communist 
agenda.34  
 The main reason they struggled to separate themselves from communism was 
that the DDR also had a peace movement; one that highlighted the aggressive nature of 
the West and targeted Western governments, particularly the United States and the 
Federal Republic, as the source of Cold War tension. A major difference was that in the 
DDR, the government sponsored, and controlled, the peace movement and therefore the 
official peace organization, the Peace Council, enjoyed significant financial and 
organizational support.35 The cluttered and conflicting rhetoric about peace in central 
Europe made it difficult to distinguish the motives of various peace groups and, 
inevitably, many West German groups were marked with a communist label. 
 West German peace activists found themselves in a particularly difficult situation 
when it came to their rhetoric. Historian Holger Nehring explained that in the Federal 
Republic, “more than in other countries, ‘peace’ had the reputation of being a term of 
communist propaganda.” This was because the DDR and the Soviet Union had 
characterized Adenauer and his policies as militaristic and had portrayed the Eastern 
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Bloc as the peace camp in their propaganda.36 This meant that every time West German 
peace activists called for peace they had to be very specific with what they meant and to 
try to differentiate their message from the message coming from the East. 
In addition, many West German pacifists were willing to give up any claims to 
the Eastern territories that used to be part of Germany to avoid tension in Central 
Europe. Since those territories were now under communist control, these people were 
often accused of being pro-communist.37 Pacifists also had to deal with accusations that 
they were either naïve about the tenuous position of West Germany on the front lines of 
the Cold War or apathetic about national security. Their pleas for unilateral disarmament 
and peace were often met with skepticism in West Germany, particularly during this 
period when the Soviet Union seemed increasingly aggressive.38 
The development of tactical nuclear weapons and the possibility of their 
deployment by the United States and NATO in Western Europe, specifically West 
Germany, became a flashpoint for the conscientious objection organizations in West 
Germany. Already opposed to war and military service, these groups believed that the 
deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany would exacerbate an already tense 
geopolitical environment in Central Europe. The conscientious objection organizations 
36 Nehring, “Americanized Protests?” 218. 
37 H.G. Friedrich, “The Peace Movement in West Germany,” Background Paper, WRI Study Conference 
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and many in the West German peace movement became vocal in their opposition to 
nuclear war believing it was their social responsibility to prevent nuclear war at all costs. 
 Chancellor Adenauer announced in April 1957 that the Bundeswehr should be 
given American-made tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons, Adenauer claimed, 
were “basically nothing but the further development of artillery” and “practically normal 
weapons” that the Bundeswehr needed to have.39 Furthermore, Adenauer believed that a 
unilateral renunciation of all nuclear weapons would be unwise and would not contribute 
to the growth of peace in Europe.40 Because of their inflammatory nature, Adenauer’s 
statements were ill advised for an election year and immediately ignited controversy.41 
This announcement appalled many West Germans and their reaction was swift. 
 Immediately after Adenauer’s statement, eighteen leading West German nuclear 
scientists, including four Nobel laureates, wrote a declaration against arming the 
Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons and against the policy of nuclear deterrence 
in general. Their prestige and positions in academia gave their message a great deal of 
weight in West German society and because of this the press gave them plenty of 
coverage.42 The “Göttingen 18”, as they became known, felt that the public was being 
misled about the nature of tactical nuclear weapons and wanted to inform the West 
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German public about the potential dangers of the tactical nuclear weapons proposed by 
the Adenauer government and about the danger of using nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent.43 The “Göttingen Manifesto” stated, 
Tactical nuclear weapons have the same destructive effect as normal atomic 
bombs. They are “tactical” only insofar as they are applied not only to 
civilian residences, but also to ground troops. Every single tactical nuclear 
weapon has a similar effect to the first atom bomb which destroyed 
Hiroshima. Since tactical nuclear weapons are available in significant 
numbers their destructive effect is on the whole much larger. They are only 
“small” in comparison to recently developed bombs, principally the 
hydrogen bomb.44 
In addition, the Göttingen 18 explained that the development of nuclear weapons had 
reached the point where no one would be safe should these weapons be used in war. 
There is no natural limit for the development of life-threatening effects of 
strategic nuclear weapons. Today a tactical nuclear weapon can destroy a 
small city, and a hydrogen bomb can render an entire region such as the 
Ruhr Valley uninhabitable. Already today, one can probably wipe out the 
entire population of West Germany with the radioactivity from H-bombs. 
We know of no technical means to protect a large population from this 
threat.45 
The scientists emphasized that they understood the political difficulties facing the 
government but maintained that they could not remain silent on the issue. They aligned 
themselves “with the freedom that the Western world represents against Communism” 
and recognized that “the fear of the H-bomb contributes to the maintenance of peace in 
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the whole world, and freedom in part of the world.”46 However the Göttingen 18 
believed, along with many other Germans, that peace guaranteed by nuclear weapons 
was unsustainable in the long term and should it fail, the results would be deadly. Their 
solution was a peace without nuclear weapons, “a small country such as West Germany 
is best protected, and world peace most assisted when nuclear weapons of any type are 
banned.”47 
 As the West German population absorbed the warning of the Göttingen 18 the 
Adenauer government reacted by claiming the scientists were “meddling in politics.” 
Furthermore, Adenauer accused the 18 scientists and their Göttingen Manifesto of 
needlessly rousing public fears of an atomic war that only aided the Soviet position.48 
The SPD quickly rallied behind the scientists and commended their “act of 
conscience.”49 With widespread support for the Göttingen 18 in the West German press 
and public, the Social Democrats recognized the opportunity to get ahead on their 
federal election campaign and made a push in the Bundestag. In the May 1957 
Bundestag debates the SPD called for a non-proliferation treaty, a test ban, and a nuclear 
weapon-free Central Europe. Deputy Chairman of the SPD faction, Fritz Erler, declared 
during a debate in the Bundestag “…in any conflict with these weapons there is no victor 
and vanquished, there is only the vanquished.” He pointed out that West German 
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participation the nuclear arms race was useless, “The balance-of-terror, which today 
keeps the peace, will continue to exist whether the Bundeswehr receives nuclear 
warheads or not.”50 The Social Democrats received support from the FDP who claimed 
“Every German now knows what tactical nuclear weapons mean for the densely 
populated Central European realm, namely to turn every city into a thousand-fold 
Auschwitz.”51 
 The CDU responded by arguing that the SPD and their allies were blowing the 
issue out of proportion. Federal Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauß, stated that the 
government had not officially requested, nor been offered, nuclear weapons of any kind 
from the United States.52 Adenauer downplayed the whole nuclear issue claiming that it 
was nicht aktuell (not current, not newsworthy) and certainly not something the public 
needed to be worried about.53 Along with downplaying the issue, Adenauer continually 
side-stepped the nuclear question while campaigning and instead asked voters if they felt 
safer with the CDU/CSU and NATO or with the SPD and no Western military support.54 
 The declaration of the Göttingen nuclear scientists and its widespread acceptance 
among the West German population were indications that German politics had changed. 
Previously, political critique by cultural elites and members of the universities was 
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unheard of; these cultural elites preferred not to politicize the intellectual sphere and 
often remained aloof from politics.55 With the April 1957 declaration, the Göttingen 18 
changed the borders of German political life, allowing the critique and protest of 
government policy to emerge from other spheres of German society. IdK member and 
peace activist Helga Tempel remembered feeling encouraged by the actions of the 
Göttingen scientists. Their willingness to speak out against dangerous government policy 
gave her and other activists hope that the leadership in Bonn would abandon their 
attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.56 
 The 1957 federal elections were a smashing victory for the CDU/CSU. For the 
first and only time in the history of the Federal Republic, one party captured the absolute 
majority.57 This was a huge defeat for the SPD. The public seemed to support the 
CDU/CSU even though the data show that they were very concerned about nuclear 
weapons.58 It has been argued that since there was not yet any real outlet in which to 
voice antimilitary concerns separate from the existing political structure, antimilitary 
protests were limited and ineffective.59 This absence of sustained, organized antimilitary 
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protest on a national scale, combined with a strong economy, seems to have aided the 
1957 CDU/CSU election campaign. 
 Another significant factor in the CDU victory was the violent Soviet suppression 
of Hungarian Revolution in the fall of 1956. For many West Germans the brutal Soviet 
intervention in Hungary validated the rearmament and nuclear weapons policies of the 
Adenauer government.60 During the 1957 federal elections the Soviet threat loomed in 
the minds of the West German voters, many of whom felt Adenauer and the CDU/CSU 
would be the best prepared to protect the country.61 
 Following their defeat in the 1957 federal elections, the Social Democrats again 
turned to the West German public to keep the antinuclear issue alive. The SPD joined 
forces with opponents of nuclear weapons to form Fight Atomic Death (KdA), a popular 
protest campaign that operated on the edges of traditional politics. The KdA campaign 
began at a meeting of SPD leadership in Bonn on January 20, 1958 and during the next 
few months, the Social Democrats developed an antinuclear campaign that became part 
of their defense policy platform and a major public protest movement.62 The campaign 
centered on four major concerns: first, a stop to all atomic weapons tests; second, no 
atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr or any other army that did not already possess 
them; third, no German scientists involved in the development of atomic weapons; the 
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final demand was for atomic weapons and missile bases to be kept out of Germany.63 
The goal of the KdA campaign was to compel the Adenauer government to cease their 
efforts to equip the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons and pursue a diplomatic agenda of 
disarmament and reunification.64 Since they had been unable to stop Adenauer and 
Strauß’s efforts in the Bundestag, the SPD leadership proposed a nationwide referendum 
(Volksbefragung) on whether the Bundeswehr should be equipped with nuclear weapons 
and if nuclear missiles should be allowed on West German soil.65 They believed a 
question of that magnitude should be put before the West German people and the KdA 
campaign was their platform to raise awareness of the nuclear threat and raise support 
for the referendum.66 
 A portion of the West German public responded positively to the SPD initiative 
and, much like the antinuclear movement that had erupted Great Britain in 1957, the 
Fight Atomic Death campaign quickly developed a strong local element. Many of the 
same people who had joined in the Paulskriche movement in 1955 to protest rearmament 
and supported the Göttingen 18 in 1957—pacifists, scientists, clergy, writers, students, 
trade unionists, and peace activists from all walks of life—formed local KdA committees 
all over West Germany.67 More than a hundred protest rallies were held all across the 
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Federal Republic that spring and summer and many were joined by thousands of 
participants. In Hamburg, the local labor movement organized a work stoppage an hour 
before closing time to allow workers to join the protest rally on 17 April and largely 
because of this, around 150,000 people demonstrated against nuclear weapons.68 
 The KdA campaign peaked during April and May of 1958. Even though the 
campaign received significant support from the SPD rank and file as well as many of the 
clergy, trade unions, pacifists, and scientists, it was by no means supported by the 
broader society. Conservatives—many Catholics, big business, the CDU/CSU, and most 
of the press—opposed the antinuclear movement. Furthermore, international 
developments did not work in the movement’s favor. The West German population was 
once again reminded of the Soviet threat when the Soviet-installed Hungarian 
government secretly tried, found guilty, and executed by hanging in June 1958 the leader 
of the Hungarian Revolution, Imre Nagy.69 In July the Federal Constitutional Court 
announced its decision that state referenda on the nuclear weapons issue—the primary 
goal of the KdA campaign—was unconstitutional.70 This ruling effectively ended the 
Fight Atomic Death campaign and the number of participants in the protest rallies, 
which had been in decline since May, dropped drastically. The SPD recognized they had 
lost the battle and ceased their efforts to use the campaign as a political weapon against 
the Adenauer government.  
                                                 
68 Rupp, Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer, 182-184, 289-296. 
69“War es Mord?,” Der Spiegel, July 2, 1958. 27/1958. 
70 Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, 66. 
83 
 
 The Fight Atomic Death campaign continued to exist with passive support from 
the SPD, primarily so the party could use it as a rhetorical tool, but it was an ineffective 
shell of what it had been at its height.71 The SPD began to recognize that a more realistic 
stance on national defense was necessary if they were ever going to seriously challenge 
the Christian Democrats in the polls. In November 1959 the Social Democrats ratified 
the Godesberg Program and made a significant change to their political course. They 
abandoned many Marxist ideas and instead of being a workers’ party they rebranded 
themselves as a Volkspartei or a party of the people. They accepted Ludwig Erhard’s 
social market economy and advocated a reasonable national defense policy.72 However, 
the SPD maintained its support of the right of conscientious objection. 
 Many antinuclear activists and peace activists learned a hard lesson from the 
KdA campaign about the pitfalls of aligning themselves with, and relying on, major 
political parties. Once the SPD no longer had a political use for the KdA, they dropped 
their active support for the program and since the SPD and many of their members were 
so instrumental in the organization and promotion of the campaign, it quickly faded 
away. This left antinuclear activists without a platform to voice their concerns about the 
government’s nuclear weapons policy. The new direction of the SPD’s political program 
after the adoption of the Godesberg Program left many peace activists without support in 
the Bundestag. Having no left-wing political party willing to stand against the 
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government’s defense agenda forced many activists to look for other ways to have a 
voice in their country’s political course. Konrad Tempel explained that because of the 
decline of the KdA peace activists, he “learned to not rely on traditional structures and to 
not rely on mass organizations.” For Konrad Tempel, this development stressed the 
importance of the individual and grassroots activism.73 Some activists maintained their 
personal affiliation with the Social Democrats but many left the party that they felt had 
abandoned them. Realizing that they could not rely on mainstream political groups for 
support, West German peace activists created their own protest organizations apart from 
political influence.74 
 In the midst of this turmoil the conscientious objection groups were in a state of 
flux. As the political environment continued to change these organizations were also 
forced to adapt to stay relevant in the rapidly shifting West German culture of the late 
1950s. While not yet embroiled in the social turmoil of the 1960s, West Germany 
underwent a period of significant cultural change in the 1950s as society adjusted to the 
realities of the postwar world.75 
The IdK focused on providing support for young men considering conscientious 
objection by hosting information sessions and providing legal advice. This difficult legal 
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process was also emotionally challenging for COs. First, one had to submit paperwork 
detailing their request for the West German government to consider them a 
conscientious objector. Then, if their application had passed the initial inspection, the 
government would call the applicant to appear personally before a board who would 
question them about their beliefs in an attempt to determine if their reasons for not 
wishing to perform military service were legitimate. The West German government was 
concerned that too many people would use conscientious objection as an excuse not 
serve simply to avoid having to their civic duty.76 To determine if the applicant’s reasons 
for objecting were sufficient to be granted objector status, the review board would ask 
difficult moral questions and pose horrifying hypothetical scenarios such as “If your 
mother and sisters were attacked and about to be assaulted by a group of thugs would 
you use a weapon to protect them?” If the young man answered yes then he could be 
denied objector status because he was not truly a pacifist in the eyes of the audit board.77 
 The IdK created some forty Beratungsstellen or counseling services all over 
West Germany to help young men navigate the difficult conscientious objection 
process.78 The regional IdK chapters would also hold training sessions where the IdK 
members would play the role of the conscientious objection Audit Committee and the 
young people in attendance would play the role of the objectors.79 Through the 
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counseling service and practice sessions, the IdK hoped to prepare young men for the 
Audit Committees and put them in the best position to be recognized as conscientious 
objectors. However, the IdK did not change their protest tactics much after 1956. Their 
protest actions were fairly limited in scope and they had not yet developed a plan for 
reaching people outside of their philosophical sphere. Furthermore, while the IdK 
remained fundamentally pacifist they lacked concrete political goals.80 
 At the same time, the IdK, as part of the WRI, continued to work to prevent war 
all over the world. While the IdK was unable to prevent West German rearmament or 
conscription these events did provide a boost to the organization, particularly in terms of 
membership, as the IdK tripled in size during this period from just a few groups in each 
state to as many as thirty-three in a state like Bavaria.81 Rearmament and conscription 
also made the IdK more attractive to the young people in West Germany. In the IdK 
section report to the War Resisters’ International quarterly publication The War Resister, 
Michaltscheff reported, “The reintroduction of conscription produced such a shock 
especially among the younger generation, it awakened so many lazy, sleepy consciences, 
that an active opposition and revolt were inevitable. This state of mind made the younger 
generation very responsive to our ideas and this gave a tremendous impulse to our 
work.”82 
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 This new growth forced the IdK to reconsider their organizational structure and 
hire a paid staff to help run the group. They created Landesverbände or state unions that 
subdivided the national organization by region. These regional groups had considerable 
autonomy within the IdK and were administered by their own executive councils. This 
structural reorganization allowed the IdK to handle the growth of the membership and 
maintain the grassroots work that was so important to their mission.83 
 The GdW also underwent significant reform during this period. Founded in 1953, 
the GdW was originally an anti-military and anti-conscription organization that protested 
against rearmament and military conscription in West Germany during the rearmament 
debates in the early 1950s. Unlike the IdK, the GdW originally existed solely to resist 
rearmament and compulsory military service in the Federal Republic of Germany.84 
Co-founder Werner Böwing explained that they created GdW because of their 
experiences in World War II. “We didn’t want a new German army because we were 
afraid that the horrors of the war would return (if West Germany rearmed).” For that 
reason, the GdW was absolutely against rearmament in East and West Germany from its 
founding.85 They founders also recognized that the SPD was no longer representing their 
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anti-military views and to counter this development sought a new way to influence 
government defense policy.86 
 However, they were not fundamentally pacifist or Christian as an organization.87 
The leadership of the GdW stated, “We are nothing more than an association of people 
who have made their decision… and no longer want to shoot other people.”88 The GdW 
was a very pragmatic organization that focused on helping COs, no matter the reason 
they had for objecting. In contrast, the IdK insisted that the COs’ reason for objecting to 
military service came from pacifist feelings and a real moral objection to war.89 The 
GdW was also more adept at addressing the political problems that faced the Federal 
Republic. They came up with new ideas for atomic weapons policies like European 
nuclear neutral zones. Unlike the IdK, Hans Hermann Köper and Wilhelm Keller, along 
with the rest of the GdW leadership, were interested in operating on a more political 
level. They were also very suspicious of communists, which reflected the prevailing 
sentiment in West German society, and did not want any communists in their 
organization.90 
 Hans Hermann Köper was a polarizing figure as the head of the GdW. Köper was 
a Wehrmacht veteran and had been wounded at the end of the war. After a brief time in 
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Soviet captivity he returned to Cologne and studied music. While in Cologne in the late 
1940s Köper joined the Socialist Youth of Germany and became an active member 
participating in early anti-rearmament demonstrations.91 By the early 1950s, Köper was 
handicapped by complications from the injuries he received during the war and he lived 
off his pension from the government. In 1954, he became the chairman of the newly 
founded GdW and led the group in their opposition to West German military 
conscription.92 
 After the establishment of conscription in 1956, the identity of the organization 
moved towards that of the IdK, one that primarily provided information and support for 
conscientious objectors and protested against the government’s military policies but 
increasingly moved towards a much broader peace agenda. From 1956 to 1958, the idea 
of a merger between the IdK and GdW had been discussed since it was clear that there 
was a duplication of efforts between the two groups. Much like the IdK, the GdW also 
went to great lengths to inform potential conscripts of their rights. For example, in early 
January 1957 the GdW sent out hundreds of thousands of leaflets warning young men 
born in 1937 to send in their requests for conscientious objector status before the 
deadline.93 On a few occasions, the GdW and IdK even worked together on the same 
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events.94 Furthermore, the GdW also established a number of Beratungsstellen in 
coordination with the IdK to support conscientious objectors.95 
 At the 1957 IdK Annual Meeting in Bremen, the leadership decided to pursue a 
merger with the GdW. As a result, they called a special meeting in Frankfurt in May 
1958 to take the steps to join the two German conscientious objection organizations.96 
While it seemed obvious that the two groups should merge to become more effective in 
their common effort to resist the government’s military policies, it quickly became 
evident that the IdK and GdW were two very different organizations.97 
 Almost immediately, the attempt to combine the groups encountered trouble. It 
seems that the GdW Chairman, Hans Hermann Köper, was not well liked or trusted by 
some of the IdK leadership and rank and file. Köper was called a witch hunter and a 
SPD stooge by his enemies.98 While he was a member, as were many in the IdK, he was 
not an official in the SPD.99 His anticommunist stance was so strong that Heinz 
Kraschutzki confided to WRI Secretary Arlo Tatum “He [Köper] was like a little 
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MacCarthy [sic] within the German peace movement.”100 Some in the IdK felt that 
merging with the GdW would negatively affect the ability of the IdK to remain apart 
from party politics. Kraschutzki warned if Köper were given a leadership position in the 
organization after the merger, “We should be entirely under the control of the SPD.”101 
On the other side of the issue were members of the GdW and the IdK that felt that a 
fusion should be made as soon as possible to bring an end to the duplication of effort by 
the two conscientious objection organizations.102 
 A representative of the WRI Executive Committee attended the meeting and the 
proposed merger and constitution of the merged groups were discussed. The merger 
stalled over the “Independence Clause” that had been written into the constitution and 
was supported by the GdW members and a number of IdK members. The clause was 
part of the GdW constitution and stated,  
In the sense of this obligation (that is our international declaration) the member 
has to support his National Committee in fulfilling his tasks and to strive that 
the independence of the organization will ever be maintained from all 
interest-groups and political parties who are one-sided fixed in the cold war as 
Communist and militant anti-Communist circles and the corresponding 
camouflage-organizations.103 
 
The clause was bitterly resented by a minority of the IdK members and some of the IdK 
leadership who felt it provided a constitutional basis for witch hunting of communists or 
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communist supporters in the group.104 They believed that a member’s personal political 
affiliation was not a concern as long as they were a dedicated pacifist and they kept their 
politics separate from the organization’s activities.105 The disagreement over this clause 
halted the merger attempt between the IdK and GdW and created a divide within the IdK 
membership. 
 It was clear to many that the difference of opinion over the independence clause 
could not be resolved. As a result, the GdW leadership met, disbanded, and reformed as 
the Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer under the proposed merger constitution, which 
included the disputed independence clause. Wilhelm Keller resigned his position as 
acting chairman of the IdK and, along with Hans Köper, became a co-chairman of the 
new VK. Nearly all of the leadership of the new VK - Wilhem Keller, Gerhard Grüning, 
Rüdiger Frank, Detlev Dahlke, and Harm Westendorf - maintained their membership in 
the IdK in an effort to bridge the gap between the two organizations and facilitate an 
eventual merger. The IdK also met and elected new officers to replace those who had 
resigned to join the VK. Both reorganization meetings went smoothly so it seems each 
side was happy with their situation.106 However, the sense that there was a duplication of 
efforts continued to exist and merger talks would surface from time to time over the next 
decade. 
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 The newly formed Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer immediately added the 
words “in der WRI” to their name. In fact, this raised some concern with the WRI since 
it was done before the group had officially become part of the WRI.107 The VK changed 
the wording to say, angemeldet (applied to) to appease the WRI leadership. The reason 
the VK was so quick to put their WRI affiliation in their official name was to avoid 
being seen as an appendage of the SPD or a left-wing political organization. By putting 
their affiliation with the WRI in their name the VK was trying to make it clear to all that 
they were not part of any political party or political interest group.108 Furthermore, this 
helped legitimize the VK and put them on the same level with the IdK which had been a 
section of the WRI since the 1920s. This is an indication that the contentious merger 
process affected the GdW leadership and made them consider their position in the West 
German peace movement. It was clear some in the IdK considered the GdW under the 
influence of the SPD and this concerned the GdW who saw their political independence 
as a crucial part of their organizational character. 
 There was significant concern among the WRI leadership as well as among the 
leadership of the IdK and VK over the risk of infighting or division within the German 
groups because of the failed fusion attempt and the subsequent reorganization. Gerhard 
Grüning believed that many of the members from both groups could work together in 
harmony but warned that conflicts between the two would only serve to help “Adenauer 
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and Ulbricht.”109 Disgruntled activists made harsh statements about “left-wing radical 
groups” or “communist influence” in regards to the IdK, which fueled hostilities 
between the CO groups. At the formation meeting of the VK it was made clear by the 
newly elected leadership that defamation of the IdK in anyway was out of the 
question.110 Most of the VK leadership hoped to merge with the IdK in the near future 
and wanted to prevent dissension as much as possible. 
 After this realignment/reformation, a number of IdK groups and members left the 
IdK and joined the VK. This caused some hurt feelings among the IdK membership who 
felt those who had left for the VK had abandoned them. At the same time, rumors 
abounded within the IdK that the VK was just a front organization of the SPD or that the 
GdW had been paid off to make sure the merger failed. Some disgruntled IdK members 
even went so far as to claim that some of the VK leadership received funds from the 
SPD.111 This claim was in part aimed at Hans Hermann Köper who received a full 
disability pension that allowed him to dedicate all his time to the GdW and travel 
frequently, thus appearing to have received illicit funding to some who were not familiar 
with his personal situation.112 
 The Hamburg IdK chapter created some controversy during this reforming 
period. The Hamburg IdK executive committee all joined the VK and encouraged all 
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IdK members to do the same.113 In early June, 1958 Harm Westendorf, member of the 
Hamburg IdK chapter and member of the VK leadership, was quoted in the press saying 
that the Hamburg chapter of the IdK had come under communist influence and been 
dissolved. The chairman of the IdK, Theodor Michaltscheff, called the WRI secretary, 
Arlo Tatum, to inform him of the event and asked that the WRI respond with a statement 
denying the accusations. The WRI released a statement that strongly denied the 
allegations of communist influence within the Hamburg chapter and declared that the 
chapter had not been dissolved.114 Leaders of the Hamburg IdK chapter, Konrad and 
Helga Tempel, who were also part of the national leadership of the VK, claimed that the 
suggestion of communist influence was untrue. However, they explained that the 
Hamburg IdK chapter had in fact been disbanded.115 The elected leaders of the chapter 
had called a membership meeting and by a legal majority of three-fourths of the 
members present decided to dissolve the chapter and join the VK.116 Furthermore, Harm 
Westendorf issued a second statement to the press declaring that he had been misquoted 
and that he did not say the chapter was under communist influence nor was that his 
opinion.117 
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 The IdK national leadership, on the recommendation of Chairman Theodor 
Michaltscheff, expelled these IdK members and appointed a temporary Executive 
Council for the Hamburg IdK chapter. They declared that the meeting to dissolve the 
Hamburg chapter was unofficial and that the local leadership did not have the power to 
make any official decision. The WRI Executive Council disapproved of this move by the 
IdK leadership and was unhappy with the whole situation.118 
 At the annual War Resisters’ International Meeting in Sonderholm, Denmark that 
July, the Executive Council addressed the situation at length. The West German 
representative on the Executive Council, Heinz Kraschutzki, was a long time IdK 
member and prominent peace activist. Kraschutzki provided the IdK’s position and their 
perception of the events that unfolded. The Executive Council received the VK’s formal 
letter of application for membership in the WRI from Konrad Tempel, a supplementary 
letter from Hans Hermann Köper, a memorandum about the developments in the IdK 
prepared by Wilhelm Keller on behalf of the VK Executive, and an oral report by Hilda 
von Klenze on the merger meetings in Bremen and Frankfurt. After a lengthy discussion, 
the council decided that the best course of action was to reprimand both organizations 
for getting into the situation and to suggest that the two groups take the time to resolve 
their differences: 
The Council has carefully considered the application for affiliation of the 
V.K. It recognizes that the responsibility for the present situation in the 
German pacifist movement must be shared by both V.K. and I.d.K. and 
sincerely hopes that the members of both organizations will seek every 
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opportunity of reconciliation. The Council has therefore decided to postpone 
any decision until its meeting in July 1959.119 
The Council encouraged both organizations to keep their common goals in mind. The 
reason the WRI Executive Council postponed any decision on the membership of the 
VK was that they hoped the dispute would be resolved over the following year and the 
organizations could conclude a successful merger, thus rendering the VK membership 
application moot. The Council also agreed that if any members were invited to speak in 
West Germany they should make a point to visit both groups in order to avoid alienating 
either group.120 
 Interestingly it appears that Michaltscheff requested that the Council ask the VK 
to not use the WRI declaration. The declaration was adopted at the founding of the WRI 
and simply states “War is a crime against humanity. I am therefore determined not to 
support any kind of war and to strive for the removal of all cause of war.”121 The 
Council unanimously disapproved of the curious request but there is no mention of why 
Michaltscheff thought it should be a concern. Perhaps he believed that if the VK was 
allowed to use the WRI declaration they would gain more legitimacy than they deserved. 
Up until that point the IdK was the only German organization affiliated with the WRI 
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and it could be that Michaltscheff was trying to preserve the IdK’s position as the 
primary conscientious objection organization in West Germany.122 
 This complicated and contentious series of events that marked the creation of the 
VK highlighted the importance these organizations placed on their character and image. 
The IdK had traditionally avoided using the words “communist” or “anticommunist” and 
simply referred to the opposing sides in the Cold War as “east” or “west” oriented. Their 
claim was that “we do not want to cooperate with either organizations that are west 
oriented working against the east, or organizations that are east oriented working against 
the west.”123 They did this because they wanted to stay as politically neutral as 
possible—what they called “staying above party politics” or “Überparteilich”—so that 
their message and support for conscientious objectors would remain free of any political 
stigma and so that they could stay true to their pacifist principles.124 
 However, the IdK acknowledged that there was “an ever present but not serious 
problem” of communists in the IdK that the IdK leadership constantly monitored.125 In 
what they described as the “(Heinz) Kratschutzki position,” Helga and Konrad Tempel 
explained that most of the IdK leadership believed that the IdK should not exclude 
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pacifists who held other political beliefs.126 Aware of the fact that a number of their 
members were communists, the IdK chose to focus on its message and work with 
conscientious objectors and, as long as all members left their political affiliations at the 
door and adhered to pacifist principles, the IdK did not feel having communist members 
was a serious concern. With this in mind it is easy to see how many in the IdK, including 
most of the senior leadership, resisted the inclusion of the Independence Clause that 
could open the door to communist witch hunts and needlessly divide their membership. 
 The GdW/VK, also very concerned about their image and character, felt the 
independence clause was necessary to establish their position as an anti-military, 
anti-conscription organization that was clearly unencumbered by any communist 
influence. Furthermore, they believed that the independence clause reinforced their 
existence as an organization without political, religious, or philosophical affiliation. 
Unlike the IdK, the VK was not necessarily bound to pacifist principles and were much 
more pragmatic with the character of their organization. When asked about the reason 
the VK insisted on the Independence Clause, Helga Tempel reflected that it would have 
been difficult for the VK to be accepted by society in the Cold War atmosphere of the 
late 1950s if communists were allowed to be members.127 
 The difference in how the two groups approached this communism issue is in 
part a product of the differences in the ideology of the leadership and membership of the 
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two groups. The two kinds of activists, pacifists and anti-militarists, were not mutually 
exclusive but they often dictated how a person conceptualized their activism and how 
they approached various issues, such as communism. 128 The pacifists were 
conscientious objection activists because they wanted to prevent war and remove all 
causes for war. The anti-militarists rejected military service because they did not want to 
see a rearmed Germany and were heavily influenced by their wartime experiences, as 
opposed to believing in nonviolence and pacifism. The GdW leadership and most of its 
membership were anti-militarists and the IdK leadership and many of its members were 
generally pacifists, with some exceptions. Prior to and during the merger attempt, many 
IdK members hoped to bring in the younger antimilitarist and encourage them to take up 
pacifist beliefs. Heinz Kraschutzki wrote to Arlo Tatum, “[W]hen I first heard about the 
plan to merge, …I was in principle in agreement with it, as it would give us the chance 
to make real pacifists out of the many good young people of [the] GdW, who had no 
proper ideology at all.”129  
 These ideological differences often meant that the two groups did not always see 
eye to eye, particularly in regards to communism. Because much of the GdW leadership 
was anti-militarist they were not as open-minded about pacifists with communist 
sympathies whereas the IdK leadership was more understanding about the issue. In many 
cases age was a common denominator with pacifists and anti-militarists and the 
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leadership of the two organizations reflected this. Werner Böwing recalled, “The 
younger people, more or less, were anti-militarists. The older people were more pacifists 
and not so anti-military. There was a difference between the younger and the older 
(activists).”130 
 The contentious fusion attempt also highlighted the generational and ideological 
differences that had begun to emerge within the West German conscientious objection 
movement. The IdK was the older, more traditional organization that was led by a cohort 
of men and women who had been peace activists for decades. Many of them had been 
part of the German peace movement since the Weimar Republic. While the younger 
activists recognized the experience and commitment of their elders, some simply did not 
like working with them. Gerhard Grüning, one of the younger IdK members who later 
joined the VK, explained, “Personally…I dislike – I cannot help [it], that may be a 
generation question – Mrs. Lohse-Link and Heinz Kraschutzki.”131 
 Many of those who were in the IdK originally but joined the VK when it was 
created immediately after the failed merger were also of the younger generation. Konrad 
and Helga Tempel were involved in the leadership of the Hamburg IdK chapter. During 
the fusion discussions, they explained that most of the Hamburg IdK wanted to merge 
with the GdW because the Hamburg IdK members wanted to create a stronger, more 
powerful organization. An organization “that was not ruled from the desk of Theodor 
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Michaltscheff.”132 In their opinion, resistance to war, conscription, and the military 
required much more than just a hardened conscience and impassioned writing. Real 
activism “required action, winning people, and changing social structures.”133 In their 
experience, most IdK members preferred to engage the issues on their own rather than 
with a coordinated group action. In the case of the Hamburg IdK section, the members 
wanted “a more sophisticated and dynamic group that was much more interested in 
changing the structures and changing society. They wanted to bring about change in 
German society instead of just satisfying their own conscience.”134 Therefore, the 
opportunity to merge with a young, dynamic organization that was willing to 
conceptualize protest actions on a larger scale was very attractive to many of the 
younger activists in the IdK.135 Konrad Tempel recalled, “I think we felt younger than 
Theodor Michaltscheff. We were in fact younger but were we aware that most IdK 
members were older and not very active.” Helga Tempel explained, “They had an old 
fashioned way of thinking,” and while they respected the convictions of Michaltscheff 
and the others they wanted to do more.136 
 The general membership of the IdK and GdW also reflected the generational 
disparity. The GdW was mostly made up of concerned young people who came to 
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conscientious objection as anti-militarists. The bulk of the IdK membership consisted 
mostly of older fundamental pacifists. Konrad and Helga Tempel reflected that the 
younger GdW was very vibrant, not always thoughtful but always lively; while the older 
IdK was more moderate and reflective.137 
 From the founding of the GdW the generational and ideological differences with 
the IdK were apparent. Not only were they more hard-line about communists in the 
group, they were also more radical and provocative in their approach to protest, and 
interested in a new kind of activism. They were clearly aware of the divide between their 
generation and the generation before them. In a 1957 article in the influential weekly 
magazine Der Spiegel, the founding members of the GdW stated that they believed that 
peace activists today could no longer be successful with the pathos of the pacifists of 
1920. In their view, German society had changed and the peace movement needed to 
change with it.138 Even in their meetings, they established their own culture of protest. 
Köper explained, “We’re neither big time serious nor impertinent. We try to do things 
quickly. No lectures on basic principles during events, no event ceremonies with 
opening, welcome, speaker introduction and so on.”139 Furthermore, the GdW identified 
with younger generation. Köper stated “The conscience of a working-class boy” should 
not count for less than “the conscience of a moral theologian.”140 Köper took the 
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generational issue a step further pointing out that Konrad Adenauer, an octogenarian 
when the conscription law was passed, was sending young men to the military but had 
himself never served, the “Chancellor’s turned 80 years old, without ever having been a 
soldier.”141 
 The generational and ideological divide was also often reflected in the way that 
the two groups approached the issues. The IdK often presented a rational message when 
engaging an issue to connect with people on an intellectual level. Their slogans were 
practical and direct so that they maintained a respectful tenor. The GdW, however, was 
much more willing to engage people on an emotional level. The protest messages of the 
GdW were considered somewhat aggressive and controversial by some.142 Their slogans 
often poked fun at the government’s policies and they frequently used gallows humor in 
their messages. The GdW motorcade in Cologne during the rearmament debate, 
mentioned earlier, is a good example. The motorcade was led by a man who mocked the 
state’s militarism by wearing a paper helmet and the cars in the motorcade carried signs 
with anti-rearmament slogans such as “The joke of the day: Peace through Cannons!” 
and “Barracks drill is no education!” and drove around the city for hours.143 Hans 
Herman Köper explained that the group chose to use a motorcade to spread their 
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message to draw more attention while the accompanying police vehicles maximized the 
drama of the event.144 
 The GdW also chose to use evocative slogans that undoubtedly angered many 
older peace activists. For example several slogans drew parallels with the militarism of 
the Kaiser Reich and the Nazi regime, “Whether Kaiser, Führer, or Adenauer, the 
general does not care!” and “It started 18 years ago!” a 1957 slogan referencing the 
beginning of the Second World War in 1939.145 They even suggested that parts of the 
government’s public campaign to raise support for their military policies were so much 
like the propaganda of the Third Reich that they wondered “does Goebbels still live?”146 
 The former president of the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (German Peace 
Society, DFG) and IdK Chairman, Fritz Wenzel, was shocked when he heard the GdW 
slogan “Head off for prayer!” – insinuating that support for Adenauer’s military policies 
from religious circles, such as political Catholics, required a person to forget their 
intelligence – “The road leads through the barracks gate into the mass grave!” – eliciting 
images of World War II – “The coward advances to barracks, the bold says: No!” – a 
particularly inflammatory slogan that turned what many considered a patriotic duty into 
a cowardly act.147 If these slogans angered other peace activists, one can imagine how 
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the general public received them, particularly those who were already leaning towards 
the right. Wenzel saw the GdW slogans as reckless attempts to draw the attention of the 
press rather than constructive messages that would help their cause.148 
 However, not all of the GdW slogans were so inflammatory. In addressing the 
potential for nuclear warfare in Europe, one slogan called for people to be “active rather 
than radioactive.”149 The GdW also demanded that resources be used for social 
advancement with the slogan “Schools instead of barracks, apprenticeships instead of 
military sites” and made pleas for the future of humanity stating, “Abolish the war, or it 
abolishes us!”150 Helga Tempel described the GdW as an organization that was much 
more pragmatic than the IdK. She explained, “They (the GdW) saw something was 
wrong. They wanted to do something about it so they went out and protested. They were 
not very sensitive to the possibility of offending people; they were not very thoughtful 
about how their message was received.”151 
 After the GdW reformed as the VK, their national presence grew even larger. 
The new name was indicative of this growth. The name Verband der 
Kriegsdienstverweigerer (Association of Military Service Objectors) reflected a much 
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bigger idea than Gruppe der Wehrdienstgegner (Group of Military Service Objectors).152 
They became more aggressive with their protest efforts and took on larger projects that 
operated on a national level. With the influx of IdK members the organization 
dramatically grew in size but also gained experienced activists who were familiar with 
working with regional sections and excited about coordinating protest events and 
information campaigns on a regional and national level. This increased exposure helped 
the VK develop into an efficient, nationally recognized protest organization. In fact, this 
growth may very well have removed any chance of a merger between the IdK and VK. 
 In its first year of existence, the VK initiated a nationwide campaign aimed at 
increasing awareness of the right conscientious objection. What separated this campaign 
from previous efforts by the GdW and IdK to inform West Germans about the right of 
conscientious objection was how it equated refusing military service with preventing 
nuclear war yet at the same time clearly distancing the message from any implication of 
communism. Called “Aktion 4/3”in reference to Article 4, Section 3 of the Grundgesetz 
(Basic Law), the right of conscientious objection, the campaign consisted of information 
meetings and a national leaflet campaign. The leaflet was printed in color, distributed by 
mail, and passed out in cities and towns all over West Germany.153 
 Aktion 4/3 is also an example of how the VK was conscious of the changing 
West German society. On the front page of the four page leaflet the colorful text reads 
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“Aktion 4/3 Do not worry: we are not offering a new detergent or other products of the 
economic miracle; our product cannot be bought or sold: it is already in possession of all 
citizens of the Federal Republic! We mean Article 4, Section 3 of the Constitution.”154 It 
then gave the wording of the law and explained that every citizen has the right to refuse 
to perform military service for reasons of conscience; no one can be forced into military 
service against their principles.  
The same time Aktion 4/3 was running, the Fight Atomic Death campaign was 
just coming down from its peak and the nation was very familiar with the anti-nuclear 
rhetoric. The VK used this period of heightened public awareness to present an alternate 
solution to the atomic weapon issue. The leaflet raised the specter of atomic war and 
asked the reader “Could you now, in good conscience, provide military service in the 
age of missiles and nuclear weapons which have finally exposed war as madness and 
criminal? Could you explain the willingness to drop atomic bombs on cities in which 
millions of women and children live?”155 The reader is then reminded, “Everyone who 
participates, also bears the responsibility for all possible consequences of nuclear 
policy.”156 However, there was a solution; the VK declared that without soldiers there 
could be no atomic war so the best way to prevent a nuclear catastrophe is to object to 
military service.157 
154Aktion 4/3, WRI Sektionen, Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer, HIS, THM. 
155Ibid. 
156Ibid. 
157Ibid. 
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 The pamphlet also addresses the difficult issue of communism and conscientious 
objection. Questioning the government’s claims that nuclear weapons were necessary to 
prevent a Russian invasion and communist takeover of West Germany, the VK points 
out that nuclear war is not a good solution. The “Threat from the East” must be 
countered by means other than total mutual annihilation. Instead, the leaflet declares, 
“Anyone who seriously wants to fight against communism and other hazards must 
renounce the unfit means of mutual mass destruction. The first step to a better solution is 
personal yes to the unconditional respect for life, …and the associated no to military 
service.”158 Aktion 4/3 presented the perfect solution, “Help us to make the Action 4/3 of 
an ongoing awareness campaign about the noblest of all basic democratic rights, the 
right to refuse military service for reasons of conscience. Our solutions must be: ‘Neither 
Communism nor war!’ ‘fight of atomic death-through conscientious objection!’” 
 Interestingly, the VK makes the point that they did not want communism or war. 
Implying that some people suggested that to avoid war is to welcome communism. The 
VK clearly stated that they did not think it was a zero sum game; it was possible to avoid 
war and resist communism at the same time. In addition, in the wake of the failing KdA, 
they proposed an alternative to the antinuclear campaign with their slogan “fight atomic 
death - through conscientious objection!” The VK believed that conscientious objection 
would have a similar effect in halting the war machine and preventing atomic warfare.  
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 This move towards protesting against nuclear weapons was a sign of things to 
come for the conscientious objection movement. As the organizations developed their 
protest strategies and became more dynamic, they began to expand their protests to 
include other issues. The turn towards anti-nuclear protests also reflects a shift in the 
concerns of the West German society as rearmament and conscription gained a degree of 
acceptance among the public. 
 After failing to make a significant impact on the course of the rearmament and 
conscription debates, the IdK and GdW were forced to reassess their position in West 
German society. The period was one of intense growth and organizational change for 
both groups. Through this process, we can see the various generational and ideological 
elements that these groups were comprised of and uncover the issues that divided, and 
united, these early West German activists. The issues facing the IdK and GdW, 
communism, growing generational divides, understanding the democratic process, and 
Cold War angst, were some of the same issues that faced West German society as a 
whole. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE PROTESTS, 1958-1960  
In late April 1958, a handful of activists from the Hamburg chapter of the IdK 
protested in front of the Hamburg Rathaus with a sign that warned against nuclear 
weapons. Whenever an opportunity presented itself, they engaged passersby in a 
discussion about the Federal Republic’s nuclear weapons policy. These conscientious 
objection activists spent two weeks in the Rathausmarkt protesting nuclear weapons and 
while their antinuclear message was certainly something peace activists agreed with, it 
was not part of the conscientious objection movement’s traditional platform. 
This chapter investigates the ways in which conscientious objection 
organizations and activists broadened the scope of their protests and developed new 
methods of protest in the late 1950s. These years represented a transitional step in which 
former anti-conscription activists learned to both broaden the scope of their activism and 
to develop, in a transnational context, tools that would be important in their future 
direction. Specifically, this period featured the development and implementation of new 
protest tactics such as nonviolent direct action and civil disobedience. Another major 
element that this chapter engages is the creation of a transnational social space that was 
essential to the development of West German and international protest movements. It 
also furthers the argument that the movement helped establish the organizational and 
operational framework for the emergence of extra-parliamentary opposition in West 
Germany. 
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 The two major events discussed in this chapter are the shift towards antinuclear 
activism and the impact of the SPD’s Godesberg Program. During the late 1950s, 
nuclear weapons and their potential danger became increasingly central to the protest 
efforts of peace activists. The Social Democrats opposed arming the Bundeswehr with 
nuclear weapons or allowing NATO to station nuclear weapons on West German soil. 
Adenauer’s government warned that the Soviet threat necessitated nuclear capabilities 
for defense and the ensuing debate spilled out of the parliament into the public sphere. 
The SPD mobilized the popular Fight Atomic Death campaign in 1958 to pressure the 
government to reconsider its position on nuclear weapons. The IdK and VK also shifted 
towards antinuclear protest after the period of reform and reorganization that followed 
rearmament in the mid-1950s. The threat of nuclear war came to the forefront of the 
West German conscientious objection movement in the late 1950s and, in fact, West 
German society as a whole.   
 In 1959, the Social Democrats adopted a new party program, known as the 
Godesberg Program, which indicated a significant shift in the political course of the 
Party towards a more mainstream platform in order to challenge the CDU for control of 
the government.1 These were wrenching decisions that badly divided the party and led 
many activists to abandon the SPD and seek another kind of leftist political space. Many 
conscientious objection activists participated in the KdA rallies and some even organized 
their own antinuclear protest events as they expanded their protest repertoire. When the 
KdA failed and the SPD adopted the Godesberg Program, a number of activists began to 
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create their own antinuclear movement to fill the void. This is the point, I argue, where 
extra-parliamentary opposition began to emerge in West Germany and people who were 
previously affiliated with the SPD found themselves truly in opposition to established 
parliamentary positions. 
 This chapter explores how the conscientious objection movement was often 
much more than a single-issue campaign by examining the creation and activities of the 
Action Group for Nonviolence (AG), the involvement with the WRI and its network of 
activists, and the influence of the British Aldermaston Marches against nuclear weapons. 
The importance of the War Resisters’ International to the development of the West 
German conscientious objection movement is considerable. Established along traditions 
of radical pacifism, the WRI was based in Enfield, England, and provided much needed 
organizational and logistical support to its chapters all over the world, including 
Germany.2 With the formation of the VK in 1958, the WRI found itself supporting, and 
at times mediating between, two West German chapters. Nevertheless, the WRI helped 
the West German organizations develop their respective memberships and focused a 
great deal on the issues facing conscientious objectors in the Federal Republic.3 
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Crime against Humanity, 2005; “Germany,” The War Resister, No. 67 Spring, 1955, 20-21, WRI, 
Archives of the War Resisters’ International, 1921-74, microfiche (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 
1977). 
3 “Remilitarisation of Germany,” The War Resister, No. 67, Spring, 1955, 6-7, WRI, Archives of the War 
Resisters’ International, 1921-74, microfiche (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1977); “Visit to 
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 The WRI allowed the West German conscientious objection organizations to 
branch out from their immediate concerns in the Federal Republic and support peace 
efforts throughout the world. During the Suez Crisis in the fall of 1956, the IdK sent 
funds totaling 1,000 DM to the WRI to help the British section’s “[C]ampaign against 
British Government policy in Egypt.”4 In 1960, the German branches of the WRI 
participated in a boycott of South African products organized by the WRI as a protest 
against apartheid. The IdK chapter in Cologne staged a protest demonstration with about 
2,000 participants and for their efforts, through WRI channels, the West German 
conscientious objection organizations received a message of thanks from the South 
African activists fighting to end apartheid.5 Not only were they made aware of the 
activities of conscientious objection and peace groups from around the world, they were 
also often able to support protest campaigns in various parts of the world.  
 The WRI even served to connect the conscientious objection activists in the 
Federal Republic with their counterparts in East Germany.6 Throughout the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the WRI maintained frequent correspondence with the German Peace 
Council the official East German peace organization.7 The WRI often invited the 
German Peace Council to provide background papers and attend their international 
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meetings. The Peace Council eagerly sent information, most of it blatant DDR 
propaganda, but was often unable to attend conferences because the host nation would 
not issue them visas.8  
In 1959, the WRI sent a delegation to Berlin to meet with the Peace Council 
where they gave several radio interviews and even dined with the North Korean 
Ambassador to East Germany who invited a WRI delegation to visit North Korea. The 
delegation did not accept the invitation but did attempt to create a common declaration 
with the East German Peace Council stating basic goals of disarmament and recognition 
of conscientious objection.9 Both the IdK and the VK strongly criticized the common 
declaration and the Executive Committee decided to refrain from issuing statements with 
the Peace Council.10 The West German CO groups were not very interested in working 
with the East German Peace Council because of their difficult position in West German 
society. A press report of the groups meeting with the official East German peace 
organization would have damaged their democratic credentials and made them look 
sympathetic to communism. When the WRI planned a reciprocal meeting with the Peace 
Council in London and asked both German groups to send delegates, the IdK and VK 
8 Report in “War Resistance,” WRI 11th Triennial Conference, Stavengar, Norway, July 26-31, 1963, 
IISG, Amsterdam, War Resisters’ International Records, WRI-11. 
9 Minutes, WRI Executive Committee Meeting, 18 October, 1959, WRI, Archives of the War Resisters’ 
International, 1921-74, microfiche (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1977). 
10 Ibid. 
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stated it was not their policy to meet officially with the Peace Council and were reluctant 
to send anyone.11  
 The WRI was often critical of the German Peace Council and held it accountable 
for the actions of the East German government. When the DDR introduced conscription 
in 1962, the WRI contacted the Peace Council to urge that objectors be treated with 
understanding and sympathy. The WRI leadership protested to the East German 
government and demanded an explanation from the Peace Council.12 However, their 
continual contact and frequent efforts to hear the East German’s position illustrates the 
WRI’s commitment to international peace work. 
 By the 1950s, the WRI had become a forum for peace activists from West 
Germany and around the world. Nehring explained that the WRI in the 1950s and 1960s 
was “…the central place for exchanging ideas about non-violent civil disobedience and 
nonviolent direct action. And it proved an important forum in which European peace 
movements could rediscover their own traditions of nonviolent protest.”13 The 
importance of the WRI to the creation of the transnational social space that West 
German activists occupied is significant. 
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 The WRI facilitated the personal contacts that formed the basis for this 
transnational social space that Konrad and Helga worked within along other West 
German conscientious objection activists. The WRI often served as the meeting point for 
a great many European and international peace activists. The WRI organized study 
conferences, workshops, and seminars where many activists made personal contacts and 
networked with people they would otherwise never meet because of their geographic 
differences.14 At these WRI events, the West German activists exchanged ideas and 
discussed protest methods with a wide range of people. It was through the WRI that 
West German conscientious objection activists Konrad and Helga Tempel met British 
activists April Carter, Pat Arrowsmith, Chris Farley, and Hugh Brock as well as 
American activists A.J. Muste, Gene Sharp, and Bayard Rustin; all people who were 
essential to the development of the West German conscientious objection and 
antinuclear movements.15 In fact, they believed they were inspired much more by the 
people they met at WRI conferences rather than the West German activists they 
interacted with within their own organization.16  
 During their first few years with the IdK in the early 1950s, Konrad and Helga 
Tempel learned about pacifism, peace activism, and got a taste of organized protest 
actions. However, they both felt they were not doing enough to protest against the 
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government’s military policies: Konrad believed the IdK protests started with 
“wonderful intentions but were undertaken with little understanding of political 
processes, with little analysis and with little thought given to how to reach and engage 
people.”17 However, Helga believed this was not limited to the IdK, “In the whole 
society there was very little experience in public relations and how to bring an opinion 
from the grass-roots to the general population.”18 In fact, Konrad stated that in West 
Germany at the time there was “very little civil society conscientiousness.”19   
 After West German rearmament in 1955 and the establishment of conscription in 
1956, the Tempels, along with other like-minded IdK members, looked for ways to be 
more effective in voicing their beliefs. They formed the Action Group for Nonviolence, 
in Hamburg in 1956 with about 20 people from the local IdK chapter.20 Konrad recalled 
in a later interview that he “wanted to be more engaged in dealing with the causes of 
war, with the structures in society that cause war, and be much more involved in 
nonviolent action.”21  
 The impetus for the Action Group for Nonviolence was not from the pacifist 
writings of Michaltscheff and other IdK leaders but from articles, which Konrad and 
Helga read in the British pacifist magazine Peace News. Konrad and Helga were 
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acquainted with the editor, Hugh Brock, through the WRI conferences they attended and 
from reading Peace News they realized that pacifism was a much more public act than 
they had experienced in Germany. At that time, very few people in Germany subscribed 
to Peace News, and nonviolent action as a protest strategy was almost nonexistent. They 
were among the few who had learned about nonviolent protest in international activities, 
and were very inspired to employ the strategy in the West German conscientious 
objection movement.22   
 The AG met weekly to study the literature on nonviolent protest and discuss how 
it could be applied to the conscientious objection movement in West Germany.23 To 
facilitate their discussions and to make information about nonviolence available to other 
West German peace activists the AG published a series titled Texte zur Gewaltlosigkeit 
or Texts on Nonviolence. Their first publication was a German translation of a collection 
of writings about nonviolence, published by American peace activist Gene Sharp who 
was a co-editor of Peace News.24 They also published excerpts of writings from Henry 
David Thoreau and other writers who focused on the principles of nonviolent action.25 
The Tempels worked ceaselessly to become familiar with the literature and principles of 
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nonviolent action and soon became among the leading authorities in the West German 
peace movement.26 
 Another focus of the Action Group for Nonviolence in its first few years of 
existence was practical training in nonviolence and nonviolent action. Having studied 
the literature on nonviolence and nonviolent action Konrad Tempel organized training 
sessions for West German conscientious objection activists. For these conscientious 
objection activists Konrad emphasized the importance of nonviolent behavior, 
particularly in difficult situations. His classes, called “Training in Reasonable Behavior 
in Situations of Conflict,” were perhaps the first training sessions on nonviolence for 
West German activists.27 They would soon have opportunities to employ their training. 
 In the late 1950s, one of the biggest issues for the West German peace movement 
was the threat of nuclear weapons on German soil. A little more than a decade had 
passed since the end of the Second World War and in many ways, the Federal Republic 
of Germany was still recovering from its destruction.28 A significant portion of the West 
German population opposed the idea of nuclear weapons on German soil, either in the 
hands of NATO or the West German Bundeswehr.29 In fact, from April, 1957 to June, 
1958 the Allensbach Institute polled the West German population five times and each 
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time more than sixty percent were against equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear 
weapons.30 The devastating power of nuclear weapons, proven at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in August, 1945, could turn Germany into a wasteland and the public was quite 
aware of that danger.  
 The Protestant Church in Germany sought to draft a resolution about Evangelical 
Christians’ position on atomic weapons and atomic war. Predictably, after several years 
of meetings and heated discussion, they were unable to agree on a statement that 
encompassed the complex issue of nuclear weapons but the leadership and membership 
of the Evangelical Church were in agreement of the danger nuclear weapons posed. Each 
proposed resolution contained strong statements about the immorality of nuclear war. 
For example the “The Brethren’s Ten Theses” from 1958 stated, “Nuclear war entails 
the mutual destruction of the populations involved, as well as countless other uninvolved 
people.”31 The “Heidelberg Theses” from 1959 declared, “In the past, the ‘just war’ 
doctrine has guided Christians. But this principle cannot be applied to nuclear war. It 
destroys what it claims to preserve.”32 In the end, the Evangelical Church took a position 
where it tolerated nuclear weapons but supported those who opposed them.33   
 However, the fear of Soviet aggression and the very tense political climate in 
Central Europe convinced the Christian Democrats and many West Germans that their 
                                                 
30 Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, The Germans, 441 
31 Cioc, Pax Atomica, 108. 
32 Ibid., 112. 
33 Ibid.,115. 
122 
 
only hope for survival was in nuclear weapons. They believed, like many in the Western 
World, that the possession of nuclear weapons was a powerful, effective, and perhaps 
only deterrent to war. The exigency of nuclear weapons for defense was confirmed for 
many Germans when the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum about the status of Berlin in 
November of 1958.34 Khrushchev demanded that the U.S. demilitarize West Berlin in six 
months or face dire consequences. The Soviets claimed the time was long past to settle 
the “abnormal” status of a divided Berlin and allow it to become a normal, whole city; a 
city that would undoubtedly fall under Soviet control.35 The danger of a nuclear conflict 
between the super powers was particularly disturbing for West Germans, as most 
believed that if a nuclear war did break out between the United States and the Soviet 
Union it would be fought in Germany.36 
 The opposition party in the West German parliament was the left-wing Social 
Democratic Party of Germany. The SPD opposed nuclear weapons, much as they had 
opposed West German rearmament and conscription, and had initiated the public 
opposition campaign Fight Atomic Death in 1958.37 KdA reached out to the previously 
untapped antinuclear sentiment outside of the political sphere. The grassroots campaign 
connected with the fears of many in the Federal Republic and raised impressive numbers 
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at KdA rallies around the country.38 The campaign was successful in raising popular 
support for a brief period but within a year, it had faded into obscurity. The SPD was 
unable to leverage the power of the popular KdA campaign in the Bundestag to support 
their opposition to the CDU on the nuclear weapons issue.39 Consequently, the SPD 
allowed the KdA to decline, only maintaining its continued existence as a façade to 
support their latent opposition to nuclear weapons after 1959.40 
 The SPD changed directions politically and in 1959 the party adopted a new 
political program, known as the Bad Godesberg program, in which they gave tacit 
approval to the idea of a nuclear armed Bundeswehr.41 The Godesberg program 
indicated a significant shift in the political course of the Party towards a more 
mainstream platform in order challenge the CDU for control of the government.42 These 
were wrenching decisions that badly divided the party and led many activists to abandon 
the SPD and seek another kind of leftist political space. Many peace activists believed 
this shift left them without representation in the West German political sphere and 
therefore forced them to begin extra-parliamentary efforts.43  
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 Some West German activists began working outside the political sphere before 
the SPD dropped the nuclear issue. In fact, at the height of the Fight Atomic Death 
movement in April 1958, the Action Group for Nonviolence staged a dramatic protest 
demonstration in Hamburg without the assistance of the SPD or the Fight Atomic Death 
campaign organizers. The event was called a “Mahnwache” or “vigil,” a term invented 
by a young master glazier, Jürgen Grimm, who was a member of the AG.44 The 
Mahnwache was the first major action undertaken by West German conscientious 
objection activists outside of their traditional scope of protest. 
 With their Action Group for Nonviolence and the support of the IdK Konrad and 
Helga organized and led the vigil against nuclear weapons in front of the Hamburg city 
hall. The Mahnwache began on April 17 at the end of a massive Fight Atomic Death 
protest rally in Hamburg that had drawn over 100,000 participants. Rather than host an 
event for an afternoon, the AG organized a protest action that was held around the clock 
for two weeks. Konrad and Helga wrote that they started the Mahnwache at the end of 
the big Fight Atomic Death rally because they felt that saying one’s opinion in an 
afternoon demonstration was not enough, that more steps were necessary. They also 
believed that a single protest rally was not enough to raise awareness of the danger posed 
by nuclear weapons. They wanted their vigil to serve to keep the public’s conscience 
awake to the fact that they live in mortal danger of nuclear weapons.45   
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 Furthermore, Konrad and Helga felt it was critical to prove that public concern 
over this issue was not simply a temporary product of a massive protest campaign 
supported by a major political party. They wanted to show that ordinary people, without 
the support of a national campaign, were willing and able to show persistence and speak 
out against government nuclear policy.46 To the leadership of the AG, many people 
involved in the Fight Atomic Death campaign followed and participated because their 
political leaders told them to, not because of their conscience.47 The Mahnwache was 
their rebuttal to this kind of activism; a person should not need to be told by their 
political party to protest against something they believed was wrong. 
 Members of the Action Group for Nonviolence and the IdK quietly demonstrated 
in the Rathausmarkt around the clock and kept count of how many hours the 
Mahnwache had been going. Day and night two members of the Action Group wearing 
armbands with the words “Mahn-Wache” stood in front of the Hamburg Rathaus with a 
sign that read “Wer die Atombombe nimmt, wird durch die Atombombe umkommen,” 
(“Whoever takes the Atomic Bomb will perish by the Atomic Bomb”).48 Every two 
hours another pair of activists would relieve the first pair and they would then spend 
some time walking around talking and discussing the issue of nuclear armament with 
people in the square.49 The coordinators of the Mahnwache carefully orchestrated the 
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schedule so that a fresh pair relieved each pair of activists, no matter the hour, every two 
hours. They also made sure that the activist pairs that stood the vigil during the night had 
torches, which had been supplied by the Hamburg IdK chapter, for added drama and to 
light the sign.50   
 The AG issued specific instructions for the conduct of the activists and insisted 
that each participant follow a strict code of nonviolence. They wanted to ensure that the 
Mahnwache maintained a courteous and peaceful presence in order to avoid giving the 
impression that they were weird types or anarchists against the state.51 Participants were 
instructed that if they were met with hostility the best course of action was to remain 
calm and silent. If the activists felt they were in danger they were to call for the police. 
Maintaining proper behavior was an essential element of the Mahnwache if the protest 
was to have legitimacy in the public sphere. As soon as the event crossed the line into 
what could be considered rowdy or irresponsible action the activists and their message 
would lose credibility and be dismissed as out of hand.  
 The Mahnwache organizers also emphasized the necessity of staying within the 
law while at the same time preserving the character of the protest. In the case that the 
police asked them to leave the square, the participants were told to ask why they were 
being told to leave and, if possible, they were to try to remain at their post. If the police 
confiscated the sign and the torches, the activists were to remain calm and courteous and 
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to stay in the square if possible. The Mahnwache organizers went so far as to provide the 
participants with the passage from the constitution that protected their right to express 
their conscience. The AG leadership told the activists that as long as they were not 
disturbing the peace, obstructing traffic, or endangering people, they had every right to 
be in the square. In fact, the Mahnwache organizers specifically used only two activists 
to stand vigil with the sign because “A collection of two people is not illegal if you do 
not have the intent to disrupt the general order.”52 However, if a pair of activists was 
forced to leave the Rathausmarkt it was up to the replacement pair to decide what to 
do— the goal was that the new pair would be able to continue the vigil.53 
 As it turns out the Mahnwache was not interrupted by the Hamburg police and as 
the hours went by the participants became more comfortable with the protest 
demonstration. Several days into the Mahnwache the Action Group for Nonviolence 
leaders and Mahnwache organizers, Konrad and Helga, sent out letters to the members 
of the IdK, calling on them to join the demonstration. They wrote that major West 
German newspapers such as Die Welt, the Hamburger Morgenpost, and the Bildzeitung 
had already reported widely on the Mahnwache and that members could help in a 
number of ways such as volunteering to be part of a pair with the sign or helping with 
providing information to the press.54 The fact that the press had reported on the 
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Mahnwache and the authorities were not bothering the activists was evidence that their 
protest was working. 
 The protest Mahnwache received media attention throughout the two-week 
demonstration but the highlight of the Mahnwache, for the media and the organizers, 
was when international activists joined the demonstration. The first international visitors 
were the most exciting. Coming all the way from Japan two young Japanese activists, 25 
year old seamstress Yoshiko Murato and 23 year old student Hayao Shimizu, joined the 
Mahnwache in front of the Hamburg Rathaus eight days into the demonstration, April 
24, 1958.55 The two young Japanese activists were on a trip to Europe representing their 
Japanese antinuclear protest movement. Yoshiko Murato brought the reality of nuclear 
war to the forefront of the Hamburg protest demonstration because she had actually 
experienced firsthand the devastation of the atomic bomb as a survivor of the bombing 
of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.56   
 The papers told her story of survival in ghastly detail and always included her 
photograph in every article. The Hamburger Morgenpost reported that her face was 
covered with scars and that because of her unresolved medical issues she was only able 
to stand the Mahnwache for one hour that day. The detailed description of her survival 
told how even though she was some distance from the center of the blast her face and 
upper body were covered with burn scars, so much so that her parents were unable to 
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recognize her. The news reported that even after her hospital recovery Murato was still 
broken physically and mentally. More frightening was the fact that even after 13 years of 
recovery she was still at risk of dying from “the dreaded ‘atomic disease’ that has 
already carried off nearly 80,000 survivors of August 6, 1945. Against this disease,” the 
Hamburger Morgenpost despairingly reported, “there is no medicine.”57 
 The two young Japanese activists told the West Germans about the Japanese 
people’s movement against nuclear armament and in particular wanted to share their 
message with the young people of West Germany. They coordinated with the Action 
Group for Nonviolence and in conjunction with the Mahnwache the Japanese activists 
showed a documentary about the devastating effect of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki later that evening. The film showed the horrors the atomic bombs visited 
on the Japanese cities and the paper reported that the images of overcrowded hospitals, 
the burned and distorted bodies of children, and the overwhelming human suffering was 
“a ballad of terror and grief.”58 At the end of the film, Yoshiko Murato once again 
described her experience as a child in the bombing of Hiroshima. The media reported 
that Yoshiko Murato’s “life has only one purpose: to warn the world, ‘Let our misery be 
enough! There must be no more Hiroshimas, no more Nagasakis!’"59   
 The other international participants came from the United States and Great 
Britain. While they did not have the dramatic appeal that Hiroshima survivors had, the 
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participation of these activists was just as important to the Mahnwache and the long-term 
development of extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany. April Carter was from 
Great Britain and she, along with American peace and civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, 
joined the vigil on April 27, 1958.60 April Carter was very involved in the British “Ban 
the Bomb” movement and was part of the leadership of the burgeoning Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND).61 In fact, she was part of the Direct Action Committee 
Against Nuclear War (DAC) that organized the first Aldermaston March against nuclear 
weapons just two weeks prior to her visit to Hamburg.62 While in Hamburg for the 
Mahnwache, April Carter further strengthened her relationship with the West German 
peace activists, particularly with Konrad and Helga Tempel. This is important to note 
because the close connections built between British and West German activists played a 
crucial role in the development of the West German antinuclear movement.   
 The other major international participant in the Mahnwache was American peace 
and civil rights activist Bayard Rustin.63 Rustin, whom Konrad and Helga had also met 
through WRI networks, was a World War II conscientious objector and in the first 
Aldermaston march two weeks earlier, he gave a rousing speech to a crowd of 8,000.64 
His presence at the Hamburg Mahnwache, much like Carter and Arrowsmith’s, 
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highlights the significance of the antinuclear protest to international peace activists and 
the strength of the transnational network of activists to which Konrad and Helga 
belonged. Furthermore, Rustin’s participation also helped develop his relationship with 
the West German members of the Action Group for Nonviolence. He too would 
maintain his contacts with the West German activists and form an integral part of the 
transnational network that was so important to the development of extra-parliamentary 
opposition in West Germany. 
 The Mahnwache came to an end on May 1, after 14 days of maintaining a 
24-hour presence in front of the Hamburg Rathaus with slogans warning the public 
about the danger of atomic weapons.65 The Mahnwache illustrated the power of the 
memory of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The West German activists 
had plenty of information about the deadly effects of nuclear weapons—blast strength, 
fallout range, and immediate and long term effects—but all they had to do to 
empathetically point out the dangers of nuclear weapons was to show photos of the 
devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were always able to reach people on a 
visceral level with images of the atomic bomb victims but when Yoshiko Murato joined 
the Mahnwache she took the reality of the danger that atomic weapons posed to a whole 
new level. Her personal story of physical and emotional devastation from the atomic 
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bomb added an element to the antinuclear protest that no amount of statistics, 
photographs, or scientific reports could ever provide – the human element.66 
 It is hard to measure the immediate effect of the Mahnwache on the West 
Germans who saw it in the Rathaus square. The news reported on the protest event and 
people were clearly impressed with the determination of the activists but it is unlikely 
that many people were strongly affected by it. When a survivor of the bombing of 
Hiroshima was added to the mix, the public took notice. The news media, which had 
already reported on the Mahnwache, printed long articles with photos of Yoshiko 
Murato that clearly showed the scars on her face and told her story in ghastly detail.67 
Murato’s participation brought the memory of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
to life and at the same time added significant weight to the Mahnwache’s warnings about 
the dangers of nuclear weapons.   
 The long-term effect of the Mahnwache, and the West German peace movement 
as a whole, was also impacted by the participation of international peace activists. April 
Carter and Bayard Rustin added legitimacy to the Mahnwache by simply being there but 
their presence, along with the presence of Yoshiko Murato and Hayao Shimizu, 
highlighted the international importance of the issue. Furthermore, the West German 
activists, particularly the Action Group for Nonviolence organizers, strengthened their 
relationship with April Carter and Bayard Rustin. These relationships were essential to 
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the emergence and development of extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany 
because the transnational social space that these relationships facilitated enabled peace 
activists from all over the world to share ideas and build networks that were critical for 
the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany.   
 The concept of transnational social spaces is quite useful when attempting to 
describe the networks and connections that precluded the organization of international 
and transnational protest movements because it allows historians to approach these 
movements without being restricted by national boundaries. Commonly held goals and 
values that transcended state borders united peace activists and allowed them to 
coordinate protest efforts. During the Cold War environment of the late 1950s and early 
1960s, people around the world could sympathize with the message of peace and nuclear 
disarmament because the super power confrontation between the Soviet Union and the 
United States affected everyone. Many of the actors in the West German conscientious 
objection movement developed and maintained a network of likeminded activists from 
around the world and these networks had a powerful effect on the growth of 
extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany.   
 The conscientious objection activists in the AG members created their own 
transnational social space in the late 1950s and developed it further through the 
Mahnwache. The event reinforced their commonly held political goals and moral beliefs 
through the participation and affirmation of international peace activists like Murato, 
Rustin, and Carter. The Mahnwache also helped develop the activists’ respective protest 
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cultures because they were able to see strategies and methods of protest in action. The 
lack of action by the IdK leadership continually disappointed the AG members. Konrad 
complained of “[N]o real leadership…no inspiration from above…no dynamic power! 
No inspiring call for active resistance.”68 Through the engagement with leading activists 
from outside West Germany, the AG found inspiration, calls for action, and the energy 
they needed. 
  The Mahnwache gave the AG the experience and the momentum they needed to 
initiate a more active protest culture. The strict code of nonviolence and orderly 
execution of every aspect of the Mahnwache clearly contributed to its success and while 
most future protest actions would be characterized by mass participation, the 
organizational effort to pull off a 24-hour presence for several weeks was as impressive 
as it was educational. Helga Tempel recalled, “We encouraged people by our example to 
go into the street with signs, to do something, to set up models of action and overcome 
the hindrances that are always inside us and to take unusual steps.”69 The Mahnwache 
also proved to the conscientious objection organizations that Konrad and Helga, along 
with the other AG members, were capable of successfully organizing major protest 
actions. Konrad recalled, “These experiences were indirect preparation for the Easter 
March. The big conscientious objection organizations got the impression that we could 
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do it. So when we published the call for the Easter March we had some legitimacy and 
they believed that we could do it.”70 
 Signs and policy discussions can only go so far and the Action Group for 
Nonviolence members recognized this. It was, however, in their opinion, the first major, 
internationally represented, antinuclear protest action undertaken by the conscientious 
objection movement in West Germany.71 The event also proved the activists could 
publically voice their opposition to a political issue outside of the realm of politics; all 
the while remaining within the boundaries of the law and societal norms. The event must 
be recognized as an important transitional step towards establishing the 
extra-parliamentary opposition movement in West Germany.   
 The British nuclear disarmament movement provided West German activists 
with a guidance and inspiration, particularly in regards to examples of protest actions. 
The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) formed January 27, 1958.72 The 
CND’s first public event was a large rally at Westminster Central Hall in London that 
February. Around 5,000 people heard prominent speakers such as noted historian A.J.P. 
Taylor call on the British government to change its nuclear weapons policy.73 At this 
meeting in Central Hall, a policy statement was drawn up. It stated:  
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The purpose of the Campaign is to press for a British initiative to reduce the 
nuclear peril and to stop the armaments race. We shall seek to persuade the 
British people that Britain must:  
a. Renounce unconditionally the use or production of nuclear weapons and 
refuse to allow their use by others in her defense;  
b. Use her utmost endeavor to bring about negotiations at all levels for 
agreement to end the armaments race and to lead to a general disarmament 
convention;  
c. Invite the cooperation of other nations, particularly non-nuclear powers, in 
her renunciation of nuclear weapons.74 
 The campaign, from the beginning, drew a number of well-known intellectuals, 
political figures, and religious leaders. Taylor believed his participation was the 
“worthiest activity I ever undertook.”75 To Taylor the argument was simple, “In my 
opinion we had a watertight case. The bomb was wicked. It was idiotic. It was 
dangerous.”76 His speeches at the mass public rallies were very well received and his 
involvement in the leadership of the campaign brought it some legitimacy. Another 
founding member and the first Chairman of the CND, John Collins, was an Anglican 
Priest who was a canon at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London. At the February rally at 
Westminster Central Hall Canon Collins declared, “I stand here, and I accepted the 
Chairmanship of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament because I believe the question 
of whether we arm ourselves with nuclear is, perhaps, the supreme moral question of our 
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day.”77 To him, and many other CND activists, the nuclear weapons issue was a very 
moral one; a sentiment that was shared by many West German activists as well. 
 The AG found its counterpart in the British Direct Action Committee Against 
Nuclear War (DAC). The goal of the DAC was to confront the issue of nuclear war head 
on with nonviolent, direct action. Their first protest action targeted the Atomic Weapons 
Research Establishment at Aldermaston, a small town in Berkshire about fifty miles west 
of London. The DAC planned a protest march to the facility in Aldermaston that would 
take place over the 1958 Easter holiday.78 Joined by the newly created CND, the British 
antinuclear activists proposed to hold a rally in Trafalgar Square in London and then 
march to Aldermaston over the next four days.   
 The DAC took a leadership role in the development of the Aldermaston marches 
and had significant influence on the character of the campaign. This was because they 
brought with them a commitment to nonviolence and an understanding of nonviolent 
protest tactics that helped create an atmosphere of nonviolent protest that shaped the 
character of the march for many years. Cotemporaries identified several key actors of the 
DAC contingent such as High Brock, April Carter, Pat Arrowsmith, and Michael 
Randle.79 These same people played pivotal roles in the creation of the transnational 
social space they shared with the West German conscientious objection activists.   
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 The CND created the now ubiquitous peace symbol during the early days of the 
organization. Gerald Holtom, the CND activist who designed it, explained meaning of 
the symbol “First, the semaphore for the initials, ND (nuclear disarmament). Second, the 
broken cross meant the death of man, the circle the unborn child. It represented the threat 
of nuclear weapons to all mankind, and, because this was new, the threat to the unborn 
child.”80 Antinuclear organizations all over Europe and the world quickly adopted this 
symbol. It also became a unifying symbol for peace activists everywhere. 
 When the West German activists heard the reports of the first Aldermaston 
march, they were impressed and inspired. That Easter, more than 5,000 people attended 
the rally in Trafalgar Square and by the time the march reached Aldermaston the crowd 
had reached 8,000. The march successfully attracted a large number of people from the 
general population. Historian Thomas Wittner noted, “Although pointless on the face of 
it, this four-day march through the chilling rain by large numbers of well-dressed, 
earnest citizens—many bearing the nuclear disarmament symbol, in its stark, funereal 
black and white—provided a powerful demonstration of public resolve to halt the 
nuclear arms race.”81 
The success of the 1958 Aldermaston march immediately changed the character 
of the CND and the antinuclear movement. April Carter recalled that the “CND’s 
original aim to act as a liberal pressure group was, however, challenged almost 
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immediately, when the Aldermaston march began to transform it into a popular 
movement flowing out onto the streets.”82 This shift to a popular protest movement was 
a process that was transmitted through the transnational social space to activists in West 
Germany. When the Action Group for Nonviolence heard about the plans for the first 
Aldermaston March in 1958, they contacted Pat Arrowsmith and April Carter. They 
were interested in coming to London to support the CND at the protest event but when 
Konrad and Helga asked about joining the march and they were told “Stay where you 
are, it’s just a protest action like all our other protests. There is no need to come.”83 
Unbeknownst to Carter and Arrowsmith, the Aldermaston march would inspire 
thousands of ordinary people to publically protest against government nuclear policy. 
Not just in Britain but on the Continent as well. 
 The following year the AG was determined to be represented at the Aldermaston 
march. Konrad made the trip to London from Hamburg to join the march that April at 
the invitation of Carter and Arrowsmith. For the 1959 Aldermaston march the CND 
changed the direction of the march so that it began in Aldermaston and ended in London. 
This shifted the point of emphasis from the development and production of nuclear 
weapons to the center of political power that was directing nuclear weapons policy.84 
The fact that the final rally was held in London also made mass attendance much more 
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possible; it was estimated that around 20,000 people attended.85 The impressive turnout 
and passionate efforts of the CND activists had a powerful impact on Konrad.  
The Aldermaston March inspired Konrad to advance the antinuclear activism of 
the conscientious objection movement and after he returned to Germany, he looked for 
more opportunities to engage the West German public. To commemorate the bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Konrad, as part of the leadership of the newly formed VK, 
gave a speech at the “World Peace Day” event that August about nonviolence and the 
dangers of atomic war.86   
The AG also organized a protest demonstration during the month of December in 
1959 at the French consulate in Hamburg to protest against France’s nuclear weapons 
development.87 For four weeks, members of the AG held nightly vigils in front of the 
French consulate. They specifically directed their protests against French plans to test a 
nuclear weapon in the Sahara desert.88 Much like the Mahnwache the previous year, the 
goal of the demonstration was to educate people about the dangers of nuclear weapons 
and to engage West Germans in conversations about nuclear weapons policies. However, 
the event elicited a limited response and did not seem effective enough to really draw 
attention to the issue. 
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 Konrad Tempel and the members of the AG hoped to do more to bring the 
dangers of nuclear weapons to the forefront of West German society and to encourage 
the Federal Republic to abandon its nuclear weapons policy. After Konrad returned from 
the 1959 Aldermaston march he and the AG looked for a nuclear weapons site to 
demonstrate at in West Germany. The group spent several months looking for a suitable 
location for an antinuclear march, such as a missile base or testing center, but were 
unable to find one. Their luck changed in December when the Hamburger Morgenpost 
reported that NATO was testing Honest John missiles at the military base in 
Bergen-Hohne.89 This was a perfect location for a protest march; it was about 60 miles 
(or 95km) from Hamburg and Bremen and about 45 miles (or 70km) from Hannover and 
Brunswick, close enough to walk to but far enough that it would take several days. 
Convinced that Bergen-Hohne was the best target for their antinuclear activism the AG 
chose to initiate a protest march the following Easter to the site.90 Eager to take action 
against nuclear armaments Konrad declared, “I will march to Bergen-Hohne even if I 
have to go alone.”91 Konrad Tempel and the AG did not have to march to Bergen-Hohne 
alone. As they began organizing the march for the next Easter the group reached out to 
their network of conscientious objectors for support.92 Unbeknownst to them at the time, 
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the AG was embarking on a protest campaign that would prove to be foundation of 
extra-parliamentary opposition in the Federal Republic of Germany.  
 By this point, the SPD’s KdA campaign was no longer a force of any 
consequence and no real outlet existed for antinuclear protest. The German Easter 
Marches mark the beginning of true extra-parliamentary opposition because another 
political party did not fill the void left by the SPD. Essentially, no group within the 
political sphere took an antinuclear position, therefore this forced West German activists 
to operate in and learn to navigate the undefined extra-parliamentary space left open to 
them.  
 Along with their opposition to nuclear weapons, the AG identified specific 
government activities that they believed posed a danger to society and formulated protest 
campaigns to counter them. In October of 1960 the Hamburger Morgenpost reported 
that the West German government planned to build a nuclear fallout shelter, an 
“Atomschutzbunker,” in Altona, a Western borough of Hamburg. The AG immediately 
reacted to this announcement and quickly organized a protest event against the 
construction of the nuclear shelter. The AG undertook a protest campaign named Aktion 
Maulwurf, or Action Mole, complete with flyers, meetings, and vigils at the construction 
site.93 
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 The rhetoric of the protest action by the AG focused on the futility of building 
nuclear shelters. The group explained that even if the shelters were able to protect the 
citizens of Hamburg from a nuclear attack, the immediate destruction of the city would 
be so complete and the long-term effects of the nuclear fallout would be so devastating 
as to make the city and the region a nuclear wasteland. All one had to do was look at the 
destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs in 1945. 
The AG detailed in their flyers the loss of life at Hiroshima, 86,000 immediately killed 
and another 150,000 dead from radiation in the 15 years prior to 1960. As if that was not 
chilling enough, the AG pointed out that the destructive capabilities of the modern 
nuclear weapons were seven times greater than the combined power of the bombs 
dropped on Japan in 1945.94 
 Furthermore, the members of the AG believed that the fallout shelters would give 
people a false sense of security from atomic weapons.95 This was problematic for several 
reasons. If people felt fallout shelters would protect them from a nuclear attack then 
some might not take the nuclear threat as seriously. One of the goals of the 1958 
Mahnwache and the Easter March was to raise public awareness of the great danger 
nuclear weapons posed to humankind. The nuclear issue was not simply a concern of the 
government or military strategists; it was a concern of the everyman. In addition, the 
building of fallout shelters was perceived by the AG to be an attempt by the West 
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German government to trick its citizens into believing that it could protect them in the 
event of a nuclear war.   
 In reality, in the event of a nuclear attack people would be required to live 
underground for years because of the radiation threat. Konrad Tempel explained that the 
idea of living in fallout shelters for extended periods had become common in the late 
1950s and early 1960s in West Germany. He specifically remembered the writings of 
University of Hamburg physicist Pascual Jordan who wrote in the late 1950s that 
mankind should get used to living underground because the nuclear threat was so great.96 
In fact, he recommended that each person, if they are able, should have their own 
bunker. 
Both Konrad and Helga were opposed to the very concept of nuclear fallout 
shelters. Simply accepting the idea and being willing to spend enormous amounts of 
time and money on a shelter was seen as a betrayal of their cause. Building a personal 
fallout shelter was paramount to defeatism and an abandonment of all the AG stood for. 
Konrad remembered that it was rumored Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, one of the 
scientists who signed the Göttingen Declaration in 1958, had a fallout shelter built for 
his family at his home in Starnberg. Many AG members felt that, if true, this was a 
                                                 
96 See Pascual Jordan, Atom und Weltall; Einführung in den Gedankeninhalt der modernen Physik 
(Braunschweig: F. Vieweg, 1960). 
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stinging act of unfaithfulness from one of the intellectual leaders of the nuclear 
disarmament movement in Germany.97   
This illustrates that this issue was much more serious than building shelters for 
public safety. To the members of the AG fallout shelters were not the answer. If the 
West German government was concerned about protecting its citizens from a nuclear 
attack, it should focus its efforts on nuclear disarmament and nonviolent confliction 
resolution strategies.   
 As the West German conscientious objection activists began expanding the scope 
of their involvement in the late 1950s to include the atomic weapons issue they also 
started exploring different methods of protest. They were influenced by the British 
anti-war group known as the Committee of 100 set up in October 1960 by Bertrand 
Russell, Hugh Brock, and April Carter among others. West German activists, namely 
Konrad and Helga, worked with the Committee of 100 and learned a great deal about 
direct action and civil disobedience. April Carter wrote, “The Committee of 100 was 
founded in an attempt to increase the numbers of people taking part in civil 
disobedience, so that direct action was moved away from the image of individual 
witness and into the stage of mass resistance.”98 West German activists also gained a 
better understanding of an important aspect of direct action, its media appeal. Carter 
recalled, “The most popular reason for favoring direct action—especially among its 
                                                 
97 Interview with Konrad and Helga Tempel, Ahrensberg, Germany, July 24, 2013. 
98 Carter, Direct Action and Liberal Democracy, 65. 
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sympathizers in the ranks of the CND—was that it gained wide press and media 
coverage.”99 The broader the media coverage a protest event attracted the more people 
were informed about the message the protesters were try to communicate. 
 The ideas and protest tactics that West German peace activists such as Konrad 
and Helga Tempel learned from The Committee of 100 were soon applied to West 
German protest actions. However, the West Germans did not copy the British methods 
completely. Rather, they used what they learned from their British counterparts in the 
Committee of 100 to inform the development of their own style of direct action. This is 
because the legal and social environments in Britain and West Germany were quite 
different from one another and this fact necessitated different approaches to direct action 
protest tactics, but this is covered in a later chapter. 
 By the early 1960s, the West German conscientious objection movement had 
undergone a great deal of change. It was much more involved in issues and protest 
campaigns from all over the world, the most prominent being the antinuclear campaign. 
A shift in focus emerged as the organizations and individual activists moved away from 
the original singular focus on anti-military and anti-conscription in West Germany and 
broadened their protest agenda to include antinuclear, anti-racism, and peace in a global 
perspective. 
 The West German conscientious objection organizations and the activists 
belonging to them were connected to a network of likeminded groups and individuals 
                                                 
99 Carter, Direct Action and Liberal Democracy, 62. 
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facilitated by the War Resisters’ International. This transnational network furthered the 
development of both the West German peace organizations and activists. Because of this 
transnational social space, the West Germans gained access to new ideas, strategies, and 
tactics as they worked to create a society that embraced nonviolence and peaceful 
conflict resolution. They also utilized a forum in which they learned about the successes 
and failures of various protest events from around the world. Through their interaction 
with other actors in the transnational social space they occupied, the West Germans 
gained firsthand knowledge about the application of new protest techniques and found 
support for the implementation of their own tactics and ideas. This wealth of knowledge 
and experience was invaluable to the West Germans as they worked to create a protest 
culture of their own in order to effectively participate in West German politics from the 
undefined space outside of the traditional party structure. In short, the transnational 
social space engineered by the West German conscientious objection activists alongside 
their counterparts around the world provided the building blocks for the foundation on 
which extra-parliamentary opposition would emerge in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
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CHAPTER V 
MARCH FOR PEACE: THE WEST GERMAN CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
MOVEMENT AND THE CREATION OF THE OSTERMARSCH 
On a cold, rainy Easter Sunday in April 1960, peace activists from Bremen, 
Hannover, Hamburg, and Brunswick gathered at the British rocket installation at 
Bergen-Hohne in Northern West Germany. They had just completed a four-day march to 
protest the deployment of nuclear weapons on West German soil in the first Easter 
March Against Atomic Weapons. The Easter March, or Ostermarsch, started with 
perhaps 1,000 participants and was the first antinuclear protest action of its kind in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The Easter March continues to this day, and it is 
considered by many historians to have been the first sustained protest movement of 
extra-parliamentary opposition in the Federal Republic of Germany.1 As it grew from 
about 1,000 participants to tens of thousands during the mid-1960s, the Easter Marches 
laid the foundation for extra-parliamentary opposition and inspired a generation of 
activists that challenged the authority of the West German state. 
The Easter March was founded by Konrad Tempel, Helga Tempel, and several 
likeminded West German peace activists in 1960. Historians point to the Social 
Democratic Party’s antinuclear campaign Fight Atomic Death and the antinuclear 
movement in Great Britain as the primary factors in the creation of the Easter March. 
1 Burns and van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 92-93; Thomas, Protest Movements 
in 1960s West Germany, 37-38; Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 111; Otto, Vom Ostermarsch zur APO. 
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While both certainly played an important role, historians often neglect the influence of 
the West German conscientious objection movement on the creation of the Easter March 
and, consequently, our understanding of the beginnings of the Easter March is 
incomplete.2 Historians of the West German peace movement often describe the 
founders as “a small group of religious pacifists,” and describe the Easter March as a 
continuation of the 1950s’ protests against nuclear weapons.3 However, the initiators of 
the Easter March were much more than just religious pacifists, and the Easter March was 
a product of a much broader network of activists and organizations, which dated back to 
the debates over rearmament and conscription in the 1950s. 
 Drawing the connection between the Easter Marches and the West German 
conscientious objection movement, this chapter argues that the learning process that 
many West German activists went through in the latter half of the 1950s during their 
work in the IdK, VK, and AG prepared them to transition from these fairly limited 
protests campaigns to broader, farther reaching campaigns that involved hundreds of 
thousands in protest against the West German government. Thus, this chapter establishes 
the importance of the movement to the creation and success of the Easter March 
campaign. This chapter also challenges the traditional understanding of the origins of the 
Easter Marches and seeks to provide a more nuanced account of how and why the Easter 
March campaign was created by discussing the early years of the campaign and 
                                                 
2 An important exception is Holger Nehring’s work on the connections between the British and West 
German antinuclear movements. See Nehring, “National Internationalists,” and his recent book Politics of 
Security. 
3 Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, 220; Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 98; Otto, Vom Ostermarsch zur APO, 
70. 
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illustrating how the lessons learned in the IdK, VK, and AG were applied. Furthermore, 
this chapter examines how the West German public received the Easter March 
movement and how its leadership navigated the complex and often contradictory Cold 
War East West rhetoric. This chapter will also look at how the Easter Marches 
developed as a distinctly West German protest movement as a result of the experiences 
of the activists and the unique geopolitical position of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The activism of these individuals, outside of official party actions such as the KdA, put 
them at odds with the Social Democratic Party and was the forerunner to the conflict 
between the politically active, nonaligned public and the established political parties. 
 The West German Easter Marches are fairly well known in the history of German 
protest activism. Historians recognize the Easter Marches as the first protest campaign of 
the 1960s and consider it to have ushered in the extra-parliamentary opposition 
movement that defined the era.4 However, historians often ignore the origins of the 
Easter Marches. What little information historians do provide about founders of the 
Easter Marches focuses on the religious element and the phrase “religiously minded 
pacifists” or “small group of Quakers” is repeatedly used.5 The Action Group for 
Nonviolence, the IdK and later VK group that focused on direct action tactics of 
nonviolence and organized the first Easter March was certainly made up of people who 
                                                 
4 Burns, and van der Will. Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 92. 
5 Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany, 37; Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 98; Wittner, 
Resisting the Bomb, 220. 
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were mostly, if not all, pacifists, but there is no indication that they were especially 
religiously motivated in their pacifism.  
 It is interesting that this aspect is the one of the few facts historians have 
provided and it warrants exploration. The historians that do mention the origins of the 
Easter Marches all cite the same source, Karl A. Otto’s 1977 book Vom Ostermarsch zur 
APO that came out of his 1975 dissertation at Bielefeld University. It is the only 
academic study of the Easter Marches and is an important contribution to the study of 
the emergence of extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany. However, most 
historians, to their detriment, repeat Otto’s description of the Easter March founders. 
Otto wrote that Konrad Tempel and a “group of religiously motivated pacifists” initiated 
the first Easter March in 1960 and went on to describe the Action Group for 
Nonviolence as a “Quaker group” within the VK.6 This description of the Action Group 
for Nonviolence only focuses on one aspect of the group and leaves out a multitude of 
other motivating issues.   
 Pacifism has often, but not always, been rooted in a person’s religious beliefs. 
However, in the context of postwar Germany, there are a multitude of reasons why 
someone would be a pacifist. The founders of the AG, Konrad and Helga Tempel, were 
Quakers but, according to them, they were the only Quakers in the 20 or so members of 
the group.7 Quaker values can be seen in some of the AG’s organizational principles, 
                                                 
6 Otto, Vom Ostermarsch zur APO, 70. 
7 Interview with Konrad and Helga Tempel, Ahrensberg, Germany, July 24, 2013. 
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such as moral responsibility and the emphasis on personal initiative. However, none of 
the AG literature or rhetoric contained religious elements or any material that would 
indicate that religious beliefs motivated the group. Konrad Tempel wrote, “[R]eligious 
issues played no role in our work, even if people like [Karl A.] Otto, among others, 
accepts it. [It] is obvious to derive such a statement from the fact that we are both 
Quakers; however, it is wrong.”8 As illustrated during the preparations for the Hamburg 
vigil in 1958, the AG saw their activism as a product of their personal convictions that 
the world had seen enough war and violence. It would be more accurate to say they also 
found motivation in the teachings of Gandhi and Thoreau.9  
 It is somewhat unfortunate that this religious label has continually been applied 
to the initiators of the Easter Marches, and while religion was an important influence for 
some of the Action Group for Nonviolence, namely the Tempels, we must be careful not 
to miss the other motivating factors that are equally important: fear of a nuclear war, war 
weariness from the Second World War, a sense of moral responsibility for Germany’s 
actions on the world stage, and the desire to bring the Cold War division of Germany 
and Europe to a peaceful end. A multitude of people in the Federal Republic and 
throughout the world shared these factors. If we only acknowledge the possible religious 
                                                 
8 Letter from Konrad Tempel to the Norddeutscher Rundfunk Hauptabteilung Politik, September 10, 1982, 
HIS, TEM 500,02. 
9 Henry David Thoreau, Widerstand Gegen Die Regierung, in Texte Zur Gewaltlosigkeit no. 2, (Hamburg: 
Aktionskreis für Gewaltlosigkeit, 1959), Konrad Tempel, Texte Zur Gewaltlosigkeit, HIS, TEM 100,03. 
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motivations, we could miss the factors that tie this group of West German activists to the 
much larger narrative of peace activism during this period of the Cold War.  
 Konrad and Helga Tempel and the other founders of the Easter March were key 
members of the West German conscientious objection movement and had been actively 
protesting the government’s military policies for several years prior to the formation of 
the Easter March. During their time with conscientious objection groups such as the IdK 
and the VK, these activists had developed the organizational and intellectual space to 
create a popular protest campaign. Furthermore, they established and practiced methods 
of nonviolent protest that engaged the West German population but stayed within the 
boundaries of the law. Without this valuable experience, the Easter Marches may not 
have been able to achieve such success or sustain its momentum into the late 1960s.   
 Konrad Tempel’s participation in the 1959 Aldermaston March propelled his 
ambition to launch a similar protest action with the Action Group for Nonviolence the 
next year. After locating the Honest John missiles at the British weapons base at 
Bergen-Hohne, the AG focused on organizing the march effort.10 The Tempels and the 
AG tapped into the West German conscientious objection movement for recruits and 
support. After much discussion, the initial organizers decided the march would consist of 
                                                 
10 The MGR-1 Honest John rocket was the first nuclear-capable surface to air missile in the U.S. arsenal. 
The truck mounted rocket was developed in the early 1950s and by the mid 1950s they were deployed in 
Europe. The MGR-1 was fitted with a 2, 10, or 30, kiloton nuclear warhead. See James N. Gibson, 
Nuclear Weapons of the United States: An Illustrated History (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Pub, 1996), 177-179. 
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four march groups that would start from different points and all converge on the British 
rocket base at Bergen-Hohne in what was called a Sternmarsch or Star March.11   
 While the AG in Hamburg set up and staffed the central leadership of the Easter 
March, the leadership of the individual marches came mostly from the regional 
conscientious objection organizations. This allowed for more participation from the 
conscientious objection groups in the area. Instead of requiring activists from the other 
cities to travel to Hamburg to participate in the march, the Easter March organizers 
relied on the regional groups and leadership to recruit participants locally. The Bremen, 
Brunswick, and Hannover march columns were organized by IdK members, including 
the future Speaker of the Easter Marches Andreas Buro, while the Hamburg column was 
organized by the AG with support of the VK.12 
 Burns and Van Der Will argued that from the beginning the Easter March had to 
create “from scratch an appropriate infrastructure capable of sustaining the burgeoning 
movement.”13 However, it is clear that the Easter March initiators did in fact have the 
organizational framework on which to build. Their experience in the conscientious 
objection movement along with their international network of activists gave them the 
tools necessary to get the Easter Marches off the ground.  
                                                 
11Letter from Konrad Tempel to VK membership January 16, 1960, Konrad Tempel Ostermarsch der 
Atomwaffengegner, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
12 Interview with Konrad and Helga Tempel, Ahrensberg, Germany, July 24, 2013; Buro, Gewaltlos gegen 
Krieg, 87-88. 
13 Burns and van der Will. Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 92. 
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 The AG had to rely on the conscientious objection organizations for a great deal 
of logistic support. Since their protest actions up to that point had been restricted to 
Hamburg and the surrounding area, they did not have the experience to coordinate an 
event of this size and scope in terms of both participants and geography. This did not 
mean, however, that they did not know how to accomplish the task. The previous few 
years of local protest activity along with numerous WRI events and a large network of 
conscientious objection activists throughout West Germany gave them a good deal of 
knowledge and resources. Furthermore, they were able to tap into their transnational 
network of activists for inspiration and advice. Through their WRI connections in West 
Germany and abroad, the AG coordinated with activists in other parts of the country and 
reached a larger circle that included representatives of the emerging New Left in West 
Germany.14 
 The Easter March organizers made sure to spread the word to the local 
populations along the march routes and hoped to raise support for the protest effort. With 
the support of the VK, they printed and distributed flyers with the headline “Atomic 
Alarm!” and contained detailed maps of the local area with the blast radius of an atomic 
bomb clearly marked. Just underneath the local map with the blast radius a question 
asked, “What is going on in the heath?” in reference to the Lüneburg Heath in Lower 
Saxony where Bergen-Hohne is situated. The flyer then explicitly detailed what would 
happen if one of the nuclear weapons stationed at Bergen-Hohne exploded, warning that 
all nearby towns would be totally destroyed, all living things would be killed, towns and 
                                                 
14 Nehring, Politics of Security, 150. 
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cities a bit more distant (such as Hannover and Bremen) would deal with the effects of 
radiation, and the entire region would become a wasteland. Much like the declaration of 
the Göttingen Eighteen in 1957, the Easter Marchers countered the dangerous duplicity 
they saw in the Adenauer government and declared, “And [Chancellor] Dr. Adenauer 
called these rockets the ‘further development of artillery’!” If the person felt compelled 
to do something about the danger lurking in their local area they were encouraged to 
write to politicians, protest in Bonn at the Defense Ministry, or take part in the Easter 
March of Atomic Weapons Opponents to Bergen-Hohne. At minimum, the Easter March 
organizers asked the locals to “show your sympathy” and “greet the opponents to atomic 
weapons” as they march to the rocket base at Bergen-Hohne.15  
 Another leaflet asked the same question, “What is going on in the heath? You 
don’t know? There are a lot worse things than tanks exercises in green seed fields or in 
quiet Juniper valleys.” The flyer declared that each Honest John rocket stationed at 
Bergen-Hohne was just as deadly as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima “(86,000 dead in 
one fell swoop!).” This leaflet also provided the schedule of speeches for the march that 
listed talks by a number of doctors, professors, and leaders of the Easter March as well 
as the founder of the GdW and one of the leaders of the VK Hans Herman Köper, Dr. 
Gustav Heckmann, and Konrad Tempel.16 
                                                 
15 Leaflet for the 1960 Easter March, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
16 Ibid. 
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 Before the march began, the organizers published a mission statement titled, 
“Why We March.” In this statement they outlined the major arguments of their 
campaign: nuclear weapons were not simply further development of artillery but were an 
entirely new, exponentially more destructive weapon as clearly demonstrated by the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; nothing justified the “mass murder” by the use of 
these weapons, including the defense of a nation. The statement included a call to outlaw 
all “weapons of mass destruction” in all states, in the case of the two Germanies the 
outlawing of all “manufacture, storage, testing and use of atomic weapons;” a call to all 
statesmen East and West to take the risk of unilateral nuclear disarmament to put an end 
to the arms race. As well as a call for all “responsibility conscious citizens in East and 
West to refuse any service for the production, storage, testing and use of nuclear 
weapons.”17 Throughout the document, the Easter March organizers emphasized that 
leading statesmen and average citizens on both sides of the iron curtain must take action. 
They viewed nuclear weapons and the responsibility to eliminate their existence as a 
global concern rather than just a German or European concern. In their view, it was the 
responsibility of the members of a civil society to take action against a policy that they 
believed would harm thousands if not millions of people. 
 The early spring weather was certain to be poor, so Easter March organizers 
asked participants to dress appropriately for the multiday march, which meant sturdy 
shoes, warm clothing, and raincoats and umbrellas. Vehicles would transport their 
                                                 
17 “Warum Wir Marschieren,” Easter March of Atomic Weapons Opponents, Hamburg Work Group, HIS, 
TEM 100,04. 
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baggage, and the organizers arranged accommodations for each night on the march. The 
marchers faced dreary wet weather when they set off for Bergen-Hohne from their 
respective starting points that they would endure for the duration of the march. Despite 
the bad weather, many remained cheerful and focused on the purpose of the march and 
the renewal spirit of the Easter holiday. One young student on the march stated, “This 
march is the fairest fulfillment of Easter.”18 Photos of the march show respectably 
dressed men and women walking in columns three abreast with small signs and a large 
cloth banner stretched between two poles declaring, “From Hamburg to 
Bergen-Hohne.”19  
 The Easter March organizers wrote the slogans on the signs and pamphlets that 
were used on the march and circulated the approved list among the participants. These 
slogans drew attention to the major concerns the Easter Marchers wanted to 
communicate to the West German public; some were provocative, and others were quite 
direct. The marchers carried signs that simply said, “We want to live!” or addressed 
nuclear weapons development stating, “No bomb without test – No test without death!” 
and “Training for nuclear weapons is training for mass murder!” One questioned the 
government’s defense policy asking, “Nuclear weapons – protection or suicide?” 
Perhaps the most provocative was the slogan that likely struck a chord with every 
                                                 
18 Dr. Lothar Schulze, “Noch ist es Zeit, Bruder!” Hamburger Morgenpost, April 23/24, 1960. 
19 “‘Ostermarsch’ aus Protest,” Harburger Anzeiger und Nachrichten, April 19, 1960. 
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German who saw it, as it connected the Honest John rockets in the Lueneburg Heath to 
the Holocaust: “First Bergen-Belsen – Now Bergen-Hohne!”20 
 A number of British CND members participated in the march and this 
information was passed on to news outlets in order to show how the nuclear weapons 
issue in Germany was significant enough to not only garner support from people outside 
of the Federal Republic but to have people travel internationally to join the protest 
march. The Easter March organizers sent a detailed list of the British participants that 
provided brief bios of each person. These participants came from varied backgrounds 
and included housewives and teachers as well as a nurse and engineer and an artist. The 
Easter March organizers made sure to point out the fact that both the Conservative and 
Labour Parties were represented among the British participants in order to further 
establish the fact that the Easter March was not driven by a particular political 
philosophy.21  
Similarly, the German participants came from diverse political and 
socio-economic backgrounds because the threat of nuclear war was an issue that 
concerned many people throughout West German society. This heterogeneous mix of 
participants reflected a shift in German protest culture. Historian Alice Holmes Cooper 
noted,  
Whereas workers had contributed the numerical bulk of the 1950s 
movements, protests from the 1960s on increasingly mobilized the middle 
                                                 
20 “‘Ostermarsch’ aus Protest,” Harburger Anzeiger und Nachtrichten, April 19, 1960. 
21 Letter from the Easter March Committee to Reuters, April 14, 1960. 
160 
class. This new, critical intelligentsia was most concentrated among the 
youth at universities and high schools (Gymnasia) and among tertiary-sector 
and public sector employees (Angestellte and Beamte). Together with the 
“old left” remnants of the traditional labor movement and Protestants already 
active in the 1950s, it led the 1960s movements that changed the face of 
German politics.22  
In this way the Easter March movement helped bridge the generational divide between 
the “old left” pacifists from the immediate postwar period and the younger activists of 
the 1960s who were not necessarily pacifists but certainly engaged peace protests. 
Konrad and Helga Tempel, in many ways, had a foot in each generation but were not 
really part of either which is perhaps why they were able to lead the burgeoning Easter 
March movement so effectively. 
 As mentioned previously the final destination of the star march that Easter 
weekend was a place called Bergen-Hohne. Konrad and Helga Tempel and the rest of 
the Easter March organizers were very cognizant of the proximity of the British rocket 
base at Bergen-Hohne to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. The AG did not 
specifically look for a nuclear weapons site that was close to a concentration camp but 
they found Bergen-Hohne to be the perfect location for the protest march in part because 
of immediacy of Bergen-Belsen. They emphasized the connection between the rocket 
base and the concentration camp in many of their flyers, signs, and speeches drawing 
direct parallels between nuclear warfare and mass murder. 
In the immediate postwar period, the images and testimonies from Bergen-Belsen 
became well known. The British were particularly aware of the concentration camp 
22 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 97. 
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because units of the British Army liberated the camp and the liberation was so well 
documented. In the 1950s, Anne Frank’s diary was published in many languages and 
was soon adapted into a Pulitzer Prize winning play and critically acclaimed film. The 
diary became a symbol of the victims of the Holocaust and, since Anne and her sister 
Margot both died in Bergen-Belsen, the concentration camp was very recognizable for 
Germans and non-Germans alike.  
 Interestingly, Bergen-Belsen as a symbol may have had implications beyond the 
Holocaust. According to Habbo Knoch, director of the Bergen-Belsen camp memorial: 
“Bergen-Belsen [...] became a synonym world-wide for German crimes committed 
during the time of Nazi rule.”23 In this sense, when the Easter March referenced 
Bergen-Belsen they were connecting the site to the whole span of German atrocities 
committed during the Second World War. Furthermore, the reference to Bergen-Belsen 
and the atrocities of the Holocaust provided a clear contrast to the actions of the Easter 
March activists.  
 As noted earlier, some of the official slogans for the Easter March directly 
referenced Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and the Holocaust.24 The March 
organizers drew clear parallels between the development of nuclear arsenals and the 
possibility of a nuclear war with the mass killing of the Holocaust. This provocative 
                                                 
23 Habbo Knoch (editor), Bergen-Belsen: Wehrmacht POW Camp 1940–1945, Concentration Camp 1943–
1945, Displaced Persons Camp 1945–1950. Catalogue of the permanent exhibition (Wallstein, 2010), 9. 
24 Easter March Slogans sent to Rudolf Augstein, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
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position left no ambiguity about the activists’ opinion of nuclear weapons in the Federal 
Republic. 
The Easter March addressed the connection of the danger presented by nuclear 
weapons with the horrors of the Holocaust in their “Why We March” statement. The 
leadership suggested that by their silence during the Nazi regime the German people 
were guilty for the perpetration of the Holocaust and that it was their duty to speak out 
against the impending mass murder that would accompany nuclear warfare. 
In view of the former concentration camp Bergen-Belsen only few 
kilometers distant from the missile training ground, we remember that we 
Germans once became guilty by silence. At that time, a public protest could 
have cost you your life, whereas today we exercise a fundamental right of 
the Basic Law when we call out to all perspicacious people: First 
Bergen-Belsen, now Bergen-Hohne. Citizens be vigilant, let us give a sign.25 
This statement highlights the driving force behind their activism; their duty, as citizens 
of the new, democratic Germany was to raise their voices and speak out against what 
they believed was wrong in the actions of their government. The activists were plainly 
stating that they, as citizens of a new Germany and unlike the citizens of Nazi Germany, 
were taking action to prevent another crime against humanity. They were doing their 
duty as members of a civil society when the German people failed to do so during the 
Nazi regime. The Easter Marchers acknowledged that similar acts of protest in Nazi 
Germany would have led to dire consequences but reminded their fellow citizens that in 
25 “Warum Wir Marschieren,” Easter March of Atomic Weapons Opponents, Hamburg Work Group, HIS, 
TEM 100,04. 
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the new Germany their right to speak out against injustice was protected by their Basic 
Law.  
By claiming the Holocaust and nuclear war were equivalent, the Easter Marchers 
drove home the seriousness of their message. If one accepted their claim that nuclear war 
and the Holocaust were equally horrible and destructive then, as Germans, it was their 
moral responsibility to speak out against nuclear weapons because they did not speak out 
against the Holocaust. At the same time the Easter March organizers, in the “Why We 
March” statement, implied that it was understandable that Germans did not speak out 
against the actions of the Nazi regime. Free speech was not a protected right in Nazi 
Germany and the consequences for such action could be fatal, but in the new Federal 
Republic no such excuse existed. If West German citizens believed nuclear weapons 
were wrong then they had a duty and a moral responsibility to speak out against the 
Government’s defense policies. 
After the conclusion of the march at the Bergen-Hohne rocket base, the marchers 
went to the Bergen-Belsen memorial to lay a wreath. One of the marchers, Dr. Lothar 
Schulze, wrote a report on the first Easter March that was published in the major 
Hamburg newspaper, the Hamburger Morgenpost, not long after the march. Dr. Schulze 
acknowledged that their actions and slogans involving Bergen-Belsen would be 
controversial but explained that the question of nuclear weapons was serious enough to 
warrant the connection: “After completion of the rally, we drove to Bergen-Belsen to lay 
a wreath. One of our signs had the inscription: ‘First Bergen-Belsen, now 
164 
 
Bergen-Hohne’ and there may well have been some who did not like this inscription. But 
where is the difference between murder in the concentration camps and mass murder by 
the bomb? In both cases, innocent people were hit.”26 Here Dr. Schulze draws a very 
strong correlation between the Holocaust and the nuclear bomb. To him, it seems the 
unifying factor was not the intent of the perpetrator but the innocence of the victims. 
After affirming the equivalence of the Holocaust and nuclear war, Dr. Schulze reiterated 
the point the Easter March organizers made about responsibility. 
The German people have been accused before of remaining silent when 
courageous words and deeds were needed. In the concentration camps - like 
Bergen-Belsen - millions of people lost their lives. But the continuance of 
test detonations and the build-up of nuclear arms threatens to destroy all of 
humanity. It is imperative to confront this danger with unmistakable, total 
rejection of all preparations for nuclear war in the east and the west.27 
 Dr. Schulze also pointed out a clear complication inherent in the nuclear weapons 
policy of the time, having nuclear weapons forced you to play a zero sum game, “None 
of us will say that those who favor nuclear weapons want to use them. But basically, 
they must be prepared to use the bomb if they threaten to do so. Those in charge are then 
perhaps no longer the masters of their decisions.”28 He believed nuclear weapons put 
countries on a path that would lead them, willingly or not, to nuclear war and once the 
line was crossed there would be no return from nuclear war. The only way to avoid the 
mass destruction and death of a nuclear war, and, ostensibly, an event on the level of the 
Holocaust, was to not have nuclear weapons at all. 
                                                 
26 Dr. Lothar Schulze, “Noch ist es Zeit, Bruder!” Hamburger Morgenpost, April 23/24, 1960. 
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The all who participated in the first Easter March considered it a success. Their 
message was spread throughout Lower Saxony and in the cities of Bremen, Hamburg, 
Hannover and Brunswick and participants from all walks of life and from beyond West 
Germany joined in the protest. When compared to events later in the decade the March 
was fairly small and limited but it was one of the most complex and well-attended events 
of the period. It would not have been possible for the Action Group for Nonviolence to 
organize a protest event of this magnitude, modest as it was, without the efforts of the 
conscientious objection organizations and their members. 
The West German conscientious objection organizations supported the Easter 
March in every facet of the march from planning and media to mailing lists and finances. 
The media contacts and press analysis went through the VK press office and all the 
Easter March publications and handouts were published by the VK.29 A large number of 
individual members who participated in the march belonged to one of the 
organizations.30 The support of conscientious objection activists was such that a quarter 
to half of each pillar of the march was comprised of VK or IdK members. In fact, the 
national leadership of the VK marched in the first Easter March and even gave some of 
the speeches at the rallies along the march.31   
29 Interview with Konrad and Helga Tempel, Ahrensberg, Germany, July 24, 2013; see also the letters, 
pamphlets, and flyers in Konrad Tempel Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
30 Interview with Konrad and Helga Tempel, Ahrensberg, Germany, July 24, 2013; Interview with Werner 
Böwing, Solingen, Germany, July 17, 2013; “Zusammenstellung der Einnahmen Ostermarsch 1960,” 
Konrad Tempel Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
31 Interview with Werner Böwing, Solingen, Germany, July 17, 2013; “Was ist in der Heide los?” Konrad 
Tempel Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
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While the Easter March was not officially organized by or affiliated with either 
the IdK or the VK, the involvement of conscientious objection activists was to such an 
extent that it led the West German press to believe that all the participants were part of 
the conscientious objection movement. Many of the newspapers reported that the 
marchers were all conscientious objectors, and some stated that the marches were 
orchestrated by the IdK and VK printing articles with titles such as “Star March of 
Conscientious Objectors,” “Conscientious Objectors plan Easter Star March,” and 
“Conscientious Objectors March.”32 
For the most part the press showed only a passing interest in the first Easter 
March. Most newspapers gave a brief description of the march and noted that in Great 
Britain a much larger march against nuclear weapons had also taken place over the 
Easter weekend. Some papers printed articles that were skeptical of the methods chosen 
to spread the Easter March message and the potential for success. 
Prior to the march the national daily Die Welt expressed a degree of skepticism 
about the tactics chosen by the Easter March organizers. The article reflected that public 
protest marches seemed to be the chosen demonstration of the times but questioned the 
efficacy of a protest march, “The means of marching is legitimate, although one could 
imagine other equally effective methods to get his view expressed. However, it has the 
disadvantage that what is to act spontaneously, must be planned down to the last, to 
32“Protestmarsch verboten,” Hamburger Abendblatt, April 9, 1960; “Marsch der Atomgegner zum NATO-
Uebungsplatz,” Niederelbe-Zeitung, April 19, 1960; “Atomprotest in der Heide,” Frankfurter Rundschau 
April 19, 1960; “Drei-Tage-Marsch gegen A-Waffen,” Hannoversche Presse, April 19, 1960; Karl-Heinz 
Stahnke, Presseanalyse, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
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reduce the rations, the field kitchens or hot sausage. This affects the effect of these 
marches. It is hard to imagine that this four-day march will have the political impact that 
the organizers seem to promise.”33 The criticism of a lack of spontaneity in the planned 
Easter March indicates a misunderstanding of what the organizers sought to achieve. The 
goal of the Easter March was not to have a group of people suddenly converge in protest 
in the city square, much like the earlier Fight Atomic Death protests, but to have people 
commit to a long term demonstration that more accurately represented their campaign.  
When the Action Group for Nonviolence initiated the two week around the clock 
antinuclear vigil in Hamburg in 1958 they specifically chose a demonstration tactic that 
emphasized commitment and dedication in order to express their message. Helga 
Tempel wrote that they wanted to show that this was not an issue that one protested for 
just an afternoon.34 The AG believed that the issue of nuclear weapons was so important 
it required their commitment to a long-term campaign and simultaneous demonstrations 
requiring endurance and extended sacrifice conveyed how seriously they took the issue. 
Most papers ran articles with brief descriptions of the march that focused on the 
bad weather the marchers endured and seemed disappointed when they reported that the 
march “proceeded without incident.”35 There was little mention of the Easter March’s 
message beyond the point that the activists were marching in protest of nuclear weapons. 
Smaller papers were much more engaged in discussing the merits of the Easter 
                                                 
33 “Marschierer,” Die Welt, March 3, 1960.  
34 “Mahn-Wache,” HIS, TEM 100,01 
35 “Kundgebungen gegen Atomruestung,” Hamburger Abendblatt, April 16, 1960. 
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Marchers’ proposals. The Stuttgart regional daily paper, the Ludwigsburger 
Kreiszeitung, was one of the few that supported the actions of the Easter Marchers. The 
author, Fritz Mack, noted the Easter March was nothing like the typical 
“Osterspaziergang” or leisurely nature walk but something else entirely. Mack wrote 
that even if you did not think the demonstration would have much success one had to 
admit that the Easter Marchers observantly recognized the “threat to existence” nuclear 
weapons posed.36 The demonstration, according to him, was different from the usual 
group of superficial people discussing “war and the rumors of war” on their days off. 
The Easter Marchers went beyond simply discussing the danger nuclear weapons pose to 
humanity by addressing the question of guilt that mankind “as God’s creatures would 
take on themselves when launching nuclear war.”37 The Ludwigsburger Kreiszeitung 
seems to have recognized one of the major differences between most antinuclear protests 
up to that point and the Easter March. The Easter March believed in the primacy of 
action rather than rhetoric and went beyond only acknowledging the danger and 
destructive force of nuclear weapons by also addressing the guilt the German people 
would carry for that destruction. 
On the other hand, the local paper from the town of Soltau near Bergen-Hohne, 
the Soltauer Kreiszeitung, took the opposite position when they directly responded to the 
Easter March message writing:  
                                                 
36 “Auch ein Osterspaziergang,” Ludwigsburger Kreiszeitung, April 16, 1960. 
37 Ibid. 
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We only want to note on the campaign that no one is for war, we would all 
prefer to see the nuclear and missile only serve the peaceful uses (in 
Germany, there are no nuclear weapons in the Bundeswehr’s possession), 
but what good is it if a few kilometers away strong-armed opponents are 
threatening our freedom every hour? We need to be at least prepared and 
ready for defense! If there are such marches, then please also march in the 
Thuringian Forest, where the Russians have missile stations. This is nothing 
more than a fact, they should rather adapt to the realities and not be 
one-sided.38 
The Soltauer Kreiszeitung presented a common argument at the time in writing that 
nuclear weapons were necessary for the defense of the country. They argued, when used 
for defense, nuclear weapons were essentially used for peaceful means. Thus changing 
the meaning of the word “peace” by claiming defensive actions were inherently peaceful 
and attacking the rhetoric of the Easter March. Using the claim that the very freedom of 
the West was threatened by the Soviets also changed the character of discussions about 
peace and implied that if the Easter March activists wanted to disarm the nuclear 
weapons bases then perhaps their version of peace was to actually surrender to the 
communists.  
The Soltauer Kreiszeitung reflected the position of many when it stated no one 
was for war but the reality of West Germany’s geopolitical position on the frontlines of 
the Cold War forced the Federal Republic to at least meet the Soviet’s missile stations 
with installations like Bergen-Hohne. However, they were quick to point out that the 
West German military did not have its own nuclear weapons, passing the burden and 
potential guilt on to the NATO allies. The Soltauer Kreiszeitung ignored the fact that the 
Easter March called for nuclear disarmament in the East and the West and suggested the 
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activists march in the Thuringian forest where it was rumored the Soviets stationed 
nuclear weapons. Ironically, the AG had actually tried to determine if there really were 
Soviet nuclear weapons in the Thuringian forest and had drawn up preliminary plans to 
demonstrate in the DDR.39  
The Soltauer Kreiszeitung took a very strong position in opposition to the Easter 
March. The article captures the essence of what the Easter March was up against in West 
Germany. Their message of nuclear disarmament and peace was continually met with 
skepticism and suspicion from parts of the population. The Easter March had to 
convince the doubters that they too recognized the threat posed by the Soviet Union but 
believed the best way to remove the threat was through nuclear disarmament in the West 
and the East. This was a very difficult task when words such as “peace” had such fluid 
definitions. 
One of the major accomplishments of the first Easter March, which was also 
acknowledged by activists at the time, was that it brought together many pacifist groups 
that individually protested against nuclear weapons. This was especially true in regard to 
the conscientious objection organizations, the VK and IdK. Konrad Tempel, in a speech 
at the 1960 WRI Triennial Conference in Ghandigram, India, stated “…the protest 
march became the most significant action arranged after the war by pacifist groups 
(I.d.K., V.K.) which was reported in detail by more than 130 German and a number of 
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foreign papers.”40 In the same speech, Tempel identified two major spheres of leadership 
that published statements in support of the Easter March; the religious and the scientific. 
The Easter March had support from two major figures from both spheres in Pastor 
Martin Niemoeller and physicist Dr. Carl Friedrich Weizsaecker. Tempel reported that 
the Easter March had to deal with fact that the Trade Unions, the Fight Atomic Death 
committees, and the Social Democrats all stayed away from the Easter March and partly 
boycotted the march.  
In his speech Konrad Tempel recognized several roadblocks to more 
participation from the general population: government propaganda that “succeeded in 
drawing away the skeptical part of the population and also influenced or paralyzed the 
pacifists,” the world political situation that seemed to justify the government’s actions, 
economic prosperity that made the population “immune against pacifist warnings,” and 
the belief that only large numbers could be effective. Tempel also noted that in 1956 
peace activists limited their activity to the issue of conscientious objection and this 
“turned out to be, at least in some groups, a fateful error because most of the members, 
especially the older members, were not used to active participation.” Tempel ended his 
speech with a call for more direct action and warned that without more support and 
direct participation from peace groups it was unlikely that government nuclear policy 
will be changed from below.41  
                                                 
40 Konrad Tempel, “Atomic Disarmament in the Federal Republic of Germany,” IISG, 249. 
41 Ibid. 
172 
 
After the first Easter March the Action Group for Nonviolence continued to seek 
out opportunities for protest actions. Perhaps motivated by the success of the Easter 
March, on May 15 the group organized a march to the East German border to 
demonstrate for human rights and protest against totalitarianism. They walked to the 
border between East and West Germany near Lauenburg, a small border town on the 
river Elbe about 30 miles or 50km East of Hamburg. Carrying black flags a little more 
than a dozen Action Group for Nonviolence members marched in protest of the 
totalitarianism of the DDR and the Eastern Bloc in general. 42 Prior to the march, the 
Action Group demonstrated with black flags in front of the French, Yugoslavian, 
Portuguese, Spanish, South African, Czechoslovakian, and Turkish consulates.43 Konrad 
Tempel reflected that demonstrations and subsequent march were hastily prepared and 
not very well thought out.44 They had neither the number of participants nor the clear, 
well-publicized message of the Easter March so they occurred without remark or, 
perhaps, notice of news outlets or the respective governments of the FRG or DDR. 
Despite the negligible results from the protest demonstrations, the group’s efforts in May 
1960 illustrate the commitment the activists had to direct action tactics. West German 
activists also continued to support the Aldermaston marches in Britain after the creation 
of the German Easter March movement. In fact, the 1961 Aldermaston march reportedly 
                                                 
42 Letter to local editors from the Action Group for Nonviolence press service, May 11, 1960, HIS, TEM 
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43 Letter to the Hamburg police from the Action Group for Nonviolence, May 30, 1960, HIS, TEM 100,01. 
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had over 500 German participants.45 This is an indication of how for many Germans the 
nuclear weapons issue, and the scope protests against the development and deployment 
of the weapons, was not limited to the Federal Republic. 
 After the success of the first Easter March in April of 1960, the organizers were 
able to maintain their momentum and prepare for a bigger march the next year. With the 
assistance of the VK Documentation Office, they worked to determine how the West 
German public received the march and collected a wide range of newspaper articles from 
the region as well as from the major papers in the Federal Republic.46 Their analysis 
showed that while the march was reported in about 130 papers most of the articles only 
briefly discussed the march highlighting the march’s similarities with the Aldermaston 
march in Britain or commenting on the weather the marchers endured. There were a 
number of articles with photographs of the march column and marchers with signs and 
the fact that their regional protest event was reported in the major West German dailies 
such as Die Welt, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Bild was very encouraging.47 
 The Easter March organizers also gathered statements from people who had 
participated in the 1960 march as well as from leaders of the peace movement in 
Germany and abroad. The famous British philosopher and peace activist Bertrand 
                                                 
45 Memo from April Carter and Bayard Rustin to CNVA Leadership, April 7, 1961. Committee for 
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Russell wrote in support of the Easter March and noted its connection with the British 
CND campaign, “I am completely willing to support a German march in the line of 
Aldermaston marches. These marches have had a very remarkable influence on the 
opinion of the British public, and I hope that similar marches in Germany prove just as 
effective.”48 Professor Dr. Max Born, physicist and mathematician who was one of the 
Göttingen 18, also wished the march success along with Professor Dr. Fritz Wenzel, 
Theologian and SPD politician, who endorsed the movement despite his party’s 
reluctance to support the Easter March. Perhaps most importantly the Easter March 
organizers secured the support of Pastor Martin Niemöller who wrote, “I once took part 
in the first march in England to Aldermaston ... I will happily support your project.”49 
 The Easter March leadership recognized that for the demonstration to have more 
of an impact they needed to reach more people with their message. They planned to 
accomplish this in two ways; redirecting and growing the march and diversifying the 
group of participants. The 1961 march expanded outside of northern Germany to include 
a southern star march in Bavaria, a southwestern star march in Baden-Württemburg and 
Hesse, and a western star march in the Ruhr.50 The direction of the march was reversed 
so that it began at a central location and then the various groups would march back to 
their home cities. In the north, the star march began at the rocket base at Bergen-Hohne 
                                                 
48 1961 Easter March planning document, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The same star march tactic, multiple march columns converging on one point, was continued from the 
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and ended in Hamburg, Bremen, Brunswick, and Hannover.51 In the south, the star 
march began in Ingolstadt and ended in the cities of Nuremburg, Munich, and Augsburg. 
In the southwest, the star march began near a rocket base in the town of Miltenberg and 
ended in Frankfurt, Mannheim, and Stuttgart. The western star march transverse the 
Ruhr industrial region beginning in Düsseldorf and ending at a rocket base in 
Dortmund.52 Except for the march from Essen to Dortmund, each star march began in a 
small rural town and ended in a number of major cities in West Germany. This would 
allow for much greater participation at the rally at the conclusion of the march as people 
could simply take part in the final day of the march and many bystanders could witness 
the concluding events and speeches.   
 The 1961 Easter March planning also featured an effort to augment the makeup 
of the march groups. The Easter March leadership wanted to focus on making the march 
more diverse and include antinuclear activists from every walk of life. In doing so they 
hoped to boost the number of participants and better illustrate the point that the nuclear 
weapons issue concerns all West Germans. They were willing to break with their 
traditional protest culture to achieve this diversity. “The overall picture of the march 
should correspond with the complexity of the nuclear opponents, so it must be the goal 
that jazz and Skiffle groups participate in the march. The more expressive the march is 
the greater chance we have that television reflects the Easter March. And we will thus 
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provide millions of people a sign.”53 The dramatic effect of the antinuclear activists 
marching into the city from the nuclear weapons site and rural towns would certainly 
pique the interest of the press and, they hoped, earn the Eastern March airtime on 
television news outlets. 
 At the same time, the Easter March organizers were initiating a significant 
change in German protest culture. The addition of popular music and the focus on 
promoting a fun protest experience that would encourage young people to join the march 
marked a shift towards the joyfulness and festive nature that became the hallmark of 
1960s peace protests. Burns and Van Der Will argued that the experience of the Easter 
Marches was the first time the peace movement added the element of joy and 
celebration.54 The music and symbols of the Easter Marches are directly influenced by 
the international peace movement and were possible because of the transnational 
network key activists cultivated in the late 1950s.  
 Along with these changes, the Easter March leadership shifted their focus to pay 
more attention to involving and inspiring the younger generation. The handouts and 
flyers advertising the 1961 Easter March reflected this approach. The flyer targeting 
young people declared in bold letters, “Hot Music is the Zest of Youth. We Young say 
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YES to Life.”55 The addition of music and colorful participants was aimed at 
encouraging the participation of other segments of West German society, particularly the 
youth, but they maintained an emphasis on the importance of action. The maxim “deeds 
not words” was at the heart of their protest culture and to achieve this in practice the 
Easter March leadership worked to inspire people who opposed nuclear armaments to 
show their commitment to the cause and take part in the March. They acknowledged that 
the March was an intimidating course of action but asserted the goal was worth the risk 
declaring, “We must awaken in our members the courage to experiment in the service of 
humanity and the chance for them to be pioneers for a better world...”56 The Easter 
March leadership believed that in the course of their action new participants would be 
assured that their deeds were not in vain, “In this way, a deep passion for peace can 
arise, which gives us all the confidence and certainty we are on the right track.”57 
 Konrad, Helga, and the other members of the Easter March leadership recognized 
that they were up against stiff competition when it came to rhetoric about duty and 
honor. The proponents of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic frequently evoked a 
sense of responsibility and the honor in defending Germany. It was easy to say West 
Germany was heroic in its defense of freedom and the Western world against the 
oppression of the Soviets. It was much harder to convince the average German that 
working for nuclear disarmament and world peace was an act of heroism. Therefore, the 
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Easter March needed to challenge the traditional assumptions of peace activism and push 
it to the level of national defense; except in their case they were performing heroic 
actions in defense of all mankind. The Easter March leadership announced, “As much as 
we must guard against the great words from the other side, so we need to heroize 
peace…which the younger generation does not relate to their ideals, but [we must] show 
them the real possibility and the imperative need to implement their ideals into action.”58 
The best way to convince the youth to put their principles into heroic action was to be 
the model of action, “But only by example, not by speeches and resolutions… Let’s give 
an example - we will reach the critical power of thinking and the break into the 
indifference of our generation!”59 
 At the same time the Easter March organizers also made sure they connected 
with the average West German worker. The largest segment of the voting population all 
had the same basic concerns and the Easter March leadership worked to relate with 
flyers that addressed common issues writing “You have no time, you must see that on 
Friday your pay check is full - we all have this concern, because high prices and taxes 
eat away at our earnings - nuclear weapons cost money.”60 Even after the success of the 
Wirtschaftswunder the average West German worker still worried about their finances 
and the Easter March organizers connected an everyday issue to the complex and 
somewhat extraordinary issue of nuclear weapons.  
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 After hooking the reader by addressing their financial concerns the flyer goes on 
to explain that the threat of nuclear weapons will affect every aspect of German life, 
“Not just money, our health, your tranquility, the happiness of your children, in short, 
peace is threatened by the madness of nuclear armament.”61 The flyer encouraged people 
to take control of the situation implying that West Germans had been complacent with 
their political voice and that direct action protest could have an influence on defense 
policy, “Enough decisions are taken from you, now you must do something at last! At 
Easter in 1961, we will not be celebrating, but taking part in the protest march of nuclear 
weapons opponents.”62 The flyer concluded by acknowledging the sacrifice the march 
would require but reminded potential participants of what was at stake declaring, “Our 
lives and the lives of our children are worth four days of marching!”63 
 The approved slogans for the 1961 Easter March reflected the refined message of 
the organizers as well as the shift to a more national approach. The Easter March 
leadership released a list of approved slogans that were divided into several categories 
based on the character of the slogans including positive, political, moral-religious, and 
general slogans. Many reflected the desire of the Easter March to promote the protest as 
a democratic action: “Our No to the Bomb is a Yes for Democracy” and “Instead of 
Stronger Armies more Courage and Ideas” for example. Some slogans were directed at 
the East West divide and Cold War rhetoric, “Western Bombs Work the Same as Eastern 
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Bombs” and “Better Co-existence than No-existence.” Signs with a photo of the 
Hiroshima bombing were to be accompanied with the slogan “Do You Understand Now 
Why We March?”64 
 The four star marches over the 1961 Easter weekend attracted many more people 
than the previous year. With several thousand attending the closing rally of each star 
march there were an estimated 23,000 participants involved in across all four marches.65 
This represented a significant increase over the thousand or so people who took part in 
some aspect of the 1960 march. The marches drew in people concerned with the nuclear 
weapons issue from every segment of society and challenged conservative strongholds in 
southern Germany. 
 Many participants wore the newly created peace symbol on their jackets as they 
marched and carried flags and banners with the symbol. Bystanders were very curious 
about the black and white symbol and activists often had the opportunity to share the 
message of nuclear disarmament while explaining the meaning of the symbol. Displayed 
in white against a black field what became widely known as the peace sign originally 
carried a much darker meaning of despair and impending doom. For the antinuclear 
activists the symbol reflected the gravity of the issue; to them the question of nuclear 
weapons was a question of life or death and the evoked images of the dying man and the 
unborn child were appropriate for their campaign. 
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 Karl-Heinz Stahnke, the director of the VK Documentation Office, again 
produced the press analysis of the Easter March. The expansion of the march to Bavaria, 
Baden-Würtemburg, Hesse, and the Ruhr valley clearly attracted more attention from the 
press and accomplished the Easter March leadership’s goal to reach a much wider 
audience. Stanhke reported that there were 956 news articles printed which marked a 
significant increase over the 130 articles from the previous year.66 Many of these articles 
were simply the German Press Agency’s report printed without adaptation or comment 
but a number discussed the Easter March and engaged with their message of nuclear 
disarmament. The VK collected a great deal of newspaper clippings that ranged from 
national and regional papers to local papers. The major papers often carried opinion 
pieces that were fairly critical of the East Marches while the smaller local papers, 
particularly those close to the border with the DDR, ran reports that were very critical of 
the Easter Marcher’s message.67 
 Interestingly Stahnke addressed the issue of German guilt and responsibility in 
the introduction to his press analysis writing, “We have to recognize once and for all that 
our attitude towards the atrocities of the Nazi times was wrong. We cannot free 
ourselves from the burden of conscience with those I-DON’T-KNOW-ANYTHING, 
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IT-WASN’T-ME, or THERE-WAS-NOTHING-WE-COULD-DO-ABOUT-IT.”68 
Stahnke, in the same mind as the Easter March campaign, believed that Germany was 
potentially once again on the cusp of participating in atrocities against mankind with the 
nuclear weapons issue. However, this time they would make sure German society was 
well informed about the impending catastrophe and impelled to action.  
 Stahnke was very aware that the average citizen needed to be able to easily 
access the Easter March message and have the complex issues clearly described so that 
they could develop an informed position on the matter. Unfortunately, Stahnke 
lamented, many were too confused to make an opinion or were satisfied with a “terrible 
simplification” of the facts and formed “one sided opinions.”69 Since easy access to 
complete information was an important factor, a clear and comprehensive understanding 
of how the West German press presented the Easter March was vital to the organizers’ 
work.  
 In his introduction Stahnke reiterated the impact a nuclear war would have and 
pointed out that if a person simply thought about the massive death and destruction of 
culture and civic freedom then they would be convinced nuclear weapons must be 
avoided. “Rethinking is needed!” he declared. In light of the gravity of the situation, 
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Stahnke stressed that the Easter March participants and the general public clearly 
understand the importance of their actions that Easter weekend.70 
 The news media had much more to report on in the spring of 1961. Many West 
German newspapers reported on the international aspect of the 1961 Easter March 
noting that demonstrations took place in Great Britain, Denmark, the United States, and 
the Federal Republic and several noted the inclusion of jazz music.71 Others reported 
much more sensational stories about the growing confrontation between the SPD and the 
trade unions and the Easter March with headlines such as “[SPD Chairman Eric] 
Ollenhaurer Against the Easter Marches,” “SPD Tries to Sideline Nuclear Weapons 
Opponents,” and “Easter March Forbidden for DGB [German Trade Union 
Confederation] Members.”72 The newspapers also reflected the Easter March’s struggle 
with the perception of communist influence running articles titled “Refusing Ulbricht” 
and “Conscientious Objectors Do Not Want Support From the SED.”73 With the 
heightened publicity of the 1961 Easter March came a great deal of critical scrutiny. The 
Easter March leadership did not shy away from the challenge but increasingly found 
itself defending the message and character of the movement. 
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The Easter March organizers were very careful to ensure that the movement was 
unencumbered by political or philosophical labels and their efforts, by and large, were 
successful.74 The conscientious objection activists were keenly aware of the difficulties 
political affiliations could bring. Throughout the latter half of the 1950s, the West 
German conscientious objection organizations struggled to avoid being labeled an 
appendage of the SPD or, even worse, under communist influence.75 The Tempels and 
the Action Group for Nonviolence had declared from the beginning that the Easter 
March would stay above party politics or “Überparteilich.”76 At the same time the 
Easter Marches were viewed with hostility from the political right and left who saw their 
attack on the policies of Federal Republic as eerily similar to the rhetoric and 
accusations from the DDR, but this never hampered their growth as a movement because 
they were able to overcome this perception in the public sphere. 
The Easter March specifically called for nuclear disarmament in every nation 
without regard to the Cold War East/West tensions.77 Not only would it stay above party 
politics, the organizers went so far as to make clear that the Easter March was also not 
an IdK or VK action even though many of the participants and a good deal of their 
logistic support came from the VK and IdK. The leadership firmly stated that the Easter 
74Letter from Konrad Tempel to VK membership January 16, 1960, Konrad Tempel Ostermarsch der 
Atomwaffengegner, HIS, TEM 100,04.  
75 Letter to Arlo Tatum June 14, 1958, IfZM, Sammlung Maurer, ED 718/2; see also Nehring, 
“Americanized Protests?” 218. 
76Letter from Konrad Tempel to VK membership January 16, 1960, Konrad Tempel Ostermarsch der 
Atomwaffengegner, HIS, TEM 100,04. 
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March was an independent movement that was made possible by the participation of 
individuals.78 The Tempels had learned through their years of activism in the 
conscientious objection movement that this was an essential element if the Easter March 
was to succeed in changing the way people thought.79 Much like the act of conscientious 
objection, these activists believed that the reason for activism should come from an 
individual’s own convictions rather than from a political party’s campaign platform or 
an organization’s edict.   
 The accusation of communist influence was one of the major hurdles facing the 
Easter March leadership as they worked to promote the Easter Marches as a legitimate 
platform for challenging the government’s nuclear weapons policy. As many activists 
outside of Germany recognized, “In Germany there is a very complex situation owing to 
the problems arising out of the political situation, and in particular the fear of 
Communism and of being branded as ‘fellow travelers.’”80 A number of major 
organizations in the Federal Republic, including the Social Democratic Party, were 
reserved or outright hostile in their relations with the Easter March in part because they 
suspected communist influence or, regardless of whether the accusations were true, they 
did not want to risk being painted with the same brush in the court of public opinion. In a 
speech to the 1960 War Resisters’ International conference in Gandhigram, India 
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Konrad Tempel addressed the issue of communist influence stating “Although this 
protest was unmistakably directed against every military use of atomic energy in the East 
as well as the West and was in no way communistic influenced, the Trade Unions, The 
Committees of ‘Fight the Atom death’ and the Social Democrats not only stayed away 
but boycotted the action.”81  
 Tempel, in an effort to counter these claims, frequently explained that the Easter 
March was a movement and not an organized association and was not affiliated or 
directed by any outside group. The marches were simply “… organized by people who 
see nuclear armament in East and West as a mortal danger to the peace of the world and 
for the existence of mankind. They therefore call anywhere in the world for the 
immediate and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons tests, waiving further 
production of nuclear weapons, arrangements on the nuclear-weapon-free zones, general 
controlled disarmament and abolition of all existing nuclear weapons.”82 Tempel also 
pointed out that though the Easter Marches take place in the West, “We also protest 
against the development of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union as we do against the 
development of atomic weapons in the USA, Great Britain, and France. We have written 
to Minister President Kruschev the same as we have to President Kennedy.”83  
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 When a news report that 10,000 antifascists from the GDR were planning to hold 
an Easter memorial rally at Bergen-Belsen was published in mid March, 1961 Tempel 
immediately responded as the leader of the Easter March. He wrote that there were no 
connections between this East German group and the Easter Marches and even though 
the Northern star march was set to start from the same location on Holy Thursday, the 
event had been planned since the previous fall and was a continuation of the same event 
held the year before. He went on to point out that the SED had declared the month of 
March a “battle month” against the Bundeswehr’s nuclear armaments and reiterated that 
the Easter Marches were “completely independent of all organizations and political 
directions” and were opposed to atomic weapons of mass destruction from both East and 
West.84 While reports of communist connections were upsetting and potentially harmful 
to the Easter Marches, the leadership used them as opportunities to educate the public 
about their antinuclear message and promote individual action. 
 In spite of their efforts, the Easter March faced criticism and outright defamation 
from the Social Democratic Party and several big businesses and trade unions.85 It was 
such a concern that April Carter and Bayard Rustin made sure to inform American peace 
activists that “… in Germany, I.G. Metal’s leadership and the leadership of the Social 
Democratic Party, both denounced the German Marches over Easter as communist 
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dominated.”86 Within in a year of its founding the Easter March campaign was 
embroiled in a public confrontation with the Social Democrats that put the future of the 
movement in danger. 
 The Social Democratic Party was traditionally the party of peace and had resisted 
West German rearmament, conscription, and nuclear weapons.87 Their antinuclear 
campaign championed a message very similar to the Easter March message and had 
featured very large rallies and demonstrations throughout the Federal Republic in 1958 
with a great deal of grassroots support. Why then was the SPD so hostile to the Easter 
March to the point of banning its membership from participating? The answer, most 
likely, lies in the organizational character and protest culture of the Easter Marches as 
well as the fact that the KdA continued to exist. 
 As discussed previously, the Easter Marches were intentionally independent from 
any and all party or organizational affiliation. They were very wary of big institutions 
such as the labor unions, the church, and traditional political parties.88 Much like the VK 
and the controversial Independence Clause from the 1958 merger attempt, the Easter 
March emphasized voluntary participation by individuals and rejected any effort, real or 
perceived, by political groups to attach themselves to the campaign. For his very firm 
stance on this issue, Konrad Tempel recalled in a later interview that he was occasionally 
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called a tyrant.89 Initially the Easter March leadership would not even allow regional VK 
or IdK chapters to officially take part in the march or for their members to carry banners 
or signs indicating VK or IdK affiliation. Unlike the KdA, the SPD could not control the 
Easter March and dictate its message or protest tactics. To the SPD, the Easter March 
was a rogue campaign that cluttered the public protest space and drew attention and 
membership away from the KdA. 
 According to Erich Ollenhauer, the SPD “distanced itself from the Easter 
Marches not because it supports a nuclear arms race or has given up on disarmament, 
but because the Easter Marches do not seem to be an appropriate means to bring us 
closer to disarmament.”90 In March of 1961 Ollenhauer claimed the Easter Marches 
were backed by communists and believed the “…preparation[s] for four marches this 
year are even more exposure [for] Communist Organization and Soviet Zone 
propaganda.”91 In light of the SPD “The SPD cannot and will not support these events. 
The SPD also expects that Party members and members of the KdA do not participate in 
these marches.”92 If West Germans were concerned about nuclear weapons, they were 
encouraged to direct their efforts towards the Fight Atomic Death campaign. However, 
by 1960 it was obvious that the KdA was really just a façade propped up by the SPD 
with no real influence or effective protest strategy. The SPD had seemingly given up its 
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antinuclear efforts in the Bundestag and indicated their acceptance of the government’s 
stance on defense and foreign policy.93 Konrad Tempel was justified when he said “We 
are going to the streets because those who should represent us do not represent us 
anymore.”94 
 In a statement provocatively titled “Why the SPD is Lying” Konrad Tempel 
challenged claims made by Erich Ollenhauer in a news article published in late March 
1961 shortly before the second Easter March. Ollenhauer stated that the Easter Marches 
were promoting unilateral nuclear disarmament in the West and insinuated that this was 
because they were sympathetic to the peace movement in the GDR. To prove these 
claims were false Tempel cited statements from Easer March leaflets that clearly stated 
their opposition to nuclear weapons both East as West such as “In the name of reason 
and humanity we therefore turn to all governments East and West, to refrain from any 
military use of nuclear energy.”95 These Easter March statements were very similar to 
the SPD’s own proclamations and Tempel noted that there was no real difference from 
the Fight Atomic Death campaign either. The core issue was that the SPD, along with 
most in traditional party politics, did not like the Easter Marches because they disagreed 
with their antinuclear platform or because they represented an unknown and 
uncontrollable entity. The SPD worried the Easter March movement would affect their 
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political positions and feared it could lead to a fundamental breakdown in party unity.96 
It was clear to the Easter March leadership that the SPD and conservative parties used 
their considerable influence and power against the Easter March in public forums such 
as the news.  
 Tempel believed the situation struck right at the heart of democracy, “When free 
and responsible citizens do not have the opportunity to adequately express their 
conscience in protest and their concern of the West is distorted from their concern of the 
East, then our democracy is lazy and all talk of democracy is lazy and all talk of 
democracy and human dignity is disingenuous.”97 He observed that, “The value of a 
democracy is to be judged by the way minorities are treated in it,” meaning in this case 
political minorities, and noted, “The current minority of nuclear weapons opponents 
posed of resolute conscience against any nuclear armament each in East and West is 
systematically vilified.”98 Tempel along with the other activists long recognized that 
their political opinions were not widely accepted but believed they had the right to 
express them all the same. With indignation, Tempel called out the SPD on their lies and 
twisting of the democratic process. In concluding he appealed to the President of the 
Federal Republic, to journalists, to the clergy and teachers, and to the people to help 
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preserve the Basic Law and the freedoms it guaranteed citing the articles that protected 
freedom of conscience, freedom of ideological belief, and freedom of expression.99 
  Despite the SPD ban on participation in the Easter March many nuclear weapons 
opponents who were previously involved in the Fight Atomic Death campaign 
transitioned to the Easter Marches. The SPD leadership reiterated its stance in opposition 
to the Easter Marches prior to the 1961 march stating “…the Social Democratic party 
cannot and will not support these events” but Social Democratic members increasingly 
participated in the Easter Marches in the early 1960s.100 To many who defied the ban, it 
became obvious that the KdA was a hollow shell propped up by the SPD and the Easter 
Marches had taken its place as the outlet for antinuclear activism.101 
 As the Easter Marches grew and increasingly took the place of the Fight Atomic 
Death campaign as the primary organization for antinuclear action in West Germany, it 
carved out space between the spheres of traditional party politics and public life. The 
SPD’s resistance and opposition to the movement served to illustrate the fact that the 
party no longer represented many on the left and extra-parliamentary opposition, in the 
form of the Easter Marches, was the only alternative. The Cold War seemed to be 
drawing closer to an armed conflict and in the absence of political representation in the 
Bundestag peace activists were forced to take matters into their own hands. In a report to 
the War Resisters’ International Konrad Tempel wrote, “The present situation in 
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Germany forces us to the greatest possible activity. The desire on the part of West 
Germany to get nuclear weapons heightens decisively the tension in world politics and 
increases the threat of nuclear war. We therefore demand that Germany gives up the idea 
of getting nuclear weapons, for the whole of Germany. [And] Germany refuses the 
stationing of troops equipped with nuclear weapons on German territory.”102  
 The Easter Marches continued to grow through the early 1960s and by 1964, 
when Konrad Tempel stepped down as Speaker, around 100,000 people participated in 
the protest. The Easter Marches help form the protest culture of the 1960s through the 
promotion of popular music and a celebratory nature, the application of mass popular 
protest, and the appeal to German youth to take an active role. Historians note that the 
Easter Marches created the blueprint for how an organization had to remain party neutral 
and rely on individual participation in order to secure long-term survival and success.103 
This also helped the movement survive attempts to paint the organization as communist 
or communist influenced. The elements that led to the success of the Easter March all 
have their roots in the first hand experience peace activists gained in the conscientious 
objection movement. The power and moral responsibility of the individual were 
principles applied in the VK and IdK, and especially in the AG.  
 One of the major accomplishments of the early Easter March campaign was that 
in many ways it bridged the divide that existed between the two West German 
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conscientious objection groups. The yearly Easter March was one of the few times that 
VK and IdK members joined in protest. While they disagreed about how the West 
German conscientious objection movement should be organized and led, they were 
united in their opposition to war and nuclear weapons and the Easter Marches, due in 
part to its insistence on voluntary participation of individuals, provided the forum for 
them to express their convictions together. In a speech to the 1963 WRI Triennial 
Conference in Stavanger, Norway Herbert Günneberg stated, “All three branches [of the 
West German conscientious objection movement] work together in the Easter March 
movement; and this movement is the realization of practical refusal in the political and 
ideological area.” He went on to argue that antinuclear activism and conscientious 
objection were based on the same principals, “It is the psychological refusal of 
individuals, who unite and make a demonstration, which in future, as we hope, will have 
a political effect. …Individual refusal in the nuclear age is based on conscientious 
objectors, but must have allies in other areas of attitude.” Günneberg summed up the 
basic principles of individual responsibility and action that the Easter March embodied 
stating, “The refusal of taking part in war-preparations is a personal, individual refusal 
first; and on this individual refusal actions are based, which are performed by equally 
minded groups.”104 
 Perhaps the best way to describe the origins of the Easter March movement is to 
say that it was founded by conscientious objection activists who sought to develop a 
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more effective form of opposition, and was a product of a diffuse network of activists 
and organizations, which dated back to the debates over rearmament and conscription in 
the 1950s. The experience gained, and the lessons learned from the conscientious 
objection movement were applied to the Easter March, and helped the movement reach 
heights the Tempels and other early leaders never dreamed possible.105 Furthermore, 
many of the original participants were conscientious objection activists, and the two 
conscientious objection organizations, the IdK and VK, provided essential support to the 
movement. The importance of the conscientious objection movement in the creation of 
the Easter March should not be overlooked; to do so would only tell half the story. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THROUGH THE IRON CURTAIN: WEST GERMAN ACTIVISTS AND THE 1961 
SAN FRANCISCO TO MOSCOW WALK FOR PEACE  
In front of the red walls of the Kremlin on October 3, 1961, Reiner Steinweg, a 
young peace activist from the small West German town of Hohenhausen in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, handed out hundreds of antimilitary leaflets to a crowd of 
enthusiastic Russians. Steinweg, along with peace activists from all over the Western 
world, had accomplished something no one had ever done before; he had walked 
through the Iron Curtain to protest militarism and nuclear weapons at the height of the 
Cold War. The incredible story of this march, known as the American-European March 
for Peace, highlights the transnational cooperation of peace activists in the United States, 
Britain, and West Germany in the early 1960s.   
This chapter investigates collaboration between West German peace activists and 
members of peace organizations outside of West Germany with particular attention to 
the transfer of information between them and exchange of tactics and methods of protest 
from one another as well as the many issues that divided them. It also studies the 
transnational social space that allowed this communication to take place. By examining 
the cooperation between the organizers of the Committee for Nonviolent Action’s 
1960-1961 American-European March for Peace, I will demonstrate how the West 
German, British, and American activists coordinated and developed nonviolent protest 
strategies. While the West German activists learned from and adopted some of the 
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protest methods of peace organizations in Great Britain and the United States, they 
created their own culture of protest and with it developed a distinct set of tactics and 
“rules of engagement” for their organizations.1 The CNVA 1960-1961 
American-European March for Peace represents a milestone in the development of the 
West German peace movement because it was one of the first, major international 
protest events to challenge government defense policies in the East and the West, and the 
first to physically cross the Cold War divide to deliver their message. This remarkable 
event would not have been possible without the recent experience of key West German 
activists from the conscientious objection movement and the emerging Easter March 
campaign. 
 Historians have looked broadly at the San Francisco to Moscow Walk for Peace; 
this chapter is a much closer look at the march.2 One that focuses on the West German 
portion of the march, specifically the involvement of West German peace activists and 
the effect the march had on West German protest culture. Furthermore, it explores more 
deeply the concept of transnational social space and how the interaction of peace 
activists from the U.S. and West Germany influenced one another.   
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 A number of problems and issues arose during the march. One of the primary 
issues was the lack of a common discourse about nuclear disarmament and peace. This 
was due to the fact that each group of activists came from distinctly unique political 
realities and their views were often based on what they dealt with their respective 
countries. Furthermore, the term peace meant different things to different people. To 
some, peace simply meant the absence of war. To others, peace meant much more and in 
some cases peace was a word that was used by the communists. For many West German 
activists, peace was a word that had to be used carefully in the context of nuclear 
disarmament. 
 Some of the issues were cultural. The West German activists often felt the 
Americans were recalcitrant when dealing with the authorities, undisciplined on the 
march, and dismissive of the potential impact the march would have on the peace 
movement in the Federal Republic. These issues came to a head at perhaps one of the 
most dramatic moments of the march when on Sunday, August 13, 1961 they found 
themselves in East Berlin, the epicenter of the Cold War, when the Berlin Wall went up. 
 The problems and issues encountered during the development and 
implementation of the peace walk are not unique to this event. In fact, several historians 
have discussed in detail how protest groups deal with these obstacles. Because of the 
multitude of national activists involved and the states being crossed during the peace 
walk this was difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Every activist brought with them 
the specific domestic and national concerns that made up their protest agenda and 
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political discourse. Holger Nehring argues that international and national dimensions are 
always at play in transnational movements.3 Activists can never really escape the 
political realities of their respective countries. When addressing the British and West 
German antinuclear movements Nehring observed, “Both movements related their own 
aims to global and international problems. But they continued to observe the world from 
their individual perspectives: national, regional and local forms remained important.”4 In 
addition, each country the march entered had its own distinct set of political realities and 
contexts that influenced the way the peace walk’s message was received.5 
 A useful definition of peace movements is that they are “…social movements 
that aim to protest against the perceived dangers of political decision-making about 
armaments.”6 The San Francisco to Moscow Peace Walk was a movement that was a 
product of American society with a specific set of protest tactics; specifically, nonviolent 
civil disobedience. Political scientist Lawrence Quill observed that civil disobedience 
was a “…form of collective activity [that] constituted an act of uncommon sense. While 
common sense leveled down political options so that alternatives played out within a 
field defined by the existing institutional order, civil disobedience (at least in some 
forms) held out the possibility of rupturing this constructed social and political reality.”7 
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Civil disobedience was being employed with success in the Civil Rights movement and 
while it was not a uniquely American tactic it was not commonly employed in Europe. 
The use of civil disobedience on the peace walk had the potential to disrupt the cohesion 
of the marchers because the tactic was unfamiliar to many of the European activists and 
likely to cause problems in Eastern European countries that had a different view of civil 
liberties. However, it was necessary for the peace walk organizers to develop a 
consistent protest strategy if the march was to spread its message effectively along the 
route because a united strategy can be a tool to bring together activists who are divided 
culturally and spatially.8 
 This event, a walk for peace that protested the nuclear weapons race and 
militarism, was an attempt to address a very serious issue facing most of the world; the 
buildup of Cold War tensions that were seemingly destined to erupt in nuclear war 
between the East and the West on the continent of Europe. The peace walk participants 
endeavored to influence the politicians in the United States and European countries to 
change their respective defense policies and remove nuclear weapons from their 
arsenals. Knowing the peace walk would have little to no effect on American and 
European politicians, the organizers focused instead on encouraging the people of each 
country to demand peace and nuclear disarmament for themselves. 
 The organizer of the peace walk, the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA), 
was formed in the United States in 1957 to protest against the U.S. government’s nuclear 
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weapons programs. The CNVA was one of the first peace organizations to employ 
nonviolent direct action, in particular civil disobedience, in the United States. The 
CNVA used nonviolent direct action in their protests against nuclear arms and while 
they were not the largest or perhaps most influential American antinuclear organization, 
they were certainly one of the most dramatic.9 
 In the fall of 1960 the CNVA planned a peace march through the U.S. and 
Europe, most importantly communist countries in Eastern Europe such as the DDR, 
Poland, and the Soviet Union. The marchers would carry signs, leaflet, and talk with 
locals about unilateral disarmament and peace. If possible, they would demonstrate at 
military installations. The CNVA organizers knew this would take a high level of 
organization and international support but they believed in the power of peace and 
nonviolence and knew that if they could get into the Soviet Union they would make 
history.10 
 Around 100 people left San Francisco December, 1961 with the goal to raise 
awareness of peaceful alternatives to the Cold War policies of military deterrence and 
promote peaceful, nonviolent solutions to international conflicts and Cold War tensions. 
They were “walking to stimulate people all over the world to think about the problem of 
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Peace (Raymond, N.H.: Greenleaf Books, 1966), 2-3. 
   
202 
 
international peace.”11 Their “program for peace” was based on the belief that “military 
power is immoral and will not work” and urged “that people demand and governments 
adopt moral policies that will lead to lasting peace, not to war.”12 While admirable, this 
attempt to create a common discourse about peace and nonviolence was heavily 
weighted in the context of the American peace movement. 
 To create a lasting peace the CNVA asked the governments of the world to 
renounce militarism and nuclear weapons. Militarism, as they defined it, was the reliance 
on military power to solve international problems. This was attached to a transnational 
framework that envisioned a world that solved its problems without violence or the 
threat of violence. The CNVA called for unilateral disarmament, the end of conscription, 
and a universal guarantee of civil rights, among other things.13 Furthermore, they 
implored people everywhere to encourage their government to take these steps. For 
example people could influence their government by refusing to pay taxes that supported 
military programs, refuse to serve in the military, protest and demonstrate at military 
installations and industries, or participate in local and national peace organizations.14 
These appeals reflected the social and political realities of the U.S. and while they were 
applicable in parts of the Western world, many of their suggestions were simply 
impossible in other countries, particularly in Eastern Europe. 
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 Nonviolence was at the core of everything activists on the CNVA 
American-European March for Peace did. The CNVA leadership emphasized Gandhian 
nonviolence in all actions. In its most extreme form this meant enduring physical abuse 
and violence without responding with violence in word or deed.15 The West German 
peace movement was also influenced by the precepts of Gandhian nonviolence. Theodor 
Michaltscheff studied and wrote extensively on Gandhi’s teachings and disseminated his 
writings through the monthly IdK publication he edited, Die Friedensrundschau.16 
Michaltscheff was particularly interested in Gandhi’s concept of Satyagraha, adhering to 
the truth in thought and action, and strove to emulate this in his life.17 He also worked 
hard to spread Gandhi’s teachings in the West German peace movement and because of 
his efforts, along with those of likeminded pacifists, many West German activists were 
able to share a common discourse on nonviolence with American CNVA members. 
 The CNVA also promoted direct action and this primarily took the form of civil 
disobedience. Civil disobedience was a tactic that had been successfully employed in the 
United States most recently by the Civil Rights movement.18 It was clear to CNVA 
activists that civil disobedience was a powerful tool that could be used to bring about 
                                                 
15 Committee For Nonviolent Action Bulletin, November 10, 1960, HIS, TEM 500,03 
16 Theodor Michaltscheff, 20 Jahre Friedensrundschau: 20 Jahre Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner 
(1947 - 1966); persönliche Erinnerungen, (Hamburg: Archiv Aktiv, 1996); Andrew Oppenheimer, “Air 
Wars and Empire: Gandhi and the Search for a Usable Past in Postwar Germany.” Central European 
History 45, no. 4 (2012): 669-696, 671-673. 
17 Oppenheimer, “Air Wars and Empire,” 680. 
18 On the transfer and implementation of Gandhian nonviolent civil disobedience in the Civil Rights 
movement see Sean Chabot, Transnational Roots of the Civil Rights Movement: African American 
Explorations of the Gandhian Repertoire (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2012). 
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political change. In previous protests demonstrations in the United States, members of 
the CNVA had climbed the gates of a missile base in Omaha, Nebraska, and trespassed 
onto a submarine base to board nuclear-armed vessels in New London, Connecticut. In 
both cases, members were arrested and several served time in prison for their actions.19 
If the peace walk across the United States and Europe was to succeed the CNVA and 
participating activists would have to use civil disobedience to change the rules and work 
outside the traditional sphere of politics. In an outline of the basic policy for the peace 
walk, the European CNVA organizing committee in London wrote:  
Their aim is to take their message to the people in each country, and they hope 
to do this with the cooperation of the authorities in each case. But should any 
country prevent the team’s entrance, or should they be admitted, but prevented 
from handing out their leaflets or carrying their banners, they will have no 
alternative but to protest through some form of non-violent civil disobedience, 
such as remaining at the border or facing arrest rather than allow their basic 
message to be obscured.20 
The direct action tactic of civil disobedience, coupled with nonviolence, constituted a 
dramatic and efficacious protest strategy that the CNVA American-European March for 
Peace utilized in Europe. This is important to note because up to this point, nonviolent 
direct action—specifically civil disobedience—was not part of the West German protest 
repertoire.   
 Along with a central organizing committee in the U.S. the CNVA tapped into 
their transnational network to coordinate with organizing committees in each European 
country along the route. The CNVA quickly realized that organizing the European 
                                                 
19Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, 249. 
20 “Basic Policy of San Francisco to Moscow Walk,” HIS, TEM 500,03 
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section of the march would be very complex and reached out to European peace activists 
for help and created a central organizing committee for the European portion that would 
coordinate the efforts of each national committee.21 These European committees assisted 
with a myriad of logistical issues from visa applications and correspondence with the 
local and state authorities to accommodations and food. Another important function of 
these committees was to contact local antinuclear and peace groups so that they could 
participate in the march and the various gatherings and protest activities. This contact 
and cooperation with other international peace organizations provided invaluable 
opportunities for the activists from each country to share ideas and discuss protest 
strategies and tactics. The CNVA utilized the transnational social space to organize the 
march and in doing so helped develop it further. 
 The European central organizing committee was based in London and consisted 
of British activists April Carter, Hugh Brock, and Bayard Rustin who was also a member 
of the CNVA Executive Committee. In their role, these activists had oversight of the 
European portion of the march.22 The CNVA chose them to serve as the organizers for 
the European leg of the march because the Americans recognized that it was essential to 
have activists who had extensive experience with peace work in Europe. Furthermore, 
their experience as European peace activists put them in the best position to develop a 
common discourse on nuclear disarmament for the peace walk. Their knowledge of the 
political situation in each country, familiarity with the various peace movements, and, 
                                                 
21Minutes of Executive Committee meeting January 6, 1961. CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 1, Box 1. 
22Ibid. 
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most importantly, their international networks and personal connections with activists in 
France, Belgium, and West Germany would be immeasurably beneficial to the march.23 
They had all been working with one another since the mid-1950s in War Resisters’ 
International. Along with the chair of the CNVA, American peace activist A.J. Muste, 
this group stayed in constant contact with the marchers and made most of the strategic 
decisions.24 
The West German organizing committee worked closely with A.J. Muste and the 
central organizing committee in London several months before the march reached the 
Federal Republic in mid July. As part of their effort to develop a common rhetoric for 
the march, the CNVA insisted that anyone involved in the walk had to be in full accord 
with three points: “unilateral disarmament and opposition to nuclear war preparation by 
any and every country; the commitment in principle for walkers to commit civil 
disobedience if, where and when necessary; direct appeal to people everywhere to call 
on their respective governments for unilateral initiative.”25 Each of the West German 
organizing committee members were selected because of their experience in the West 
German peace movement. They had all worked with Carter, Brock, and Rustin in the 
WRI and had developed strong relationships. Furthermore, all of the members of the 
West German organizing committee were involved in the West German conscientious 
                                                 
23Minutes of Executive Committee meeting January 6, 1961. CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 1, Box 1. 
24The Dutch born Reverend A.J. Muste was one of the most famous American peace activists and had 
been involved in nonviolent protest activities for decades. He was also well known for his work in the 
labor movement and the civil rights movement. Jo Ann Robinson, Abraham Went Out: A Biography of 
A.J. Muste (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981). 
25Minutes of Executive Committee meeting January 24, 1961. CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 1, Box 1. 
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objection movement as members of the IdK or the VK and were involved in the Easter 
Marches. The committee included Helga and Konrad Tempel, Dr. Andreas Buro, 
Herbert Stubenrauch, and Heinz Kloppenburg.26 
 These organizing committees—the European central organizing committee and 
the national organizing committees—along with the CNVA leadership, all took part in 
developing the strategy for the peace walk as it passed through Europe. This strategy, 
based on an attempt to create a common discourse about peace and nuclear disarmament 
and predicated on nonviolent protest tactics such as civil disobedience, was necessary for 
creating a sense of unity for the marchers. Furthermore, the establishment of a common 
strategy and the collective actions of the organizers and participants contributed to the 
advancement of the activists’ transnational social space.27 
 The European central organizing committee believed it was especially important 
to include Konrad and Helga Tempel in the West German planning committee. In a letter 
to CNVA Chair, A.J. Muste, April Carter and Bayard Rustin wrote, “It is essential we 
get [the] support of Helga and Konrad if [the] March is to have any worthwhile support 
in W. Germany: their Easter March organization now includes all the most dynamic and 
politically sound groups and individuals in North and Central Germany, and has 
achieved the miracle of bringing the VK and IdK together.”28 Furthermore, Carter and 
                                                 
26Minutes of Executive Committee meeting April 20, 1961. CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 1, Box 1. 
27Nehring, “National Internationalists,” 576. 
28 Politically sound most likely meant not communist in this context. Confidential Memo from April 
Carter and Bayard Rustin to AJ Muste April 22 and 23, 1961, CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 6, Box 14. 
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Rustin pointed out that “Konrad represents the most vital and active part of the German 
Peace movement [and] we decide in working through him especially since he has the 
confidence of [Martin] Niemoeller and several other older and respected leaders.”29 
Interestingly, the West German organizing committee was willing to temporarily 
adopt the common discourse of the march even though the central demand of the peace 
walk, unilateral nuclear disarmament of each country they passed through, was not part 
of their protest rhetoric in the Federal Republic. The Easter March, the primary 
antinuclear protest movement in West Germany, did not call for unilateral disarmament 
but simply opposed (American) nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr. Many West 
German antinuclear activists believed the CNVA position was an extreme one that was 
unrealistic and even dangerous in the political environment of the Federal Republic.30 
This reaction can be attributed to the fact that West Germany did not have nuclear 
weapons of its own and it was on the frontlines of the Cold War, where a call for 
unilateral disarmament seemed both hazardous and communist-inspired.31 Even though 
the West Germans involved in the organization of the peace walk accepted the CNVA’s 
protest message, it is not hard to see how other West German activists, let alone the 
West German public, might not. 
29 Memo from April Carter and Bayard Rustin to AJ Muste April 13, 1961, CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 
6, Box 14. 
30 Konrad and Helga Tempel, interview by author, Ahrensburg, Germany, July 24, 2013. 
31Nehring, “National Internationalists,” 564. 
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When the CNVA began coordinating with the West German activists a number 
of problems arose, all a direct result of the unique political reality of the Federal 
Republic. Because the march organizers had not yet received permission to enter East 
Germany the West German activists were concerned about going forward with planning 
the West German section of the walk. They believed it would be a serious mistake for 
the walk to enter the Federal Republic unless it had advance permission to enter the 
DDR, and that if the walk was not allowed into East Germany, the resulting publicity 
would be very harmful to the already tense East/West relationship. The West Germans 
were also concerned about the effect on the September Federal elections if the march 
went wrong; they worried the resulting political grandstanding would swing votes in 
favor of the right.32 Furthermore, if a demonstration was held at the border protesting the 
DDR’s decision it would serve only to intensify Cold War tensions between the two 
German states.33 Helga Tempel explained that if the march failed to reach the East and 
the walkers were stopped at the East German border “it would strengthen hostilities and 
prejudices between the East and West. [Because of this] we were a bit reluctant to have 
the march come.”34 The West German activists were working to reduce Cold War 
tensions and open peaceful avenues of discussion and conflict resolution between the 
two German states; a protest demonstration at the border, in their minds, would only 
exacerbate the situation. 
32 “Report on meeting held in Germany,” April 22 and 23, 1961, CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 6, Box 14. 
33Minutes of Executive Committee meeting May 23, 1961. CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 1, Box 1. 
34 Konrad and Helga Tempel, interview by author, Ahrensburg, Germany, July 24, 2013. 
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Konrad Tempel and Heinz Kloppenburg advised the European committee that if 
the march was refused entry into East Germany then it should try to enter the Eastern 
Bloc through Austria or Scandinavia. The possibility of the march becoming political 
ammunition if it was stalled at the border was a very serious concern for them. The 
Executive committee replied that while “an alternate route is not precluded, but a single 
or simple rebuff at the East German border is not considered sufficient to cause a change 
of plan. The committee recommends that the walk persevere at the East German border 
for some length of time and that civil disobedience at that point be considered and tried 
before any consideration of change of route.”35 
 The West German organizers also feared the consequences if the march was 
allowed to enter East Germany. They believed that if the march was allowed to enter the 
DDR and was welcomed by the Peace Council, an organ of the East German 
government, the West German peace activists and their respective organizations could 
be labeled communist sympathizers by the West German press. The West Germans were 
also very concerned about the possibility of the East German Peace Council attempting 
to hijack the march in order to raise their own message and attack the policies of the 
Western governments.36 This was a very real concern as the Tempels and Buro had dealt 
with a similar situation with communists attempting to hijack the message of the Easter 
March in West Germany. During the 1961 Easter March several other organizations 
attempted to take advantage of the publicity surrounding the event and promote their 
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own message. In a few cases communist leaning groups carried signs with their own 
slogans and tried to march at the head of the column, Tempel and the other Easter March 
leaders stopped them from doing this and reiterated the policy of individual 
participation.37 
 As discussed earlier, West German peace activists found themselves in a 
particularly difficult situation when it came to their rhetoric. In the Federal Republic, due 
in part to its position as a frontline state in the Cold War and the nature of its postwar 
occupation, the term peace was considered by many to be a communist term. This meant 
that every time West German peace activists employed peace rhetoric they were 
confronted with accusations of communist influence. Furthermore, their position at the 
frontlines of the Cold War in Europe meant that their political reality was very different 
than the American and British situations and this restrained their field of action a great 
deal.38 
When the Tempels joined in organizing the march it seemed to them that 
everything had already been decided. They often got the impression that the Americans 
were not careful enough to listen to their European counterparts and include their 
concerns in the decision making process. Helga recalled, “When we heard about it [the 
CNVA March] we only had the possibility to help when they came through West 
                                                 
37 Norddeutscher Rundfunk, April 3, 1961; Konrad and Helga Tempel, interview by author, Ahrensburg, 
Germany, July 24, 2013. 
38Nehring, Politics of Security, 32. 
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Germany rather than plan anything about the march.”39 April Carter and Bayard Rustin 
recognized the discomfort of West German activists and informed the Executive 
Committee, “It was clear that the German group felt that the American Committee 
should have consulted in advance with European Pacifists who would be directly 
affected by the March, and should take into account the advice and fears of National 
Committees who would have to bear the repercussions of the March on their movement 
after the Americans had returned home.”40 However, the West Germans understood that 
the Peace Walk was coming to Germany even if they did not provide organizational 
assistance, “the only other option was to say no and leave them in the street. So we 
helped organize the march in Germany but we were a bit afraid of what might happen at 
the border.”41 This episode encapsulates one major problems facing transnational 
activism, activists have difficulty leaving their particular national perceptions behind. 
The American activists were often unable to see beyond their immediate protest rhetoric 
and goals to consider the implications of their actions in a very different political 
environment, particularly on the local peace movement 
 Helga and Konrad Tempel handled most of the correspondence and West 
German promotion for the march; they sent a number of flyers advertising the march to 
peace organizations and activists, asking for support and donations.42 Their goal was to 
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raise enough money to support each West German activist on the march in full and pay 
back the CNVA for the funds spent in preparation for West German participation.43 The 
West German organizing committee felt that it was very important to completely support 
its activists. In its view, securing adequate funding for protest actions prior to the events 
was an important element of a successful protest campaign. The West German 
organizing committee had helped prepare the march route by securing permission to 
hold gatherings and leaflet in the towns and cities they would pass through.44 In each 
town along the way the committee had also arranged for a local peace activist to assist 
the marchers. These local activists helped coordinate logistical issues such as food and 
housing as well as organizing meetings and demonstrations.45 Many opened their homes 
to the marchers and gave whatever assistance they could. 
Another important role for the West German organizing committee was the 
recruitment and training of West German march participants. The European organizing 
committee wanted to ensure that the new marchers were well versed in a number of 
nonviolent tactics such as “how to face arrest non-violently, the use of a silent vigil, the 
effectiveness of fasting in a given situation, and attitude toward Police.”46 They also 
wanted to make sure that all were familiar with the pacifist writings of Henry David 
43 Each of the West German participants needed around 800-1000 DM for the march from the Federal 
Republic to Moscow. Interestingly the organizers wrote that it would be embarrassing if they could not 
support their marchers despite the Wirtschaftswunder. Letter from Helga Stolle to West German peace 
workers and peace organizations June 1961, HIS, TEM 600,03. 
44 Dr. Andreas Buro, interview by author, Grävenwiesbach, Germany, July 16, 2013. 
45Lehmann, We Walked to Moscow, 47. 
46 “Training for Team Members,” April 28, 1961, CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 6, Box 14. 
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Thoreau and Gandhi.47 Konrad Tempel was chosen to be responsible for the training of 
the West German march participants. Tempel’s training sessions included: 
self-discipline, cooperation, and accepting or not accepting leadership.48 He had a 
particularly difficult portion of the training where he asked all the men to roll up their 
pant leg. He had a needle and asked them to hurt themselves to show their wiliness to 
sacrifice by sticking themselves with the needle. And all the men were about to do it. 
Konrad said, “Stop what you are doing! You are trusting me without using your brain. 
Every leader needs your brain.” He taught many cooperation exercises, nonviolent 
techniques, and focused on confidence building within the group.49 Much like the Action 
Group for Nonviolence, Tempel emphasized individual action based on personal 
convictions. 
 Konrad Tempel’s training sessions dealt with some of the nuance of Gandhian 
nonviolence. According to Tempel, it was not enough to be willing to suffer abuse for 
your cause in a spirit of nonviolence. Tempel taught that nonviolent action, which could 
involve painful sacrifice, required intelligent action. One’s actions must have purpose; 
blindly following orders was not part of Gandhi’s concept of Satyagraha. Nonviolent 
action, based on Gandhian principles, was not the same as passive resistance. Gandhi 
wrote that Satyagraha consisted of three elements “Satyagraha is a weapon of the strong; 
it admits of no violence under any circumstance whatsoever; and it ever insists upon 
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truth.”50 Tempel also sought to instill the basic elements of what Sean Chabot calls the 
Gandhian repertoire, a set of rules of conduct for protest actions. Chabot describes both 
the individual and organizational levels of the Gandhian repertoire, “At the individual 
level, the Gandhian repertoire outlined a code of discipline for participants in direct 
action campaigns. Everyone was supposed to suffer the anger of an opponent without 
retaliation, avoid the use of insults or any form of violence, willingly submit to arrest or 
punishment, and obey the orders of group leaders.” Tempel specifically focused on each 
of these components of the individual’s responsibility in his training sessions. The 
application of the repertoire at the organizational level required a different set of 
responsibilities, “At the strategic and organizational level, the Gandhian repertoire 
emphasized self-reliance, honorable negotiation with the authorities, self-discipline, and 
openness in communication.”51 While there were no formal training sessions for the 
march organizers, all were well read on the principles of Gandhian nonviolent action, 
and throughout the peace walk they adhered to the Gandhian repertoire. 
 In the Federal Republic of Germany a number of West German peace activists 
joined the march. These included a number of young student activists who had been 
chosen to participate by the West German committee such as 23 year old Franziska 
Mentzel from West Berlin who had participated in the 1961 Easter March from 
Düsseldorf to Dortmund, 20 year old Johannes Meyer from Hamburg who had been part 
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of the Easter March from the beginning in 1960 and was a member of the IdK, and 
22 year old Reiner Steinweg of Hohenhausen, also part of the 1961 Düsseldorf to 
Dortmund Easter March and a member of the VK. They all spoke English and had 
proven track records in peace work in West Germany.52 Furthermore, each of the West 
German members selected by the planning committee had participated in two weekends 
of mandatory training to prepare them for the various political and social issues they 
might encounter on the march as well as train them in the basics of Gandhian nonviolent 
action.53 Their language skills proved invaluable to the peace walk as they were 
frequently called upon to translate during meetings, demonstrations, and impromptu 
gatherings.54 They were also essential when dealing with the government and police in 
East and West Germany.   
The international cooperation efforts during the march also highlighted 
significant differences in the way the West German and American activists planned and 
executed protest actions. From the beginning the West German activists were shocked 
by the way the Americans dealt with people in positions of authority. They were also 
shocked by what they believed to be an irresponsible lack of planning for the march. The 
fact that the Americans had not worked out a detailed written agreement with the 
51Sean Chabot, “Transnational Diffusion and the African-American Reinvention of the Gandhian 
Repertoire.” in Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston, Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions 
of Social Movements (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 101. 
52 “History of the San Francisco to Moscow March for Peace” HIS, TEM 500,03. 
53 Letter from Helga Stolle to West German peace workers and peace organizations June 1961, HIS, TEM 
600,03. 
54Lyttle, You Come with Naked Hands, 111. 
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government of each country on the march route or that the CNVA had not collected 
enough money to finance the march beforehand stunned the West Germans.55 
 This difference in attitude was highlighted a number of times during the march. 
To the horror of the West German activists, the Americans often operated by the policy 
of ‘it is easier to ask for forgiveness than permission’ when dealing with the complex 
regulations and prohibitions in the West German towns and cities. The West Germans 
felt everyone should march with dignity and respect for the local community and 
maintain a sense of cohesiveness. They also preferred that the marchers ask permission 
to stop for lunch and short breaks. At the same time the American activists could not 
believe their eyes when a West German marcher would stop the first policeman they saw 
when entering a town and ask “whether we could have three, two or one leafleter on 
each side of the street; whether we could cross the street to get more leaflets; how often 
pedestrian crossings were provided; whether we should walk on the sidewalk or on the 
pavement edge; whether we should proceed in ones or twos.”56 It is not surprising that 
activists from different parts of the world had different approaches to conducting a 
protest march. While it is clear that specific national concerns heavily influenced the 
participants’ political objectives, their respective cultural traditions also influenced their 
behavior. 
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A number of episodes on the march provided the activists with opportunities to 
observe the different approaches to protest march conduct. At one point as the marchers 
walked through the Federal Republic a number of West German activists joined the 
march with their own brightly painted signs. They carried signs with slogans from the 
Easter March such as “Besser Ko-Existenz als No-Existenz” (“Better Coexistence than 
No existence”) and “Was willst Du verteidigen, wenn nichts übrigbleibt?” (“What do 
you want to defend when there is nothing left?”).57 Interestingly, the police did not want 
to allow the signs carried by the West German activists with the Easter March slogans. 
The police claimed that the slogans had not been approved and therefore could not be 
carried on the peace march. The marchers protested this restriction and eventually the 
police agreed to allow them to carry the signs as long as they were only carried at 
shoulder height.58 This incident is quite strange because the West Germans had carried 
signs with these very slogans on five separate marches that were spread all across the 
Federal Republic just three months earlier.   
Most likely the police were simply trying to maintain as much control as possible 
over the march but one has to wonder what the German activists thought about the 
situation. When confronted with this restriction the Americans had simply refused to 
comply and negotiated with the authorities over the issue. Once they had resolved the 
issue the activists marched on. Later in the day the police tried to stop the marchers from 
leafleting in Wuppertal. When they pressed the police to show them a copy of the law or 
57 “Slogans für den Ostermarsch” HIS, TEM 100, 04. 
58Lyttle, You Come with Naked Hands, 110. 
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regulation that stipulated where they could not pass out leaflets the police had no answer. 
The officers then consulted with their superiors and eventually gave in and allowed the 
marchers to continue leafleting.59   
 Each time the marchers were confronted with restrictions by the local authorities 
they refused to be intimidated or dissuaded and ultimately got their way. For the West 
German activists this regular confrontation with authority was undoubtedly an 
enlightening experience. The American activists put the Gandhian repertoire in action 
during these encounters with the local authorities. The West German activists, who were 
familiar with the Gandhian repertoire through their training with Tempel, were able to 
witness firsthand how Satyagraha was a position of strength. This lesson was soon 
emphasized to a higher degree when civil disobedience was employed. 
 While the West Germans were often uncomfortable with the way the Americans 
dealt with authority, they respected their passion for the movement and were very 
impressed with their nonviolent direct-action tactics of civil disobedience. Because the 
marchers had not been allowed to demonstrate at any military establishments in the 
Federal Republic they decided to defy the authorities and stage demonstrations before 
they left. There was some discussion within the group and with the organizing 
committees about how many demonstrations should be attempted and where. The 
CNVA chairman, A.J. Muste, did not want to risk losing the march before reaching a 
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communist country if the marchers were deported or imprisoned so he advised only one 
demonstration.60 
 The group eventually decided on four demonstrations on August 4; the Defense 
Ministry in Bonn, the NATO barracks at Dortmund-Brackel, the Niedersachsen 
recruiting headquarters in Hannover, and the military base at Bergen-Hohne.61 Each 
location was chosen for its connection to either the West German military or NATO; the 
Bundeswehr installations were selected to convey the message of unilateral disarmament 
in West Germany while the NATO locations were chosen as the representatives of the 
international body that was responsible for the preservation of peace or the escalation of 
violence in Central Europe. The marchers sent a press release to news outlets and wrote 
to the police in each location notifying them of the demonstrations that would take place 
that Thursday, detailing exactly what they were planning to do.62 They explained that the 
demonstrations would be peaceful and nonviolent; every demonstrator would be 
governed by a discipline of nonviolence in word and deed.63 This too was part of the 
Gandhian repertoire; honorable negotiation with the authorities and openness in 
communication.64 Furthermore, by announcing their intention to stage protests and 
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providing the authorities with specific information on when, where, how, and why they 
were protesting the march organizers helped dispel the threatening nature, 
unpredictability, and most importantly the chaos often associated with protest events. 
 The demonstrations at the rocket base at Bergen-Hohne and the recruiting 
headquarters in Hannover went smoothly and were unhindered by the police. The 
demonstrations at the Ministry of Defense in Bonn and the NATO barracks in Dortmund 
were a different matter. In Bonn the activists were apprehended by the police as soon as 
they left the house where they were staying. The police asked them to get in a waiting 
van and instead of cooperating with the police they sat down and had to be carried into 
the van. At the police station an officer questioned them and asked them if they knew 
that the planned demonstration at the Defense Ministry was forbidden. The marchers 
said they were aware and were then informed that they would be punished if they 
proceeded with the demonstration. Much to their surprise, the activists were released and 
all their leaflets and signs were returned to them.65 
 The marchers then went to the square in front of the West German Ministry of 
Defense and began to tell the crowd why they were there and what they were about. As 
soon as they raised their signs they were confiscated by the police and the marchers were 
arrested. In front of a large crowd of onlookers and German press they went limp in the 
hands of the police and were once again bodily loaded into the police van. At their trial 
the marchers received a sentence of a 25 DM fine each or one day in jail. They refused 
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to pay the fine and after some confusion the court decided to simply let them go free.66 
Apparently the police and the court could not understand why the activists would 
willingly disobey an order against the demonstration even though they knew they would 
be punished. One of the marchers, American Barton Stone, remarked “In my opinion it 
is of great urgency that direct action and the concept of civil disobedience be made 
commonplace in the minds of the German people. For this reason I greatly respect and 
appreciate the German citizens who participated in the four demonstrations here at the 
risk of much greater punishment then the foreigners, and the many other German people 
who have courageously helped us.”67 
 At the NATO barracks at Dortmund-Brackel the situation played out a bit 
differently. When the marchers, along with a local march supporter, approached the 
main gate and began the demonstration they were immediately stopped by waiting 
police. The police said that they were on base property and that it was forbidden to 
demonstrate. The marchers pointed out that they were on a public road and cars and 
pedestrians had been going past the main gate all morning. To this the police responded 
that they had special orders to not allow anyone with signs or leaflets to demonstrate at 
the gate, but they could not produce any written order or regulation supporting their 
claim. When the activists decided to disobey the police and continue with the 
demonstration, the men were taken by the police and loaded into the police van. The rest 
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of the group immediately sat down and all signs and some leaflets were confiscated. 
After sitting in protest for an hour, the remaining women attempted to continue on to the 
main gate of the base. All of their leaflets were confiscated before they reached the main 
gate but they were allowed to stand in silent vigil.68 
After their interrogation at the police station, the men were informed that they 
could stand at the gate but they were not allowed to hold signs or pass out leaflets. This 
did not deter the men and as soon as they could they returned to the base with new signs 
and more leaflets. These were immediately confiscated by the police and after several 
more attempts to pass out leaflets one of the demonstrators was again arrested and his 
limp body was loaded into the police van. This process was repeated and eventually the 
police allowed the demonstrators to hand out their leaflets to the passing pedestrians and 
soldiers. With all of their signs confiscated the demonstrators made cloth signs and 
attached them to their jackets in defiance of the police orders. At this point the 
authorities had had enough and they were all arrested and carried by hand into the police 
van to be transported to the police station where they were not released until later that 
evening.69 All the while the German press filmed and took photos of the demonstration 
and the acts of nonviolence when the demonstrators were arrested.70 
68 “Report, Dortmund-Brackel Protestdemonstration,” 1961, CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 6, Box 16. 
69 Ibid. 
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The demonstrations at the Defense Ministry in Bonn and the military base at 
Dortmund-Brackel were successful in a number of ways. First, the marchers were able to 
create dramatic scenes with their nonviolent direct-action tactics of civil disobedience 
that were witnessed by a large number of onlookers and German press.71 This was 
exactly the kind of attention the activists wanted. Second, their civil disobedience 
coupled with nonviolence surprised the West German authorities and in a way forced 
them to reconsider how they viewed peace activists.72 Third, and perhaps the most 
important, the efficacy of nonviolent civil disobedience had a significant impact on the 
West German activists involved. The experience taught Reiner Steinweg that civil 
disobedience worked and the actions of just a few can break through the indifference, 
blind belief in authority, and lack of moral courage to stand up for one’s beliefs that 
seemed to paralyze West German society.73 
Furthermore, the success of the demonstrations’ nonviolent tactics resounded 
through the rest of the West German peace movement as well. In a report to Hugh 
Brock, editor of Peace News in London, Helga wrote “the impressive non-violent 
behavior in the civil disobedience actions in Bonn and Dortmund will have impressed 
our pacifists too. Maybe after that we will find a better echo in demanding more actions 
of this manner.”74 These protest events exemplify the significance and importance of 
71 “Demonstranten gegen Aufrüstung in Bonn zu Geldstrafen verurteilt,” Westdeutsches Tageblatt, August 
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transnational cooperation to the development of the West German protest culture. The 
American marchers showed the West Germans how nonviolent civil disobedience can 
make even a small protest action have an impact and, thanks to the media, reach 
thousands with their message.   
When the march crossed over into the German Democratic Republic at the 
Helmstedt-Marienborn border crossing on August 7 the activists were excited and a bit 
apprehensive about going behind the Iron Curtain.75 The East Germans welcomed them 
as a group but East German authorities were not very happy to host activists from West 
Germany. It seems that the East German authorities were worried about the presence of 
the West German activists and often insinuated that they were sent as spies for the 
Adenauer government. One American marcher wrote that, “GDR officials were also 
very much against having Konrad Tempel around – a West German Quaker and student 
who had done a lot of organizing for us, and had obtained an East German visa on his 
own and joined us. He understood East Germans and spoke in their idiom far too 
effectively for the official’s comfort.”76 The other West German marchers were also 
closely watched but none were individually detained or arrested while they marched 
through the DDR.77 
At times the West German organizers were concerned that the Americans 
became too emboldened by their success in dealing with the authorities and that they 
75Minutes of Executive Committee meeting August 21, 1961. CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 1, Box 1. 
76Lehmann, We Walked to Moscow, 51. 
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would eventually push too hard and seriously jeopardize the march. In the DDR the 
marchers pushed the authorities to the limit and the concerns of the West German 
activists were confirmed.78 The march was plagued with problems in the DDR that 
primarily came from the state-sponsored German Peace Committee.79 The German 
Peace Committee was eager to join the march and capitalize on the moment to push their 
message for peace, often carrying their own signs and passing out their own leaflets.80 
The problem was that the East German message of peace called for West German 
disarmament and condemned the “militarism” of the Federal Republic and the United 
States while at the same time not saying anything about the nuclear weapons and 
military buildup in East Germany and other communist countries.81 
 This was part of a struggle for the legitimacy of the politics of peace that had 
been going on for more than a decade between peace organizations in the two 
Germanies. In the DDR the state-sponsored German Peace Council was the only peace 
organization allowed to exist and it was strictly controlled by the East German Socialist 
Unity Party. The traditional German peace organization, the German Peace Society, was 
banned in the DDR in 1949 and consequently all peace rhetoric coming out East 
Germany was dominated by the agenda of the communist state.   
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The activists could not abide the high-jacking of their march and they constantly 
objected to the actions of the East German participants. The marchers believed that the 
integrity of the peace walk was being compromised and they frequently resorted to 
noncooperation and would sit down and halt the march in protest.82 This action would 
earn them a brief respite from the East German signs and leaflets but they always came 
back. By the time the march reached the outskirts of East Berlin on Sunday, August 13, 
the tension between the Peace Committee of the DDR and the marchers was nearing the 
boiling point.   
Geopolitical tensions were also nearing a boiling point in the contested city of 
Berlin. The current Berlin Crisis had been ongoing since the fall of 1958 when Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech in which he demanded that the Western 
powers pull their forces out of West Berlin. This ultimatum sparked a three-year crisis 
over the future of the city of Berlin that culminated in early August of 1961, the very 
same moment the San Francisco to Moscow Walk for Peace entered the city. In the 
summer of 1961, President John F. Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna to address 
the ongoing issue of Berlin but they were unable to reach an agreement. Following the 
conference Khrushchev once again demanded the Western powers withdraw from 
Berlin. Kennedy responded by activating 150,000 reservists and increasing defense 
expenditures, in preparation for a potential conflict over the future of the city.83 
82 “Bulletin Copy East Germany,” CNVA Papers, SCPC, Series 6, Box 16. 
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 At the core of the crisis was the difficult question of what to do with Germany in 
the long term and the CNVA leadership was well aware of this. Prior to the march 
reaching Europe, the CNVA executive committee had decided to avoid the issue of 
German reunification and only generally make reference to it in regard to the need for 
disarmament.84 They believed the issue to be too politically complex to broach on the 
peace walk.85 Unbeknownst to them, the march would find itself at the center of a 
politically complex and extremely dangerous crisis that became a defining moment of 
the Cold War.   
 Early in the morning on Sunday, August 13, East German workers under police 
guard sealed off the borders of West Berlin with barbed wire. This action, ordered by 
East German leader Walter Ulbricht, was an attempt to stop the flood of people fleeing 
the DDR to West Berlin and to solve the “Berlin question” that had plagued the East 
West relationship.86 The heightened tensions between the East and the West were 
coming to a head in Berlin and many feared war between the superpowers. West 
Berliners gathered in protest at the border at the Brandenburg Gate, the very place the 
CNVA had planned to march a few days later to symbolize the walk’s crossing into the 
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communist East.87 At the same time many East Berliners congregated and protested the 
closing of the border.88 The members of the walk for peace found themselves in the 
middle of a very tense political situation. To make things even more difficult, their only 
source of information was the German Peace Committee leaders with whom they had 
been having so many problems.89 It was not until later that night that the marchers were 
able to get in contact with A.J. Muste who advised them that the situation was very 
dangerous and to not try and walk from East to West Berlin. Muste asked them to stay 
where they were and that he would try to reach them the next day.90 
 That same night a representative from the East German Ministry of the Interior 
arrived to meet with Bradford Lyttle. He outlined the situation in Berlin and said that 
under no circumstances would the march be allowed to enter Berlin. Furthermore, the 
government would send buses the following morning that would take them to Stalinstadt 
on the East German-Polish border where the marchers would cross into Poland and 
continue the walk for peace. After talking with the team, Lyttle informed the government 
representative that they rejected the East German government’s proposal and offered to 
walk around Berlin instead of entering West Berlin through the Brandenburg Gate.91 The 
representative from the East German Ministry of the Interior flatly refused to negotiate 
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and informed the marchers that buses would arrive in the morning to take them to the 
Polish border. When the buses arrived the marchers refused to board them and once 
again their limp bodies were carried into the waiting vehicles as they practiced 
nonviolent noncooperation. Because they would not comply, the East Germans decided 
to deport the marchers back to West Germany instead of taking them to Stalinstadt near 
the Polish border.92 
 At the time it seemed that the march was over. They did not know if the Polish 
government would allow them to enter the country to continue the walk and, based on 
the response of the East German authorities, the marchers feared that their goal of 
reaching Moscow was in jeopardy.93 The West German activists on the march felt that 
the Americans had pushed the East German authorities into an impossible situation.94 
West German activist Andreas Buro spoke with the team and got the impression that 
“…the group did not understand the really difficult and explosive situation in Berlin and 
the DDR.”95 Furthermore, because of this lack of understanding, the group’s perception 
of the East German authorities, and their treatment of the marchers, was inaccurate. 
Helga Tempel reported, “It seemed to him [Buro] as if the group understood the 
behavior of the officials from the [East German] Peace Council and the police as a 
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special oppression against the March itself, and not as an outcome of the really new and 
unforeseeable situation.”96 
The inability to fully understand the situation was due in part to the fact that the 
American marchers came from a different political reality.97 Germans, from both the 
FRG and the DDR, recognized more fully the gravity of the situation because they, to 
varying degrees, lived in a state of constant fear of war. The Germans thoroughly 
understood that they lived on the frontlines of the next war and that Berlin was the 
flashpoint. This belief was even more pronounced for German activists who “imagined 
the Cold War arms race as a constant pre-war situation.”98 This belief, coupled with their 
personal experiences and memories of the Second World War, something the American 
activists lacked, dictated the German response to the situation that Sunday. 
The West German organizing committee felt very strongly that marchers had 
been “too inflexible” and that this was because of a lack of preparation. The West 
German committee “often got the impression that their knowledge of the Eastern 
countries and their understanding of their way to live and to act was too small to react 
adequately to the political possibilities without obscuring the idea of the march or 
jeopardizing to complete [sic] the March to Moscow.”99 Unlike many of the activists on 
95 Letter to Hugh Brock from Helga Stolle August 16, 1961, HIS, TEM 500, 03. 
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the peace walk, each of the West German team members had experience in peace work 
and had been specifically trained in preparation for this march. The Americans, however, 
did not seem to be prepared to deal with potential issues that could, and often did, arise 
on the march. The West German committee reported:  
The team members were not all experienced in peace work as they were said 
to be. Most Americans and some Europeans had not been trained or briefed 
by their National Committees, so they came without any certain expectations 
while those trained had learned to demand a certain behavior from 
themselves and therefore had certain ideas about the way the group and 
individuals should act, what knowledge they ought to have, and how 
decisions should be found. In fact there was a serious lack of willingness to 
learn about […] the special conditions of the foreign countries and to act 
according to these conditions.100 
Furthermore, the committee wrote that in some cases the marchers chose not to utilize 
the experience of the West German activists: “Those who were experienced in the march 
were not willing to listen to the opinion of the new comers, who often knew the situation 
in their own country better than the veteran walkers.”101 The combination of inadequate 
training and a willingness to defy the authorities when they believed the integrity of the 
march was at risk could, at times, end up putting the whole project in jeopardy. In short, 
the West Germans believed that while the group was in the DDR they “demanded too 
much from the officials, overestimated their own power and meaning and 
underestimate[d] the difficult situation of the authorities in a communist totalitarian 
state.”102 
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 After several days of negotiation the marchers secured visas to enter Poland and 
continue the walk for peace.103 The team had learned their lesson and decided to be more 
compliant with the authorities for the rest of the march.104 They would not practice civil 
disobedience for the rest of the walk but would always work to resolve any issues with 
nonviolence and reasonable discussion. After reflection the team realized that civil 
disobedience simply did not work in the East because there was no audience for the act 
and, instead of imprisonment for their actions, they were simply deported out of the 
country.105 Furthermore, direct-action protest tactics such as civil disobedience were 
concepts that worked in Western democracies but had limited cogency in dictatorships. 
As it turned out the marchers did not encounter the same problems in Poland and the 
Soviet Union as they had in France, the FRG, or the DDR. The Soviets, not wanting to 
seem hostile to the international peace movement, welcomed the marchers to campaign 
in the Soviet Union and influenced Poland to do the same.106 
 The members of the American-European March for Peace were able to achieve 
their goal and enter the Soviet Union in late September, 1961. During their march across 
the Soviet Union they were met with friendly curiosity from the local peasants and had a 
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number of opportunities to talk with the people about peace and nuclear disarmament.107 
After 5,000 miles, seven countries, and ten months of walking, the march reached 
Moscow October 3, 1961. In Moscow they handed out thousands of leaflets and spoke to 
large crowds every night. They were shuttled around by Soviet officials the entire five 
days they were there but for the most part they were allowed to speak about their cause 
without restriction.108 They found the Russian people to be very welcoming and quite 
curious about their message.109 
 At the same time the march proved to many West German activists that 
transnational cooperation was possible and could be a very effective way of promoting a 
message. This was the first time that many of them had interacted with American peace 
activists on a personal level and after walking and doing peace work together for nearly 
five months across four countries they believed that they had achieved something great 
and had raised the bar for international cooperation. While they did not always agree 
with the methods and tactics of the American activists, the West Germans could not 
deny the efficacy of nonviolent direct action and were particularly impressed with the 
civil disobedience tactics employed by the Americans. Helga Tempel was particularly 
influenced by the Americans’ flexibility, especially after they had passed through the 
Iron Curtain, “Their willingness to adapt to the changing situation in the East was 
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impressive.”110 Furthermore, Andreas Buro, one of the West German organizers, felt, 
somewhat paradoxically, that the Americans’ lack of political awareness was actually 
somewhat of a strength because it helped them focus on a common goal; no atomic 
weapons regardless of existing political factors.111 
The efforts by the walk organizers to create a common discourse on peace and 
nuclear disarmament were fraught with difficulties. Most of these difficulties stemmed 
from the multitude of national and regional perspectives the marchers brought with 
them. The peace walk also highlighted an important function of a transnational social 
space: the ability to transfer ideas. Up to this point neither the conscientious objection 
groups nor the Easter March movement had used civil disobedience as a protest tactic. 
The primary methods of protest employed by these activists were organized vigils, such 
as the protest vigil against atomic weapons Mahnwache in 1958 organized by the Action 
Group for Nonviolence under the leadership of Helga and Konrad Tempel, leafleting 
campaigns, such as the Aktion 4/3 campaign by the VK to raise awareness about the 
constitutional right to conscientiously object to military service, and protest marches, 
best exemplified by the Easter March events of 1960 and 1961 against nuclear weapons. 
In every case the protest organizations worked within the law and were careful to 
comply with local authorities. This was important to the conscientious objection 
organizations and the Easter March movement because they did not want to be branded 
as lawless hooligans and lose their potential for influence in the public sphere. 
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Nonviolence was always a part of their protest culture but civil disobedience, possibly 
because they had not yet seen it employed, was not a common tactic used by the West 
German peace movement. 
The ideas of direct action through nonviolent civil disobedience that were put to 
use during the San Francisco to Moscow Walk for Peace had a strong effect on the West 
German peace activists.112 In fact, the Executive Committee of the VK, including Helga 
and Konrad Tempel and Wilhelm Keller, met in Hamburg September 10, 1961 and 
decided to set up an initiative committee to attempt to found a German Komitee der 
100.113 This group was based on the British “Committee of 100” that was organized in 
1960 by the famous British pacifist Bertrand Russell and other antiwar activists. The 
organization would be dedicated to the use of mass nonviolent resistance and civil 
disobedience and had worked with the West German peace activists to coordinate 
events. The goal was to found a West German organization that was interested in 
direct-action and could explore the possibility of employing nonviolent civil 
disobedience.114 At the demonstrations in Bonn and Dortmund-Brackel during the San 
Francisco to Moscow Walk for Peace the West German activists saw first hand how 
powerful nonviolent civil disobedience could be. Furthermore, they recognized that 
when civil disobedience was performed in a spirit of nonviolence it was not identified as 
112 Letter from Christopher Farley to Helga Stolle, October 8, 196, HIS, TEM 100, 01. 
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dangerous lawlessness but rather as a peaceful way to bring attention to their message 
against war and nuclear weapons. It could help them break through the rigid boundaries 
of politics and allow the West German activists to influence policy making from outside 
the traditional realm of political parties. 
Activists can never really escape the political realities of their respective 
countries. However, these struggles illustrate the protest culture of the West German 
peace movement and offer a window into the unique character and immediate concerns 
of the movement. Ultimately, the march highlights the development of the peace 
movement in West Germany, from the early opposition to rearmament and conscription 
in the mid-1950s to the major national and transnational protests against nuclear 
weapons and war in the 1960s, and illustrates how the movement became a force in 
West German society.  
This march also confirmed for the West German activists the importance of 
careful planning and thorough training. Even though the march was not terminated just 
outside of East Berlin, it very well could have been and that was the kind of risk the 
West Germans did not want to take. Most importantly the San Francisco to Moscow 
Walk for Peace was an excellent opportunity for the West German activists to establish 
and develop personal and institutional connections like never before. Those who 
participated in the organizing and coordinating efforts of the march gained valuable 
experience in transnational cooperation that would pay dividends for the West German 
peace movement. The five West German activists who walked from the West 
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German-French border in Aachen all the way to Moscow learned a great deal about their 
neighbors to the East and discovered first hand that peace was a genuine concern for 
those living behind the Iron Curtain. After returning to West Germany, these activists, 
when confronted by cynics telling them to go preach peace and disarmament to the 
Soviets, could say with confidence “We have gone to the Soviet Union and we protested 
for peace and disarmament in front of the Kremlin!” 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
In December of 1966, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats formed 
a Grand Coalition under the leadership of Kurt Georg Kiesinger. With ninety-five 
percent of the Bundestag under the control of the Grand Coalition, the APO in West 
Germany, joined by the growing anti-authoritarian student movement, was galvanized. 
Over the next few years, the APO and the student movement rocked West German 
society and defiantly challenged the government in Bonn. Through mass demonstrations, 
civil disobedience actions, and university takeovers, the APO and student movement 
initiated a caesura in West German political discourse that reverberated for decades.1 
The creation of the Grand Coalition with the CDU/CSU-SPD alliance in 1966 
marks the endpoint of this dissertation. The concurrent rise of the APO and the shooting 
of Benno Ohnesorg just a few months later radicalized the student movement which 
changed the character of protest in West Germany. Furthermore increased American 
involvement in Southeast Asia triggered a massive wave of protest in West Germany 
that in some ways superseded nearly all other aspects of the peace movement. While the 
Easter Marches became even larger in the late 1960s, the rise of the student movement 
changed it significantly and ultimately caused its demise. The VK and IdK also changed 
1 Burns and van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 99-101. 
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in the latter half of the 1960s and, frankly, while they continued to exert influence they 
were increasingly sidelined by the emerging student movement.2  
The West German peace movement, through the activities of the antinuclear 
movement and the conscientious objection movement, continued to coalesce in the early 
1960s. In 1961, the Easter Marches opened regional offices all over West Germany.3 
The next few years the Easter Marches grew significantly with 50,000 participants in 
1962, 80,000 in 1963, and by 1964, 100,000 people participated in marches all across the 
Federal Republic.4 In nearly every major city in West Germany in 1964, the Easter 
Marches held a culminating march rally.5 By the late 1960s, the Easter Marches were 
one of the largest, mass participatory movements in West Germany.6  
All this would not have been possible were it not for the actions of key 
individuals in the conscientious objection movement. Their work in the late 1950s, 
2 During this period of protest, there was an enormous increase in conscientious objectors. In 1966, there 
were 4,431 applications for conscientious objector status. This number increased to 5,963 in 1967 and in 
1968 11,952 potential conscripts applied for conscientious objector status. By 1971 this number had grown 
even more as 27,657 young men chose not to serve in the Bundeswehr. This marked increase in 
conscientious objectors is indicative of the social changes going on in the late 1960s.  It was clear that 
draft age men in the Federal Republic were becoming increasingly more likely to choose conscientious 
objection.  In 1972, of the 192,509 conscripts called up 17.5 percent conscientiously objected to military 
service; a remarkable 171.4 percent increase in percentage since 1957. This dramatic shift clearly signified 
a change in the social perception of military service and conscientious objection in the Federal Republic as 
well as the powerful, negative influence of the Vietnam War. See Federal Republic of Germany, White 
Paper 1973/1974, 59, 112. 
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facilitated by the IdK and VK and inspired by the WRI and the transnational social space 
it fostered, gave them the practical and theoretical training in forming protest movements 
and the confidence that their actions would have an effect on West German society. The 
success of the Easter Marches validated years of hard work and sacrifice for this cohort 
of activists, but as the campaign grew and adapted to the changing social climate of the 
mid- to late-1960s they increasingly found themselves pushed to the margins as a new 
generation of activists took control of the movement. 
Throughout the early 1960s, the movement attracted an increasing number of 
German youth who identified with the Easter March’s message of nuclear disarmament. 
The success of the Easter March movement in capturing the interest of the West German 
public dramatically changed the face of the peace movement. The Easter Marches 
further embodied the celebratory nature that characterized the protest movements of the 
late-1960s with young people in bright colors, children riding bikes along the march 
column, people with balloons and small musical instruments, whole music bands at the 
head of the march or even in a horse-drawn wagon, and singing popular protest songs 
such as “The H-Bomb’s Thunder,” “Down by the Riverside,” and “Geh Mit Uns (Go 
with us)” sang to the tune of the well-known spiritual “Bye and Bye.”7 
Following the 1962 Easter March, the leadership added a subtitle to the name of 
the campaign to reflect the broadening of the movement’s focus. The subtitle 
“Kampagne für Abrüstung” (Campaign for Disarmament) more accurately described the 
7 “Bericht von einer Kampagne für Abrüstung, Ostermarsch 1962,” Pläne, October, 1962, HIS, TEM 
300,04. 
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objective (Zielsetzung) of the campaign that, by 1962, included a sharper political 
critique of nuclear weapons policy in the Federal Republic.8 The Easter March expanded 
its activities to include events that marked a broader recognition of state sponsored 
violence with dates of commemoration outside of the Easter holiday. Many of these 
events, such as Hiroshima Day on August 6 and Anti-War Day on September 1, were 
already part of the CO movement’s protest agenda.9 
The Easter Marches soon overtook the CO organizations in terms of popularity 
and importance to the West German peace movement. The nuclear armaments issue was 
still being discussed in the Bundestag and there was a possibility of having a voice in 
these discussions. After 1956, conscription was part of West German law and the CO 
movement could only serve to support COs and work to prevent the outbreak of war. 
The Easter Marches, on the other hand, represented an outlet for dissent and actually had 
a chance to affect government defense policy. For Andreas Buro, the IdK became less 
important after 1960 as he focused more on the Easter Marches.10 To Buro, and many in 
his cohort of CO activists, the VK and IdK still served a purpose in their support of COs 
and overall work for disarmament and peace but the Easter Marches provided a forum 
for a much broader segment of the population. Werner Böwing reflected, “The Easter 
8 Flyer, “Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner Kampagne für Abrüstung, Grundsätze,” HIS, TEM 300,02; 
Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, 220. 
9 “Zwischen Atomkrieg und Gewaltlosigkeit,” Freiburger Zeitung, August 13, 1959. 
10 Interview with Andreas Buro, Grävenwiesbach, Germany, July 16, 2013. 
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March was a more inclusive organization” that engaged with the issue of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear disarmament more effectively.11 
The CO movement continued its work supporting COs and raising awareness for 
conscientious objection but, despite becoming overshadowed by the Easter Marches, 
never ceased its engagement with peace protest and international anti-war campaigns. As 
an indication of the effect of the movement’s work, along with the escalation of the war 
in Vietnam, conscientious objection became more accepted in West German society. 
Into the latter half of the 1960s, young men in West Germany increasingly claimed 
conscientious objection status. In 1966 there were 4,431 applications for conscientious 
objector status. This number increased to 5,963 in 1967 and in 1968 11,952 potential 
conscripts applied for conscientious objector status.12 This is a significant increase over 
the first few years of conscription. In 1957, only 328 (0.3 percent) of the 100,000 men 
mustered for the first draft in April 1957 (those inspected by the draft boards but not 
actually drafted) exercised the right of conscientious objection.13  
In the early 1960s, the West German government proposed legislation known as 
the Notstandsgesetze (Emergency Laws) that would significantly curtain personal 
freedoms in the case of a national emergency and potentially require citizens to aid in the 
defense of the country regardless of their personal convictions. The Allied Powers still 
maintained control over emergency powers in crisis situations and the West German 
11 Interview with Werner Böwing, Solingen, Germany, July 17, 2013. 
12 Federal Republic of Germany, White Paper 1973/1974, 59. 
13 Federal Republic of Germany, White Paper 1970, 265. 
244 
government wanted to assume these powers and settle the final issue of national 
sovereignty.14 This elicited a strong backlash from many West Germans who saw 
similarities with the emergency laws of the Weimar period that Hitler used to 
consolidate power.15 Klaus Vack, the General Secretary of the VK, stated with concern 
that the proposed West German laws “…differ from the Emergency Laws of other 
Western countries in that they aim at a complete militarization of the population and are 
strongly reminiscent of the Emergency Laws of the Weimar Constitution and the so-
called Authorization Laws of the Hitler era.” He went on to draw a direct line from 
Imperial Germany to the Federal Republic, “Sad as it is, it has to be stated that, starting 
from the Kaiser’s law, via Hitler’s decrees, and arriving at the present drafts, we witness 
an obvious decline of democracy.”16 
The conscientious objection movement adamantly rejected the proposed laws and 
the issue became a concern on the international level. The WRI Chairman, Harold Bing, 
characterized the proposed laws as a direct threat to democracy in the Federal Republic 
stating the change to the Basic Law “will give the government greatly increased powers 
of almost dictatorial character and a series of emergency laws which, when brought into 
operation, would establish a totalitarian regime.”17 The VK viewed the laws as “a 
14 Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 87. 
15 For more on the Emergency Laws and the public resistance they encountered, see Michael Schneider, 
Demokratie in Gefahr: Der Konflikt um die Notstandsgesetze, Sozialdemokratie, Gewerkschaften und 
intellektueller Protest (1958-1968) (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1986). 
16 “Emergency Laws, A Bill Before The Parliament of the Federal German Republic,” WRI, Archives of 
the War Resisters’ International, 1921-74, microfiche (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1977). 
17 Ibid. 
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creeping preparation for war,” and the IdK believed the rights of civilians would be 
completely voided since through the laws “the whole nation would be prepared for total 
mobilization for total war and the last basic constitutional right would be jettisoned.”18 
The IdK went on to declare, “The defense of democracy and freedom must not be 
allowed to lead to the surrender of this very democracy and freedom.”19 Martin 
Niemöller summed up the opinion of many when he stated “My basic objection to an 
emergency legislation is that I consider democracy to be the only possibility for a 
German future and I see this democracy on which our future depends extremely 
endangered.”20 
The VK and IdK mobilized their membership and actively protested against the 
proposed laws. The WRI, extremely concerned about the potential threat the Emergency 
Laws posed, encouraged chapters around the world to support their German friends. One 
campaign addressed a proposed provision of the laws that would allow the government 
to commandeer civilian vehicles for military use. The VK created signs and bumper 
stickers that defiantly stated, “My Car Stays Civilian!”21 
The Easter March campaign also focused their efforts on the Emergency Laws. 
While not directly related to nuclear armaments, for the Easter March movement the 
18 “Emergency Laws, A Bill Before The Parliament of the Federal German Republic,” WRI, Archives of 
the War Resisters’ International, 1921-74, microfiche (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1977). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “War Resisters’ International, News from sections,” February, 1962, Horst Maurer Collection, IfZM, 
ED 718/16. 
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Emergency Laws represented a war preparation mentality on the part of the government 
and an expansion of militarism in West German society. The Emergency Laws became 
such an issue for the Easter March campaign that it was made a central element of the 
protest platform beginning with the 1965 March.22 Their protest rhetoric reflected this 
broader protest agenda and, along with standard Easter March slogans such as “Our No 
to the Bomb is a Yes for Democracy,” the 1966 Easter March featured many slogans 
directed at the Emergency Laws including: “Instead of Emergency Laws – Détente and 
Disarmament,” “Emergency threatened because of Emergency Laws,” and “Don’t 
change the Basic Law, change Policy.”23 Many activists saw the Emergency Laws as 
evidence of the increasing militarization of society and a direct threat to West German 
democracy. Some marchers joined with intellectuals and academics to create a separate 
group they called the “Committee ‘State of Emergency of Democracy’” in an effort to 
counter the Emergency Laws head on.24 
The IdK and VK cooperated on several protest efforts despite their continued 
existence, at their own wish, as separate organizations. As the Vietnam War escalated, 
the CO movement initiated information campaigns and protest actions that targeted 
American installations in West Germany and the complaisance they saw in the 
government towards American foreign policy. One information campaign in 1966 
directly targeted American soldiers. VK and IdK members passed out pamphlets to 
22 Informationen zur Abrüstung, 19 (1964), 73, HIS, TEM 400,01. 
23 “Arbeitsmappe 1966,” Kampange für Abrüstung – Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, Zentraler 
Ausschuss, HIS, TEM 400,03. 
24 Nehring, Politics of Security, 252. 
247 
soldiers at American bases titled “To American Servicemen in Europe” with a drawing 
of a Vietnamese mother and child fleeing a cloud of bombs and missiles raining from the 
sky.25 The IdK and VK, with a fairly astute understanding of how the war was being 
fought, told the soldiers, “If you are sent to Vietnam, you will be part of a system which 
destroys whole villages of men, women and children, burning them with napalm and 
forcing them to survive in refugee camps.”26 The CO groups acknowledged that the 
soldiers were in a difficult position, “Talk is easy, but you are the one in the tough spot,” 
but let them know that many of the German activists were COs themselves. The leaflet 
encouraged the American soldiers to do something about the conflict in Vietnam: write 
their superiors about their objection to the war, protest in the barracks, apply for 
conscientious objector status, or simply go AWOL. The German activists reminded the 
American soldiers that the U.S. Government held individual soldiers responsible for 
their actions at the Nuremburg trials and in an interesting twist claimed that this 
protected soldiers who resisted the war.27 
The Easter Marches also incorporated resistance to the Vietnam War in its 
protest agenda by the mid-1960s. As with the protest against the Emergency Laws, 
protest against the war in Vietnam was another addition to the ever-increasing Easter 
March protest agenda. American military bases and the Bundeswehr’s participation in 
NATO exercises were, for many West Germans, clear signs of Bonn’s support, or at 
25 “To American servicemen in Europe,” Archives of the War Resisters’ International, 1921-74, 
microfiche (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1977). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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least acquiescence, of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In a 1965 flyer that targeted 
Germans, the Easter Marches printed a full-page photo of a Vietnamese prisoner being 
threatened with a knife with the title “Politicians in Bonn are for cruelty in Vietnam.”28 
The Easter March flyer highlighted the increasing violence and destruction in Vietnam 
and decried the “dirty war” America was waging with napalm and gas. The flyer called 
on Germans to take action against the atrocities and join the 1965 Easter March, “What 
is happening today in Vietnam, tomorrow may be practiced in Germany!”29 Approved 
Easter March slogans, now numbering in the dozens, called for an end to the war and 
declared “Don’t Bomb! Negotiate with the Vietcong!” and “No Support for US-Policy in 
Vietnam.”30 One slogan tied the Vietnam War back to the principle issue for the Easter 
March campaign asking, “Does the Third World War begin in Vietnam?” Ultimately, the 
conflict created the potential for the use of nuclear weapons and the deployment of 
napalm and massive bombing campaign only strengthened this view with Easter March 
activists. The inclusion of the war in Vietnam in the protest agenda represented a 
divergence from the original goal of nuclear disarmament but not a complete 
abandonment. 
In the mid-1960s, as the Easter March began to incorporate other issues such as 
resistance to the proposed Emergency Laws and American involvement in Vietnam, the 
campaign changed significantly from its founding in 1960. By the late-1960s the Easter 
28 “Bonner Politiker für Härte in Vietnam,” HIS, TEM 400,01. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Arbeitsmappe 1966,” Kampange für Abrüstung – Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, Zentraler 
Ausschuss, HIS, TEM 400,03. 
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Marches were a major force in West German society and had laid the foundation for the 
emerging student movements. However, its antinuclear message was diluted as a number 
of issues were added to the platform and the creation of the Grand Coalition drove the 
campaign to address more political concerns.31 Konrad Tempel later reflected that the 
initial strength of the Easter Marches came from its uncomplicated stance on nuclear 
disarmament, “It started with a very simple, clear message, no atomic weapons east or 
west. So in the beginning it was very easy to bring people in who agreed with the 
message. The more complicated the message became the more difficult it was to keep 
the group focused.” 32 The changes in the campaign caused many of the original 
founders to leave the Easter March and, for some, depart protest activism altogether. 
Tempel stepped down as speaker of the Easter Marches in 1964 citing his personal belief 
that a person should not occupy a leadership position for more than three years. Andreas 
Buro took over as speaker and led the campaign into the tumultuous years of the late 
1960s.33 When the Emergency Laws were adopted in 1968 and the student movement 
became increasingly violent, the Easter Marches abruptly disintegrated.34 
The VK experienced a similar evolution during the mid- to late-1960s. As the 
1968 generation took a larger role in the organization and made up an increasing larger 
portion of the membership, the character of the VK changed to reflect the political 
31 Burns and van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 94. 
32 Interview with Konrad and Helga Tempel, Ahrensberg, Germany, July 24, 2013. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Burns and van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 96. 
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currents and rising student protests. Werner Böwing believed the new VK committee 
was unpredictable and chaotic politically. He left the position of Chairman as younger 
members pushed for a broader protest platform and Böwing felt the new members, many 
were also part of the Socialist German Student Union (Sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studentenbund or SDS), were unproductive and no longer focused on conscientious 
objection.35 The IdK saw a similar change but it was not as extreme because the older 
generation pacifists maintained a great deal of control over the character and leadership 
of the organization. Theodor Michaltschef continued to write and serve in a leadership 
role until his death in 1966.36 Both CO organizations survived 1968 intact and eventually 
merged with the German Peace Society in the 1970s, finally accomplishing the merger 
that they first attempted in 1958. 
 The Easter March and CO movement were responsible for many of the changes 
that occurred within their organizations in the latter half of the 1960s. The key activists 
that helped transform the CO movement and establish the Easter Marches valued 
individual action and personal responsibility. They worked to create the space in West 
German society where a person could voice political opinion with a real chance of being 
heard. The efforts of Helga and Konrad Tempel, Klaus Vack, Andreas Buro, Werner 
Böwing, and others of their cohort carved out a position in the undefined space between 
the political and social spheres that allowed for the emergence and development of 
extra-parliamentary opposition. It should come as no surprise that their movements 
                                                 
35 Interview with Werner Böwing, Solingen, Germany, July 17, 2013. 
36 Michaltscheff, 20 Jahre Friedensrundschau. 
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evolved as more individuals, particularly youth, joined and brought with them their own 
closely held convictions and political beliefs. They set out to change West German 
society and succeeded, although perhaps not exactly as they initially envisioned. 
This dissertation, ultimately, studies the recivilizing process in West Germany by 
examining the early protest movements and positioning them in history of how Germany 
became a civilized society after the Second World War. This dissertation focuses on the 
point where the spheres of politics and society intersect and explains how this 
intersection allows for a better understanding of the development of West German 
society. By studying the conscientious objection movement and a cohort of key activists 
during the latter half of the 1950s and early 1960s this dissertation illustrates how West 
Germans navigated the undefined extra-parliamentary space and learned to participate in 
the new democracy. Through their actions, which were driven by strongly held 
convictions and sense of morality, these individuals helped create a place in their society 
that allowed for the peaceful but resolute expression of political opinion.  
This dissertation investigates the conscientious objection movement as a bridge 
between the people who protested in the 1950s, the activist cohort that emerged in the 
early 1960s, and the student movements of the late 1960s. Furthermore, it challenges the 
traditional understanding of the conscientious objection movement in West Germany. 
This dissertation serves as the starting point for future study on the issue of conscription 
and society in the Federal Republic. It will also help to uncover the beginnings of 
extra-parliamentary protest in West Germany by exploring the continuities between the 
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postwar generation of protesters and the 1968-generation and investigating the 
organizational legacy of some of the first protest groups in the Federal Republic. 
The conflict between the generations is a defining aspect of the protest 
movements of the 1960s, however little is made of the connections between them. I 
propose that the anti-conscription and conscientious objection organizations that began 
in the 1950s and continued through the 1960s are some of the connections. Many of the 
people involved in the founding of the IdK and VK participated in the rearmament 
protests in the mid- to late-1950s when the Adenauer government created the 
Bundeswehr and subsequently instituted conscription. This cohort of activists developed 
their protest repertoire, forged their transnational networks, and established their 
movements in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As the Easter March campaign and the CO 
movement matured in the 1960s, a new generation of activists learned how to protest and 
developed their own protest culture.  
At the center of this narrative are the CO groups that were the training ground for 
this important group of activists. I argue that although these CO groups primarily 
focused on conscientious objection, they also promoted a complex set of issues 
regarding political legitimacy, the role of the postwar state, and challenged the right of 
an older generation over the use of their bodies. The CO movement helped establish the 
postwar German peace movement and propelled it into the 1960s. A major contribution 
that the CO movement made to the development of the peace movement in West 
Germany was the initiation of the antinuclear movement in the late l950s and best 
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exemplified in the Easter March campaign. The CO movement was never particularly 
effective as a one-note movement, but it achieved lasting influence because it offered a 
platform for a larger critique of the Federal Republic of Germany and because it helped 
to incubate a generation of activists who became the APO. The CO movement worked 
best when it stopped being a distinct movement and became part of the landscape of 
social upheaval in the 1960s. 
A key element to the success of this activist cohort was the personal and 
organizational relationships developed with activists outside of the Federal Republic. I 
argue that it was through the international connections and organizational development 
of the IdK and VK, along with the knowledge gained from several years of active 
protest, that the Easter Marches were able to emerge and grow into one of the most 
powerful protest movements in Germany. By focusing on the IdK and VK in the late 
1950s and early 1960s my dissertation will provide an essential component to the 
pre-history of 1968 that will help explain how a powerful protest movement like the 
Easter Marches came into existence.   
The core of activists that emerged from the CO movement created the cultural, 
intellectual, and organizational space for the APO to develop and grow into a powerful 
force in the Federal Republic of Germany. The protest culture they developed – their 
protest tactics and protest philosophy – along with their transnational networks and 
protest events helped lay the foundation for widespread, mass participatory protest 
movements that shook the foundation of West German society and helped it develop into 
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a more liberal democracy. In the midst of this process, this activist cohort assisted the 
advancement of civil society in Germany and all the while stayed civil, in word and 
deed.   
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